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INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SOME IMPACTS 
OF THE RECENT ECONOMIC CRISIS ON INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION
Mónica Verea*
Elaine Levine**
The global financial/economic crisis that began in 2008, the worst since the Great 
Depression, had an important effect in people’s movement around the world. The reces-
sion dampened the movement of economic migrants to the major immigrant-receiv-
ing countries. It has been said that some emerging economies that are continuing 
to grow and doing better than most of the developed world are re-attracting their 
expatriates and, in some cases, even luring new highly-skilled citizens of the U.S. and 
Europe. Academics and college-educated engineers from Brazil to China to Poland 
have long set off for the world’s more developed nations for better opportunities, 
sometimes in their own fields, often behind steering wheels or in fast-food or res-
taurant kitchens. Indeed, over time, about 75 percent of international migrants 
typically moved to a country with a higher level of human development than their 
country of origin, according to the United Nations Development Fund (Miller, Ford, 
and Marquand 2012). But now that tide is turning: immigrants no longer always see 
developed countries as a better place to be. This U-turn is a “brain gain” for devel-
oping countries. There is no doubt that the 2008 financial crisis has caused many 
to question whether the developed world is still the only land of opportunity worth 
migrating to (Miller, Ford, and Marquand 2012).
In terms of public policy, this severe economic crisis has exacerbated domestic 
pressures for implementing restrictions in immigration policies. In Russia, for exam-
ple, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin recently enacted a policy intending to reduce 
the number of foreign workers in the country, while at the same time encouraging a 
youth section of his Unified Russia party to engage in a campaign to “reclaim jobs for 
Russians that are occupied by foreign migrant workers” (Globalization 101 2013). 
In Australia, where violence against foreigners, such as Indians, has become a prob-
lem in recent years, the government has reduced its intake of migrants to mitigate 
the effects that the financial crisis is expected to have on ethnic relations in an in -
creasingly competitive job market. Countries like Japan and Spain have tried an 
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alternative approach for lessening the political and financial burden immigrants 
represent by offering them cash incentives to return home.
Unfortunately, the policy response from national governments has been pre-
cisely the opposite of recommendations made by the International Organization for 
Migration cautioning against limiting migration. For example, in Russia, Vladimir 
Putin called for quotas on permits for work visas to be temporarily cut in half 
(Schwirtz 2009). Many other governments, such as the UK and Germany, have fol-
lowed suit, stepping up deportations and implementing measures that make it dif-
ficult for migrants to enter the country. Jean-Leonard Touadi, an Italian member 
of Parliament, originally of Congolese descent, was quoted in the New York Times as 
saying, “You can’t say all Italians are racist, but it would also be dangerous to under-
estimate what’s happening. . . . Faced with social and economic crisis, it’s easy to 
push rage and frustration on the foreigner. It shouldn’t make this a war between 
poor Italians and poor immigrants” (Donadio 2008). 
Sending countries have had an important impact indirectly, since migrants who 
have returned voluntarily or been deported are looking for jobs in a labor market neg-
atively affected by the economic crisis. In some countries, this situation has led to 
economic and social instability, because they do not have the capacity to absorb all the 
returnees easily. One of the most disastrous impacts has been the sharp decline in 
remittances, which constitute an important source of income for these out-migration 
countries. Some of them rely heavily on money sent home from compatriots working 
abroad to increase the nation’s gdp and promote economic development. Specifically, 
some communities with strong emigration traditions are the most affected, since 
remittances are the major source of income for them and the families living there.
 Currently the biggest concentration of immigrants is in Europe, followed by 
Asia. As a country, the United States is home to one-fifth of world’s permanent, tem-
porary, humanitarian, or unauthorized immigrants. The United Nations estimates 
there are roughly 20 million to 30 million undocumented migrants worldwide, 
comprising 10 to 15 percent of the world’s immigrants. An estimated 11 million unau-
thorized immigrants live in the U.S. alone, according to their official data. President 
Obama, who in 2008 said he would push for a law to grant many of these immigrants 
legal access to jobs in the United States, instead deported a record number of un -
documented working immigrants who left their relatives in the U.S.1 Enforcement 
efforts to remove unauthorized migrants are up in many countries. Italy and France 
have increased enforcement measures (including controversial deportations from 
France of Roma immigrants back to Eastern Europe (Mittelstadt 2010).
1  From 2008 to 2011, for example, the Obama administration deported approximately one million un-
documented migrants to their places of origin, many more than under the Bush administration. Most 
of the detentions took place in work places, not while crossing the border. This has coincided with the 
economic recession (dHs 2010).
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An economic crisis usually affects immigrants more than the native population, 
due to their economic and social vulnerability. In most immigrant-receiving na -
tions, immigrants’ economic vulnerability is a product of their occupational niches, 
characterized by informality and/or seasonal fluctuation. It is important to men-
tion that undocumented workers represent the flows most closely linked to 
economic fluctuations and therefore are the ones most likely to be affected in poor 
economic times. China has the world’s largest Diaspora, but it has emerged as a 
global power —along with the other so-called briC nations: Brazil, Russia, and 
India. Its government has made a new push to woo back the millions of citizens, 
mainly highly skilled professionals and businesspersons, who had left the country 
over the past 30 years. The array of financial and other incentives to tempt them 
home is unmatched anywhere else in the world and is proving to be the icing on 
the cake of economic growth and opportunity that Chinese expatriates are rushing 
home to devour. The number of people coming home each year rather than staying on 
to work in their host countries has risen more than 10-fold since the beginning of 
the century. “What we are seeing is what appears to be European skilled migration 
to developing countries, like briC countries,” says Ryszard Cholewinski, a special-
ist on migration policy at the International Labor Organization. “Given the eco-
nomic crisis in Europe,” he says, especially for young people in southern Europe, 
“opportunity for them now exists in the developing world” (Miller, Ford, and 
Marquand 2012).
During the last four years, declining gdp in most developed countries had 
already led to a decreased demand for labor, mainly in overrepresented industries 
that have seen extensive job loss, which has impacted immigrants as well as 
nationals. Immigrant-receiving countries have registered job losses in areas such 
as construction, manufacturing, and services. If we add to this the fact that trade and 
foreign direct investment were not as dynamic as they used to be, many migrants 
working in the export sector lost their jobs and in some cases, have been forced to 
return home. For example, 10 million internal migrants from rural China have been 
put out of their jobs due to decreasing export demand worldwide (Castles and 
Miller 2009). The crisis has also caused cuts in the formal sector, often pushing peo-
ple into the informal work force where there is little social protection. Since public 
resources have been severely reduced, in recent years, institutions have been unable 
to provide services at the same level as before. Overall, recent analysis reflects the 
fact that migrants have been associated with vulnerable occupations, informal work, 
and public resource restrictions during the crisis (Emesphdnetwork 2012). A 
recent report reveals that the toll among migrant men has been particularly high as 
they are often concentrated in the sectors that experienced the most serious con-
tractions (notably construction and manufacturing), and immigrant youth (ages 
15-24) (Papademetriou et al. 2010). Unemployment among foreign-born youth 
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has reached 41 percent in Spain, 37 percent in Sweden, and 20 percent in 
Canada. By contrast, immigrant women have fared better than their male counter-
parts in almost all wealthy countries. The report also states that certain immigrant 
groups and minorities have lost the most ground economically during the reces-
sion: Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom, North African and 
Andean immigrants in Spain, and Latinos in the United States. Some migrant-
destination countries that historically have been countries of emigration, such as 
Ireland and Greece, may be reverting to earlier trends. Ireland re-emerged as a coun-
try of net emigration in 2009 for the first time since 1995, reporting the highest 
net outflows of both immigrants and natives in the European Union. Nearly a million 
people left Spain during 2011 due to the severe economic recession and unem-
ployment that reached 24.6 percent of the work force. According to figures from 
the Statistical Institute, in 2012, 420 150 people left Spain, 37 539 more than in the 
same period of 2011. Of this total, nearly 55 000 are Spanish (21.6 percent) and 
the rest foreigners (Este País 2012).
In general terms, migrants have faced worsening employment prospects in 
destination countries, often coupled with tightening entry regulations. With this 
situation, migrant workers have been forced to accept lower wages and endure 
poorer working conditions in order to try to keep their jobs. Others have tended to 
stay instead of returning home despite the lack of jobs and increasing discrimina-
tion, because the situation is even worse in their countries of origin. This has been 
the case more for temporary migrants than for permanent ones. Many potential 
migrants from developing countries have also been deterred from making the trip 
across borders. For example, emigration from Mexico to the U.S. decreased signif-
icantly during the last five years, particularly for the undocumented, dropping from 
a net difference of approximately 300 000 a year, between entries and exits (includ-
ing deportations), to being almost even.2
Low-skilled workers still represent the bulk of global migration flows. They 
are the ones most affected for several reasons: the great majority lack language 
skills, their educational level is not high, and they are concentrated in boom/bust 
sectors like construction. Irregular migrants are among the hardest hit and most vul-
nerable during crisis situations (Khan, Abimourched, and Ciobanu 2009).
2  The U.S. Border Patrol apprehended 340 000 foreigners just inside U.S. borders in FY2011, including 
96 percent apprehended on the Mexico-U.S. border. The number of Border Patrol apprehensions has 
been declining from 1.6 million in FY 2000. There were 21 400 Border Patrol agents at the beginning 
of 2012, of whom 86 percent were on the Mexico-U.S. border. Almost 2 million undocumented im-
migrants were deported between 2007 and 2011 (only 397 000 in 2011). Gradually, the priority shifted 
to immigrants with criminal records (55 percent in 2011) or who had been deported previously and 
returned. The detentions of undocumented foreigners have not stopped, though the number of immi-
grants who simply have no papers seems to be diminishing (Chardy 2012).
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Most European countries were hit by the economic crisis and saw declines in 
employment rates. Eurostat reported that 33.3 million foreign citizens lived in the 
EU-27 member states in 2011. The population of the EU-27 countries was 502 mil-
lion in 2011. Three-fourths of the foreigners in the EU were in five countries. 
The unemployment rate in the 17 euro zone nations was 11.2 percent in June 2012, 
meaning that almost 18 million workers were jobless. About 58 percent of non-EU 
foreigners aged 20 to 64 in EU member states were employed in 2011, compared 
with 69 percent of EU nationals in this age group. Europe has too many auto facto-
ries, and they are producing at less than 65 percent of capacity because of an insuf-
ficient demand for cars. Car sales in Europe were projected at about 12 million in 
2012, down from 15 million in 2007. 
Unfortunately, in the wake of the global economic crisis and labor market 
pressures, the debate over migration has gained momentum. The rise in anti-
immigrant sentiments, xenophobic prejudices, and discrimination is often exacer-
bated in times of economic crisis. Migrants, chosen as the scapegoats, are often 
seen as either the source of the economic malaise, stealing jobs from natives, or as 
unnecessary expenditures for the economy, in terms of the costs they represent in 
health, education, and other items. European anti-migrant sentiment must be 
viewed as part of a larger trend of xenophobic attitudes exacerbated by the global 
recession. Nevertheless, new tendencies have emerged among the new extreme 
right, who encourage intolerance and hate, contaminating parties and democratic 
institutions across Europe. Their spectacular electoral rise in Austria, Sweden, 
and Holland confirms it: the hard ultra-right Jobbik in Hungary, the Northern 
League in Italy, the bnp in Great Britain, or the Islamophobes in Switzerland, and 
the crisis involving groups of Roma from Romania and Bulgaria in France and Italy 
are some examples. These tendencies represent a setback for democratic parties’ 
historic achievements, especially the progress made toward universal human 
rights (Ibarra 2011). 
The media has also played an important a role in this cycle; as the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights asserts, “Xenophobic and racist attacks on 
migrants are often a response to a distorted perception, at times fomented by the 
media, of the scope of irregular migration and its consequences for the host soci-
eties” (United Nations 2009). Changing public attitudes, even in times of economic 
prosperity, is a slow and arduous process. Reversing the economic decline would go 
a long way toward reducing xenophobic sentiments; however, without a concerted 
effort to promote integration on a community level, it is tremendously unlikely that 
any long-term progress will be made toward fully accepting the contributions of 
migrant workers to the global economy (Globalization 101 2013)
Economic realities often outweigh political rhetoric; thus, an increased demand 
for labor may prevail, in practice, over anti-immigrant discourse. Existing immigration 
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laws may be implemented or interpreted more strictly or more leniently depending 
on the overall economic conditions and/or the general political climate, which is in 
turn influenced by the economy and vice versa. The immigration reform debate 
underway in the United States in spring 2013 provides an interesting example of 
the interactions and mutual influences —or interference— that can take place 
between economics and politics when immigration is discussed.
The various attempts to get immigration-reform legislation through the U.S. 
Congress between 2004 and 2007 seem to have been thwarted mainly because of 
partisan differences. Once the recession set in at the end of 2007, the stark reality 
of millions of unemployed was enough to deter any serious attempt to legislate on the 
issue. At the end of 2010, it looked as if the dream Act had some chances of getting 
passed, which turned out not to be the case. Simultaneously, various states, among 
which Arizona was the most emblematic, had taken matters into their own hands 
and passed punitive immigration laws at the state level.
In April 2013, despite the still uncomfortably high unemployment rate and 
the unusually low work force participation rate, a bipartisan group of eight senators 
(four Democrats and four Republicans) introduced the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013. If it had passed, this 
legislation would have eventually provided a path to citizenship for many of the 
approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants now residing in the U.S. 
Some opponents of the proposal have tried to justify their position on economic 
grounds. Roy Beck, chief executive of Numbers-U.S.A, a group that advocates 
lower immigration, was quoted in the Washington Post as arguing, “We’re in the 
fifth year of very high unemployment….We’re in a terrible situation for [U.S.] 
American workers. People at the lower levels have seen real wages decline. Given 
that backdrop, why would you grant people amnesty?” (Nakamura 2013). Never-
theless such concerns seem to have been trumped by the fact that Obama received 
slightly over 70 percent of the Latino vote in the 2012 elections. As a result some 
prominent Republicans, like Marco Rubio, have decided to moderate their positions 
on immigration reform and have urged their fellow party members to do likewise. 
Although the bill passed the Senate, as of the and of 2013, it had not even been 
brought to a vote in the House.
The 2008-2009 economic crisis has produced varied, yet in some ways similar, 
situations in many parts of the world in terms of changing policies and attitudes 
toward immigrant populations. This volume contains papers originally presented at 
the Metropolis International Steering Committee’s Academic Forum on “Impacts 
of the Recent Economic Crisis on International Migration,” held at Cisan-unam in 
Mexico City in March 2012. In keeping with the Metropolis Project’s goal of pro-
viding “a forum for bridging research, policy and practice on migration and diversity,” 
papers were presented by both academics and public servants involved with immi-
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gration issues. Therefore, the chapters in this book are quite diverse, not only in 
terms of the countries represented, but also with respect to each one’s length, scope, 
aims, perspective, and content. 
 This volume provides just a few examples of how immigration policies and 
practices in many parts of the world have inevitably been affected by the “great 
recession.” The first five chapters explore how migration flows responded to the 
changing economic conditions imposed by the recession in five specific and very dif-
ferent country cases: the United States, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Finland. Chapter Six explains how an important remittance-receiving country, 
the Philippines, has tried to mitigate the impacts of continuing global economic 
difficulties. The two final chapters analyze how economic difficulties have kindled 
social backlash and anti-immigrant sentiments among some sectors of the popula-
tion in both Europe (Chapter 7) and the United States (Chapter 8).
Elaine Levine’s article, “The Impact of the 2008-2009 Economic Crisis on 
Latinos and Latino Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market,” explores labor market 
outcomes for Latinos and Latino immigrants in the U.S. today, in particular Mexicans 
and those of Mexican origin. After brief comments on the history of labor migra-
tion to the U.S., she explains how certain industries and occupations had recently 
become labor market niches for Latino workers. She examines job losses after 2007 
and the evolution of employment between 2007 and 2010 in those industries and 
occupations with the highest numbers and percentages of Latino workers and dis-
cusses the increasing difficulties for Latino workers in the U.S. labor market since 
the onset of the 2008-2009 recession. She concludes with references to the rise in 
anti-immigrant sentiments in the state of Georgia, which, as she concludes, may 
prove even more detrimental to immigrant workers, particularly the undocumented, 
than lost jobs and lower wages.
Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Jennifer McGarrigle begin their article “Immi-
gration and Policy: New Challenges after the Economic Crisis in Portugal,” by 
explaining how Portugal —along with other southern European countries hereto-
fore characterized by significant emigration— recently became a destination for 
international labor migrants. Nevertheless, in the Portuguese case, emigration per-
sisted along with the inflow of workers from Eastern Europe and Asia, and a renewed 
flow from Brazil. They analyze the connections between macroeconomic perfor-
mance and migratory flows and the changes taking place in what is now a much less 
favorable economic context. Thus far, Portugal seems to have been able to avoid 
significant social tensions and conflicts between national and foreign workers, or 
political discourses expressing anti-immigrant sentiments and attitudes, which no 
doubt have been dissipated to some extent by persisting emigration.
In his article “The Impact of the Recession on Migration in the United Kingdom,” 
Jon Simmons explains why net immigration is still significant in spite of the reces-
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sion. He incorporates several data sets into his analysis to show how migration flows 
and patterns have changed over the past few years. First of all, 
the period of the recession coincided with a sharp fall in immigration but an even 
sharper fall in emigration. In a period when the economy was contracting and unem-
ployment rising, more people were still coming to reside in the uk than were leaving to 
go elsewhere. . . . As the recession ended in the fourth quarter of 2009, immigration 
recovered and began to rise again, . . . but emigration numbers for British citizens have 
remained low. 
He points out that during the recent recession, the number of foreign students 
coming to the uk overtook the number of foreign migrants coming to work. He argues, 
therefore, that the recession has had “only a relatively modest impact on migration 
trends [in the uk] overall” and that this result was “due to the changed composition 
of the migratory flows to the uk, and specifically the significant rise in student 
migration over this period.”
Bernd Geiss writes about “Immigration to and Emigration from Germany in 
the Last Few Years.” His assessment is that the impacts of the recent financial and 
economic crisis on migration to Germany were relatively small. In contrast to events 
in some other European economies, the crisis in Germany lasted only for a short 
time. He underlines the fact that, even though economic growth did decline some-
what, the employment rate remained nearly stable because of special measures 
implemented by the government to maintain employment levels and workers’ 
incomes. Thus, while he believes that Germany was “successful in managing the 
last economic crisis,” he expresses concerns about the future. Total population will 
decline and the age distribution will change. He maintains that Germany will need 
more skilled workers. He laments, however, that migration policies are not based only 
on economic logic, but also “on traditions, mentalities, irrational imaginations, and, 
last but not least, the fear of strangers.”
In her article “Employment of the Immigrant Population and Managing Labor 
Migration in Finland,” Paula Kuusipalo explains that Finland has only recently 
changed from an emigrant-sending to an immigrant-receiving country. The trans-
formation started in the 1980s, first attracting Finnish returnees, and gradually, as 
a result of economic growth and a rising demand for labor, becoming more and 
more work-related. She points out that the current public discussion on immigra-
tion issues is framed, on one hand, by concerns over a declining population and 
future labor force needs and, on the other hand, by the fairly recent populist opin-
ions against foreign influences, some of which also have racist overtones. Studies 
show that getting settled, learning the language and other new skills, and finding 
one’s place in the community takes time. The government has implemented various 
measures to facilitate immigrants’ social and economic integration. Nevertheless, 
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in some instances new arrivals suffer from high unemployment rates, while certain 
industries and rural areas experience labor shortages. Kuusipalo concludes that 
the levels of integration achieved over the past 30 years have served to increase 
trust between immigrant populations and receiving communities despite the populist 
political movement’s negative rhetoric.
In her article “The Economic Crisis and Overseas Filipinos’ Remittances: 
Learning to Build a Future Back Home,” Imelda Nicolas points out that the Philippines 
has emerged as one of the major migrant-sending countries in the world today. 
Remittances from Filipinos abroad constitute over 10 percent of gdp, clearly outrank-
ing investment flows and official development assistance. Official data show that 
remittances rose steadily between 2005 and 2011. She attributes this sustained remit-
tance growth to the following factors: 
diversity of overseas Filipinos’ skills and expertise in more than 200 countries all over 
the world, new and expanded markets for labor migration, expansion of bank and 
non-bank services tailor-fitted for overseas Filipinos, and the various efforts by the 
government and civil society organizations in mitigating the effects of the global eco-
nomic crisis.
She concludes, “Migration is a complicated and complex issue and concern. It 
is a development challenge but one that proposes a wide spectrum of opportunities 
for learning and growth.”
Jan Rath, in his article “Europe’s Backlash against Multiculturalism,” explores 
some fears Europeans have expressed lately about immigration. He questions 
whether Europe has been taken hostage by political entrepreneurs trying to gain polit-
ical influence by trampling on immigrant ethnic and religious minorities, or if they have 
been too naive accepting individuals and groups from countries that are —or are seen 
as— culturally distant from the imagined national centers. He states that the recent 
“cultural backlash” is not confined exclusively to Europe, where he analyses differ-
ent cases, but that several traditional receiving countries are experiencing these 
anti-immigrant attitudes. He points out different examples of the “classical coun-
tries of immigration.” Some examples are the Tea Party in the United States, with their 
swipes at minorities and some recent electoral campaigns; Australia, known for its 
unconditional embrace of multiculturalism, where they now fear being swamped by 
Asians; and Canada, which has supported cultural pluralism as a core element of its 
identity, and has now come up against the limits of multiculturalism, calling for 
“reasonable accommodation.” Rath highlights that, while ethnic and cultural diversi-
ty is becoming commonplace, in many receiving countries, general discontentment 
has emerged that is more critical of the state’s role and immigration and diversity.
Finally, “The Rise of Anti-immigrant Sentiments in the U.S.: Arizona and 
Alabama, Emblematic Cases,” by Mónica Verea, explores how the severe economic 
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recession, exacerbated by domestic pressure, has encouraged the U.S. government 
to implement a series of much more restrictive measures in its migratory policy 
than in the immediate past. She believes that the rise of anti-immigrant actions, 
xenophobic pressures, and discriminatory attitudes are often aggravated in times of 
economic crisis. In order to understand these attitudes, she presents the main legal 
frameworks that the U.S. government and Congress approved to manage undocu-
mented migrant flow from the 1980s to the Obama administration and the recent 
proposal in Congress from “The Gang of Eight” to reform their broken immigration 
system. The growing number of foreign residents and undocumented migrants in 
the United States during the last decade has made society more aware of who the 
immigrants are and what their make-up is. Language, physical appearance, and 
certain customs that are inherent characteristics and values of some ethnic groups, 
embedded in a specific place, have become more visible and evident because of 
their continual —and in some cases sudden— growth. These changes have also 
contributed to fostering anti-immigrant attitudes, especially in certain states that 
have played an increasing role in controlling irregular migration, filling the vacuum 
the federal government has created by its reluctance to approve an immigration 
reform. Verea explains how Arizona and Alabama have become emblematic cases, 
because of their anti-immigrant movement and harsh measures proposed, approved, 
and in some cases implemented during the last few years.
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THE IMPACT OF THE 2008-2009 
ECONOMIC CRISIS ON LATINOS AND LATINO IMMIGRANTS 
IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET
Elaine Levine*
The recession that officially began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 is the 
most severe that the United States economy has experienced since the 1930s. The post-
recession recovery has been exceptionally weak and unemployment remains 
unusually high. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (bls) recognized that “the 
employment decline experienced during the December 2007-June 2009 recession 
was greater than that of any recession of recent decades,” and 47 months after it 
started, in November 2011, “employment was still over 4 percent lower than when 
the recession began.” In February 2012, the bls pointed out “that many of the sta-
tistics that describe the U.S. economy have yet to return to their pre-recession values” 
and that the proportion of long-term unemployed (those unemployed for 27 weeks 
or longer) remained notably high (usdol 2012b).
As of July 2012, three years after the recession had officially ended, the 
unemployment rate stood at 8.3 percent. There were 12.8 million people unem-
ployed and 40.7 percent of these, or 5.2 million, were long-term unemployed; and 
8.2 million persons involuntarily worked part time, because they had not been 
able to find full-time work. Another 2.5 million were considered only marginally 
attached to the labor force because although they were available for work and 
wanted to work, and had looked for a job sometime in the previous 12 months, they 
had not looked for a job in the 4 weeks prior to being surveyed. Over one-third (34 per-
cent or 852 000) of those counted as marginally attached to the labor force are 
listed as discouraged workers, persons not currently looking for work because they 
believe no jobs are available for them. In other words, three years after the recession 
ended, 23.5 million people, or 15 percent of the labor force, were either unemployed 
or underemployed (usdol 2012c). Furthermore, since the recession began, the 
labor force participation rate has declined from an annual average of 66.0 percent 
in 2007 to 63.7 percent in July 2012. The number of persons 16 years old and over 
counted as not in the labor force rose from an annual average of 78.7 million in 2007 
to 88.3 million as of July 2012 (usdol 2008; 2012c).
*  Researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte (Cisan), Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México (unam), elaine@unam.mx.
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Over the past two decades, Latino immigrants have been an important com-
ponent of labor force growth in the United States. They were responsible for 54 per-
cent of the increase in the labor force between 2000 and 2010 (Kochhar 2012), 
and in 2010 slightly more than half the Latinos in the labor force (51.1 percent) 
were immigrants (Motel 2012). Before the 2008-2009 recession, Mexican and 
other Latin American immigrants easily found work in several labor market niches 
where their participation had grown rapidly during the 1990s and the first part of 
the 2000s: construction, meat packing, poultry processing, crop production, vari-
ous branches of food processing, plant nurseries and landscaping services, building 
cleaning and maintenance, and personal care for children or the elderly, among oth-
ers. The recession brought high levels of unemployment for all. Throughout the 
economic decline, from the beginning of 2008 until the middle of 2009 and the weak 
recovery thereafter, unemployment for Latinos was consistently higher than 
the rate for non-Hispanic whites and lower than the rate for blacks, just as it has been 
since the 1970s or earlier.
In this chapter, I analyze labor market outcomes for Latinos and Latino immi-
grants in the United States today, with special attention to Mexicans and those of 
Mexican origin, who constitute approximately two-thirds of the Latino population. 
I begin with some very brief comments on the history of labor migration to the U.S. 
and then analyze U.S. Department of Labor statistics to show how certain industries 
and occupations have become labor market niches for Latino workers. I examine job 
losses after 2007 and the evolution of employment between 2007 and 2010 in those 
industries and occupations with the highest numbers and percentages of Latino work-
ers. I discuss the increasing difficulties for Latino workers in the U.S. labor market 
since the onset of the 2008-2009 recession. I conclude with some references to 
the state of Georgia, where I conducted field work in 2009 and 2010, interviewing 
Mexican immigrants about their living and working conditions. The situation in 
Georgia illustrates some of the more far-reaching social and political consequences 
of the economic crisis, which may prove to be even more detrimental to immigrant 
workers, particularly the undocumented, than lost jobs and lower wages.
Historical Tendencies in Labor Migration 
To the United States
Attracting immigrant labor has been fundamental for economic growth in the 
United States throughout the nation’s history. Furthermore, the influx of migrants 
has more or less adapted to the ups and downs in economic activity and demographic 
tendencies within the country. The industrial boom at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury marked the beginning of a period of rapid growth, both absolute and relative, 
in the arrival of new immigrants. By 1910, the 13.5 million foreign-born in the 
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U.S. made up 14.7 percent of the population, almost equivalent to the historical 
high of 14.8 percent reached in 1890, when the number was 9.2 million (Gibson 
and Lennon 1999).
In the late nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants and later some other groups 
of Asians had been prohibited entry to the United States. For most other national 
origins, the first quantitative restrictions placed on the number of newly arrived 
immigrants admitted were established in 1921. At that time, it was decided that the 
number of persons admitted from any one country could not exceed three percent 
of the total number of persons of that nationality residing in the U.S. in 1910. 
Exceptions were made for professionals, servants, and persons already living in the 
Western Hemisphere for more than a year. Lower percentages and a numerical limit, 
to be implemented over the next few years, were stipulated in the Immigration Act 
of 1924. Nevertheless, the total number of immigrants continued to grow, reaching 
14.2 million in 1930 (11.6 percent of the population), until the economic crisis re versed 
the tendency. From that point on, due to the combined effects of declining inflows, 
deaths, mass deportations of Mexicans, and voluntary return to their countries of 
origin by other groups, the number of immigrants residing in the U.S. dropped to 
9.6 million in 1970. This was only 4.7 percent of the total population, which had 
grown from 122.8 million in 1930 to 203.2 million (Gibson and Lennon 1999).
The 1970s marked a new inflection point. From then on the number of immi-
grants began to rise rapidly and stood at over 38 million in 2007. At that point the 
foreign-born were 12.6 percent of the population and 15.7 percent of the labor force. 
In addition to these changes, which to a certain extent responded to the economic 
and demographic changes taking place in the U.S. at the time, significant shifts 
occurred in immigrants’ countries of origin. Since colonial times and the subsequent 
establishment of the United States as an independent nation, the country had been 
increasingly populated by European immigrants and their descendants. The indig-
enous groups, or Native Americans, had been pushed ever further westward and 
to a large degree exterminated by the European settlers. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, Europeans continued to dominate the migratory flows, until 
the 1960s, when new trends began to emerge, not only in the case of immigration 
to the U.S., but worldwide as well.
Among other things, the post-World War II reconstruction and the later con-
solidation and expansion of the European Union brought growing prosperity to the 
region and converted several of the countries there into destinations for immi-
grants from other parts of the world. The increasingly unfavorable terms of trade 
for the primary goods exported by many Latin American countries, as well as gen-
erally unfavorable economic conditions there and significant population growth, 
turned many of them into immigrant-sending rather than immigrant-receiving 
countries. There were also political changes, and even armed conflicts, in parts of 
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Central America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, that have spurred emigration since 
the late twentieth century. 
Therefore, in the early years of the twenty-first century, Latin America became 
the most important region of origin for immigrants entering the U.S., followed by 
Asia, and then Europe to a much lesser degree. In 2007, 31 percent of all immi-
grants in the U.S. were from Mexico. The Philippines, India, and China followed 
in importance, with 4 percent each, and then came El Salvador, Vietnam, Korea, 
and Cuba, with 3 percent each. By that time, Canada accounted for only 2 percent. 
According to Migration Policy Institute (mpi) data, no European country figured 
in the top 10 counties of origin for immigrants to the U.S., and Europeans as a whole 
made up only 13 percent of the foreign-born population (Migration Policy Institute 
2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2008, 44).1 Approximately 27 percent of all immi-
grants in the U.S. were from Asia, and about 54 percent were from Latin America 
(including Mexico).
Given the fact that the native-born population has been aging rapidly over the 
past few decades, immigrants in general, and Latin American immigrants in par-
ticular, constitute an increasingly important component of the U.S. labor force. At 
the end of the twentieth century the contribution of new immigrants to labor force 
growth was the highest it had been over the previous 60 years. The eight million new 
immigrants who joined the labor force between 1990 and 2001 accounted for 50 
percent of the growth during that period (Sum, Fogg, and Harrington 2002).2
In general, growth in the U.S. labor force has slowed down after the 1970s. 
Over that decade it rose by 29.9 percent due to the incorporation of those born 
during the post war “baby boom” and increasing participation by women. During 
the 1990s, the labor force only grew by 11.5 percent, but without the newly arrived 
immigrants who entered the job market, growth would have been only 5 percent. 
The tendency has been much the same for the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury; in other words, at least half or more of the growth in the labor force has been 
the result of immigration. There is a more or less generalized consensus among 
economists that the absence of new immigrant workers would have significantly 
limited both employment and economic growth in general in the U.S. at that time 
(Sum, Fogg, and Harrington 2002; Council of Economic Advisers 2007).
1  The data presented in the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Fact Book (2011) included Ger-
many in fourth place, and the United Kingdom in tenth place, on their list of the main countries of 
origin for immigrants to the U.S. in 2005, but did not give figures. The mpi data (2009) does give per-
centages, and therefore I have used this data in the text since it seems more precise. In the 2000 census 
data, Germany was listed in ninth place as a country of origin for immigrants to the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom in tenth. 
2  Those considered “new immigrants” in the text by Sum and coauthors are those who arrived after 
1990.
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After the mild 2001 recession, and despite the greater difficulties in crossing 
the border after 9/11, Mexican migration grew significantly from then until mid-
2006. Furthermore, the number of undocumented immigrants entering the U.S. 
at that time was much higher than the number of authorized entries for Mexicans 
(Passel and Cohn 2009b). However the arrival of undocumented Mexicans declined 
significantly as of 2007, not because living and working conditions have improved in 
Mexico, but rather because possibilities for employment in the U.S. have declined. 
The 2008-2009 recession and the persistently high unemployment rates thereafter 
have discouraged many potential migrants. These fluctuations in migration flows 
are evidence of the growing complementarity and a certain degree of de facto inte-
gration between the two labor markets. The flow of migrant workers from Mexico 
adapts, in general, to the demand for labor in the U.S. 
In addition to the more or less normal cyclical fluctuations, the U.S. labor 
market has undergone some radical changes over the past few decades in response 
to the challenges posed by globalization and increased international competition. 
Employment in general for both skilled and unskilled workers has become less 
stable and many jobs are quite precarious. Technological innovations have made it 
possible for companies to eliminate jobs and contain wage increases. Manufacturing 
jobs have declined steadily from their peak level of 19.4 million in 1979 to just under 
14.1 million in 2010. However, as manufacturing jobs disappear, new opportunities 
have opened in the service sector, which now employs over 75 percent of the labor 
force. Patterns in the supply and demand for labor have changed considerably. The 
male labor force participation rate declined more or less steadily from 79.1 percent 
in 1971 to 70.5 percent in 2011. Meanwhile the participation rate for women rose 
from 43.4 percent in 1971 to 60 percent in 1999 and has declined slightly since then 
to 58.1 percent in 2011 (usdol 2012a). Many male workers displaced from relatively 
well-paying manufacturing jobs over the past few decades consider the wages preva-
lent in many of the new service sector jobs unacceptable and have preferred to leave 
the labor force. However, the supply of Mexican immigrants willing to accept those 
jobs grew considerably as long as companies in the U.S. were willing to hire them.
The sustained economic growth achieved in the 1980s and 1990s generated a 
rise in the demand for labor at both ends of the skills spectrum, in other words both 
very high and very low-skilled jobs. The U.S. attracted a wide range of professionals 
from all over the world. Most recently Asia stands out as the main source of highly 
skilled immigrants. Less skilled labor comes primarily from Mexico and also some 
parts of Central America and includes a high proportion of undocumented workers 
(Passel and Cohn 2009a, 2011). The question of how to deal with the over 11 million 
undocumented persons currently in the U.S. remains at the center of the unre-
solved debates over immigration reform. In spite of all the negative rhetoric and the 
large number of deportations since 2008, the number of undocumented persons in 
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the labor force —estimated to stand at around 8 million in 2010 or 5.2 percent of the 
labor force (Passel and Cohn 2011)— indicates a continued practice of hiring undoc-
umented workers whenever and wherever it is considered profitable and convenient. 
Some immigrant groups are clearly consolidating specific labor market niches for 
themselves. While most of the Asians are concentrated in certain technical and pro-
fessional areas, Mexicans and some of the other Latin Americans tend to be employed 
in construction, light manufacturing, and some services. Given the proliferation of 
Mexican and Mexican-origin workers in low-skilled, low-paying jobs, it is somewhat 
surprising to note that in 2006, Mexico was the second most important provider of 
highly skilled immigrants in the U.S., with 462 409, after India’s 599 361 (Giorguli and 
Gaspar 2008). However, taking into account the total number of immigrants from each 
country changes the perspective somewhat, since there are almost eight times more 
immigrants from Mexico in the U.S. than from any other country of origin.
Data on occupational distribution from the 2000 census clearly illustrate these 
proportional differences. At that time, the highest numbers of immigrants employed 
in management and professional occupations were from India (408 000), Mexico 
(358 000), China (320 000), and the Philippines (317 000). However, in relative terms 
the contrasts were quite clear. For Mexico those employed in management and pro-
fessional positions were only 8.1 percent of all the Mexican immigrants working 
in the US, whereas for India, China, and the Philippines, they were 64.5 percent, 
49.3 percent, and 38.8 percent respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).
There are clear tendencies with respect to immigrants’ countries of origin, their 
human capital, and their income levels in the United States. European and Asian 
immigrants’ high income levels are generally proportional to their high levels of edu-
cational attainment, which in many cases surpass that of the native-born population, 
and hence their highly favorable insertion in the U.S. labor market. In contrast, the 
high numbers of undocumented workers and the generally low levels of educational 
attainment characteristic of most recent Mexican immigrants leave them extremely 
vulnerable in terms of working conditions and salary levels. Nevertheless, wages 
deemed insufficient by many native-born workers are enough to attract Mexican 
immigrants as long as there is a demand for their labor.
Hispanics/Latinos in the United States 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Hispanics (or Latinos) emerged as the 
largest minority group in the United States, slightly surpassing the African-American 
population in the 2000 census count.3  Between 1966 and 2000 the U.S. population 
3  The term “Hispanic” was first used by the Census Bureau in the 1970s to designate persons born in 
Latin America or Spain and all persons born in the U.S. who are descendants of someone born in Latin 
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grew from 200 million to 300 million. The Latino component contributed with 
36 percent of the overall growth while the non-Hispanic white component only 
accounted for 34 percent of the total population increase (Pew Hispanic Center, 
2006). Currently the approximately 50.7 million Latinos constitute 16.4 percent of 
the total population (Motel 2012). According to Census Bureau projections, the num-
ber of Latinos will reach approximately 133 million by mid-century, equivalent to 
30 percent of the total projected population of 439 million (Roberts 2008).
The Latino population’s rapid growth is closely tied to the intense migratory 
flows experienced in recent decades. Out-migration from Mexico and other Latin 
American countries and Latino settlement in the U.S. are two sides of a single coin. 
They are part of a single process that is simultaneously exit and entry, departure and 
arrival, and the causes of which are inextricably tied to contemporary globalization. 
This is evident in both receiving and sending countries alike, with different and 
specific manifestations in each case. While departure frequently separates families 
and leaves social voids —often evidenced in villages and towns inhabited only by 
children and the elderly—, new Mexican and Latino neighborhoods are springing 
up in many parts of the U.S. previously unaffected by migration flows (see, for exam-
ple, Massey 2008; Odem and Lacy 2009).
According to the official 2010 census, there were 50.5 million Latinos in the U.S. 
distributed as follows: Mexicans, 63 percent; Puerto Ricans, 9.2 percent; Cubans, 
3.5 percent; Central Americans,4 7.9 percent; South Americans, 5.5 percent; Do mi n-
icans, 2.8 percent; Spaniards, 1.3 percent; and 6.8 percent of unspecified origin 
(Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011). About 37 percent of all Latinos are immi-
grants, which is very close to the proportion among those of Mexican origin (35.6 
percent in 2010). The percentage of immigrants is much lower among Spanish-origin 
Latinos (12.9 percent). In contrast, most of the South and Central Americans resid-
ing in the U.S. now are first-generation immigrants (Motel 2012).
During the 1990s, the Latino population rose by 12.9 million. More than half 
of this growth, 56 percent, was due to immigration, and the remaining 44 percent 
was from the natural increase of those already living in the U.S. This tendency was 
reversed in the first decade of the twenty-first century as the natural increase 
surpassed the number of newly arrived immigrants. The change was particularly 
evident for Mexicans. Their numbers rose by 11.4 million, of which 7.2 million 
America or Spain. Subsequently, and to a certain extent in rejection of a term viewed as imposed by 
the U.S. government, some of these persons began to refer to themselves as Latinos. The use or acceptance 
of either term may vary by region within the U.S. Currently in many academic and political circles 
both terms are used as synonymous and interchangeable, as will be the case in this text. 
4  According to the definition used in the report by Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert (2011), the category 
“Central American” excludes Mexicans and includes persons who reported themselves as Costa Rican, 
Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian, Salvadoran, from the Canal Zone, belonging to 
a Central American indigenous group, or simply as Central Americans. 
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(63 percent) can be attributed to births in the U.S. and only 4.2 million (37 per-
cent) to the arrival of new immigrants (Pew Hispanic Center 2011). 
Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, approximately 75 percent of all Latino 
immigrants have not yet become citizens of the United States. According to current 
legislation, legal permanent residents can become citizens after five years if they 
meet certain requirements. It is somewhat difficult to determine exactly how many 
Latino immigrants are legal residents and how many are undocumented. According 
to recent estimates, 58 percent of the approximately 11.2 million undocumented 
immigrants now living in the U.S. are Mexican, and another 23 percent come from 
other Latin American countries (Passel and Cohn 2011).
Due mainly to different levels of educational attainment, other types of train-
ing, and occupational distribution, considerable variations in socioeconomic levels 
exist among U.S.-born Latinos, as well as among Latino immigrants, and within 
each of the different groups that make up the Latino population as a whole. Some 
national-origin groups may contain political asylum seekers, people from different 
socioeconomic strata, as well as professional and international business migrants. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Latino immigrants in the U.S. today are “labor migrants” 
seeking employment opportunities and wage rates that they could not expect to find 
in their home countries.
Often statistics and data on Latinos are presented globally, without differenti-
ating among the various groups that constitute the Latino population as a whole. 
Therefore, some groups’ high levels of educational attainment and incomes are lost 
from sight in the aggregate figures because of the much lower levels of schooling 
and incomes characteristic of most Mexican and many Central American migrants. 
Furthermore, where distinctions are made, data will usually be presented for Mex-
icans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans with a catchall category for other Latinos, or at 
best a distinction between Central Americans and South Americans. In these latter 
cases, it is sometimes quite difficult to obtain information by national origin given the 
relatively small numbers from each country. 
Among Latinos in the U.S, Cubans and South Americans tend to have the 
highest income levels. In contrast, Mexicans and Central Americans have higher 
percentages of persons with low incomes and hence significant numbers of low-
income households. Puerto Ricans also have a considerable proportion of low-income 
households even though their individual earnings may not be as low as those of the 
last two groups mentioned. This can be explained by the fact that Puerto Rican men 
have low labor force participation rates and high unemployment rates, and there are 
a considerable number of female-headed households. The figure was 27 percent in 
2006, which was higher than that of any other group of Latinos. Furthermore, for 
all population groups in the U.S., women still tend to earn significantly less than men 
with similar education, skill levels, or training (Levine 2010).
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Given the high percentage of immigrants, Latino men tend to have higher 
labor force participation rates than other groups, and the rates for Latina women 
are slightly lower than for others. As Graph 1 shows, differences also exist among the 
various Latino/a groups. Mexican men tend to have a considerably higher participa-
tion rate than Puerto Ricans or Cubans, and Puerto Rican women’s participation 
is slightly higher than that of other Latinas. As a result of the recession, male labor 
force participation fell between 2006 and 2010, while it rose somewhat for women, 
especially Cuban women, whose participation rate was only 49.9 percent in 2006 
(usdol 2007, 2011).
In 2010, unemployment rates (see Graph 2) reached their highest levels since 
the early 1980s, after having dropped to very low levels in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Between 2006 and 2010, unemployment rates increased by several per-
centage points for all population groups. Puerto Rican, African-American, and Cuban 
men experienced the greatest rise in unemployment, as did Cuban and Mexican 
women. The unemployment rate for Latinos as a whole generally falls between a 
higher rate for African-Americans and a lower rate for non-Hispanic whites.5 These 
relative positions in unemployment rates have held for the last three decades or more.
5  According to U.S. Census Bureau definitions, the terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” are ethnic, not racial 
descriptions; therefore, racially, Latinos may be either white or black. 
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To a certain degree, the entire Latino population has been stigmatized because 
of the high percentage of immigrants, and more specifically undocumented immi-
grants, among them. This is especially true for those in the lower socioeconomic 
strata because of their phenotype, their limited knowledge of English, the neigh-
borhoods the live in, and their low-skilled, low-paying jobs. Furthermore, given the 
preponderance of Mexicans, and in particular low-skilled Mexican workers, socio-
economic indicators for Latinos as a whole tend to be low, despite the fact that among 
South Americans and Cubans, in particular, and also Mexicans and Central Amer-
icans, there are many highly skilled immigrants with high incomes.
Salaries in most of the labor market niches with high numbers or high per-
centages of Latino workers tend to be low and, furthermore, have declined over the 
last few decades. Therefore, the prospects for socioeconomic mobility among new 
Latino immigrants are more limited now than in the past (Levine 2008). Most 
labor migrants with no college degree —which happens to be the case for the majori-
ty of Latin American immigrants to the U.S., given the high percentage of Mexicans 
in this situation— leave precarious, low-paying jobs in their home countries in search 
of precarious low-paying jobs in the U.S. or other parts of the world. Because of the 
existing wage differentials, which may be up to tenfold or more, they are, never-
theless, taking on what are usually the least desirable and lowest paying jobs in the 
destination country (Levine 2001, 2008).
grapH 2
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sourCe: Compiled by the author with data from the U.S. Department of Labor (2011).
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Mexicans and Other Latinos in the U.S. Labor Market
Since their main motivation for migrating is to get a job that pays in dollars, it is not 
surprising that Mexicans are currently the group with the highest labor force par-
ticipation rate in the U.S, 67.7 percent in 2010 (usdol 2011). The participation rate 
for Mexican men, 79.4 percent in 2010, is considerably higher than that of any 
other population group (whites, 72.0 percent; Afro-Americans, 65 percent; Asians, 
73.2 percent). Although the participation rate for Mexican women, 54.1 percent, is 
lower than for other groups (whites 58.5 percent, Afro-Americans 59.9 percent, 
Asians 57 percent), it is significantly higher than the labor force participation rate for 
women in Mexico, which is now 44 percent (inegi 2012).
Unemployment rates tend to reflect the cyclical changes in economic activity, as they 
usually rise and fall more or less in opposition to the rate of economic growth. As men-
tioned earlier, for the past three decades or more, unemployment rates for Latinos, 
and for Mexican-origin Latinos as well, have consistently been above the rate for 
whites,6 and below the rate for African-Americans. The unemployment rate for Mex-
icans is usually lower than for Puerto Ricans and higher than for Cubans. Cubans 
have habitually registered lower unemployment rates than whites as a whole (which, 
as mentioned before, includes most Latinos). However, in 2010, Cuban men had an 
unusually high unemployment rate (12.9 percent), which was slightly above the rate 
for Mexican men (12.3 percent), but not nearly as high as the extremely high rates for 
African-American men (18.4 percent) and Puerto Rican men (17.3 percent).
It is not unusual for some recent immigrants to hold the lowest paying, least 
desirable jobs in the U.S., which nevertheless provide much more than they could 
expect to earn in their home countries. This has been the case for most Mexican immi-
grants because of their low educational attainment, limited knowledge of English, 
and adverse labor market conditions in their home country. Unfortunately, the 
educational disadvantages often persist among second- and third-generation Mex-
icans born in the U.S. 
U.S. Department of Labor data for 2010 (see Table 1) indicate that the Mex-
ican-origin work force —in other words Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born 
descendants— is more or less evenly distributed among three of the five major 
occupational categories: 19 percent in natural resources, construction, and main-
tenance occupations; 18.2 in production, transportation, and material moving 
occupations; and 19.9 percent in sales and office occupations. Their participation 
in management, professional, and related occupations (16.1 percent) is lower than for 
any other ethnic or racial group, and in service occupations it is higher (26.7 percent), 
6  The unemployment rate for non-Hispanic whites is lower than the figure indicated here, which is for 
all whites and therefore includes most Latinos, who tend to have higher unemployment rates than 
non-Hispanic whites.
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exceeding the rates for African-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Only 3 
percent of all Mexican-origin workers are currently employed in farming, fishing, and 
forestry occupations (which as of 2004 is no longer shown as an independent category 
and now employs less that 2 percent of the total labor force), but this proportion is 
much higher than that of any other group. Furthermore, 42 percent of all those 
working in such occupations nationwide are Latinos (usdol 2011).
In terms of occupational sub-categories, within the five major categories, 9.3 
percent of Mexicans were employed in professional and related occupations. A 
similar proportion, 9.7 percent, worked in manufacturing, and 12 percent worked in 
construction and extraction; in these two categories, some well-paying positions 
exist for highly skilled, experienced workers, but most are low-skilled, low-paying 
jobs. Eleven and four-tenths percent were employed in office and administrative 
support occupations. This category contains many female-dominated occupations, 
and earnings tend to be low. The same holds for sales and related occupations which 
employ 8.5 percent of the Mexican-origin work force. Food preparation and serving 
and related occupations, and building and grounds cleaning and maintenance employ 
9.6 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively, where wages are quite low. Within each of 
the general categories, Mexicans and other Latinos tend to be most heavily concen-
trated in a few specific occupations such as certain branches of light, rather than 
heavy, manufacturing; maids and housekeeping cleaners; grounds maintenance 
workers; dishwashers; cooks; and various types of construction work.
Between 1990 and 2010 the percentage of Latinos in the work force grew 
from 7.5 to 14.3 percent. The data for the number employed by detailed industry 
(see Table 2) show that some branches became increasingly dependent on Latino 
labor. Over the two decades considered here, the percent of Latino workers grew 
significantly in the following branches: support activities for agriculture and for-
estry, from 15.4 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2010; landscaping services, from 
25.2 to 41.5 percent; cut and sew apparel, from 22.6 to 34.8 percent; services to 
buildings and dwellings, from 18 to 35.6 percent; dry cleaning and laundry servic-
es, from 14.6 to 28.5 percent; and services to private households, from 17.6 to 
39.5 percent. In the general branch of food manufacturing, Latino participation 
grew from 14.1 to 27.6 percent, and growth was even more pronounced in some 
subsectors: animal slaughtering and processing went from 17.0 to 38.1 percent; and 
bakeries, except retail, from 13.0 to 31.8 percent. In some cases, Latino participation 
rates had reached slightly higher levels in 2007, before the recession, and in others 
it continued to grow, although minimally, even afterwards.
Construction and carpet and rug mills were the industries where the percent-
age of Latinos employed had increased the most between 1990 and 2007. In con-
struction, it rose from 8.5 percent in 1990 to 25.3 percent in 2007, with almost 3 
million Latinos employed. Given the severe impact the recession had on this 
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table 2
industries witH tHe HigHest perCent of latinos employed in u.s. 
(1990, 2007, and 2010)
Ordered by percent Latino in 2007
Industries
 Percent 
Latino 1990
 Percent 
Latino 2007
Percent 
Latino 2010
Total percent of Latinos employed 7.5 14.0 14.3
Landscaping services 25.2 43.7 41.5
Cutting and sewing apparel 22.6 39.6 34.8
Support activities for agriculture 
and forestry 15.4 37.1 35.5
Animal slaughtering and processing 17.0 35.2 38.1
Private households 17.6 34.8 39.5
Services to buildings and dwellings 18.0 33.1 35.6
Bakeries, except retail 13.0 31.7 31.8
Drycleaning and laundry services 14.6 31.2 28.5
Carpet and rug mills 10.1 29.4 49.0
Crop production 19.5 28.8 30.6
Car washes 22.5 27.8 34.8
Fruit and vegetable preserving 
and specialty foods 21.0 27.6 30.0
Construction 8.5 25.3 24.4
Traveler accommodation 15.2 24.8 24.4
Apparel, fabrics, and notions 
wholesale trade 15.2 23.7 21.8
Warehousing and storage 13.8 23.6 28.8
Retail bakeries 9.0 22.3 23.9
Groceries and related products 
wholesale trade 13.4 21.9 21.1
Restaurants and other food services 11.6 21.6 22.3
Barber shops 10.0 21.5 11.7
Cement, concrete, lime, and gypsum 
products 8.2 19.9 19.9
Source: Compiled by the author with data from usdol (1991, 2008, 2011).
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industry, the number of Latinos employed had dropped to only 2.1 million by 
2010, which was 24.4 percent of the total employed. Latino participation in carpet 
and rug manufacturing grew from 10.1 percent in 1990 to 29.4 percent in 2007. It 
dropped sharply to 19.2 percent in 2008 and registered a spectacular rebound to 
49 percent in 2010. However, the total number of persons employed in this industry 
is quite small, only 59 million in 2010. The small city of Dalton, Georgia (known as 
“carpet city” or the “carpet capital of the U.S.”), is the most important site for carpet 
and rug mills in the country; Latinos now constitute almost one-third of the total 
population in Whitfield County, where Dalton is located.
Latinos’ occupational and industrial concentration is closely tied to their geo-
graphic concentration, which is still quite pronounced despite significant dispersion 
to new destinations in recent years. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
75 percent of the Latino population resided in just seven states. However, some states 
in the Southeast, whose Latino populations are still numerically rather small, reg-
istered extraordinary growth rates (ranging from over 200 to almost 400 percent 
between 1990 and 2000) in their Latino populations because of the employment 
opportunities opening up there at that time. Mexicans and other Latinos have fre-
quently been actively recruited for jobs in meat packing, poultry processing, carpet 
manufacturing, or crop production, for example, that local residents disdain. It 
seems that all that is necessary to consolidate a labor market niche of this type is 
an influx of Latino immigrants and jobs that no one else wants, at least at the going 
wage rates. This has been very clear for agricultural work in states like California, 
Texas, and Oregon. The demand for labor for many undesirable, low-wage jobs 
grew significantly at the end of the twentieth century, just as new waves of immigrants 
were arriving from Mexico and other parts of Latin America who were more than 
willing to accept those jobs.
I have used the U.S. Department of Labor’s data on “Employed persons by 
detailed occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity” to provide some 
insights about specific labor market niches for Mexican and other Latino immigrants. 
It should be pointed out that given the preponderance of Mexicans in the Latino 
labor force —almost two thirds of all Latino workers are Mexican or of Mexican 
origin— and the fact that the tendencies for the other two main groups, Puerto 
Ricans and Cubans, often diverge in opposite directions, data for Latinos as a whole 
can provide a fairly accurate approximation to labor market outcomes for Mex-
icans. Furthermore, slightly over half the Latinos employed in the U.S. in recent 
years are immigrants (Motel 2012).
Having analyzed these statistics over several years, I have been able to ascer-
tain that the occupations with the highest numbers of Latino workers are mainly 
low-skilled, low-paying jobs that do not require a college degree. The same holds 
true for occupations with the highest percentages of Latinos (Levine 2001, 2008, 
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2010). Moreover, most of the occupations with the highest percentages of Latinos 
in 2007 and in 2010 also had relatively high percentages of undocumented work-
ers prior to the onset of the recession at the end of 2007 (Passel 2006). Therefore, 
I will attempt to make some inferences about the recession’s impact on Latino 
immigrants in the U.S. labor force by observing the effects it had on Latino work-
ers in general.
Impacts of the Crisis on Latino Workers
At the height of the recession, Latinos had lost 863 800 jobs, or 14 percent of the 
6.2 million jobs that disappeared in the U.S. between 2007 and 2009, which was pro-
portional to their participation in the employed labor force at the time. The most 
severe loss for Latino workers was in the construction industry, where 720 000 
people were thrown out of work. In contrast, simultaneously, in some industries 
and occupations, they experienced slight job gains, which can most likely be 
explained by the lower cost of their labor. However, Latinos registered job losses in 
many of the occupations with relatively high percentages of Latino workers. Table 3 
shows the net changes between 2007 and 2010 in the number of Latino workers 
in the industries that employed the highest numbers of Latinos in 2007.
During 2010, when some sectors of the economy began to show mild signs of 
recovery, Latinos recuperated approximately 300 000 jobs, even though overall 
employment continued to decline. The economy as a whole lost an additional 813 000 
jobs, and therefore Latino participation in the workforce rose to 14.3 percent 
(usdol 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). 
Analysis of the usdol detailed occupations data (see Table 4) shows that from 
2007 to 2010 Latinos suffered net job losses in most of the occupations with high 
numbers of Latino workers. The annual figures reveal that in general the sharpest 
losses occurred between 2008 and 2009, even though the patterns are somewhat 
different for each occupation. Such differences are surely tied to regional and 
local variations in industrial and occupational structures and as well as demo-
graphic variations and different outcomes for different population groups. It is 
definitely noteworthy that the mild recovery observed in some sectors of the econ-
omy produced a net increase in Latino employment in 2010, even though the 
overall level of employment continued to decline. Nevertheless, the total number 
of Latinos employed in 2010, 19 886 000, was still lower than it had been in 2007, 
when there were 20 447 000 Latinos working. Total employment continued to fall 
throughout 2010, but finally reversed the trend in 2011 as employment for non-
Latinos began to rise slowly.
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table 3
industries employing tHe HigHest numbers of latinos in tHe u.s. 
in 2007 and tHe CHanges from 2007 to 2010
Ordered by number of Latinos employed in 2007 
Number of Latinos
Industries  2007  2010
Net change 
2007-2010
Total Latinos employed, 16 years and over 20 446 580 19 886 152 -560 428 
Construction 2 999 568 2 214 788 -784 780 
Restaurants and other food services 1 697 112 1 761 031 63 919 
Elementary and secondary schools 845 937 903 310 57 373 
Landscaping services 560 234 489 700 -70 534 
Hospitals 458 535 543 663 85 128 
Services to buildings and dwellings 438 575 492 348 53 773 
Grocery stores 398 544 413 624 15 080 
Real estate 346 236 308 352 -37 884 
Traveler accommodation 340 752 319 396 -21 356 
Truck transportation 320 280 264 808 -55 472 
Department stores and discount stores 285 375 353 829 68 454 
Private households 282 924 263 465 -19 459 
Justice, public order, and safety activities 260 624 339 710 79 086 
Crop production 258 048 301 104 43 056 
Child day-care services 240 240 241 983 1 743 
Automotive repair and maintenance 238 329 243 080 4 751 
Colleges and universities, including junior colleges 227 392 279 318 51,926 
Banking and related activities 226 884 246 266 19 382 
Other amusement, gambling, and recreation industries 213 048 204 633 -8 415 
Insurance carriers and related activities 202 951 183 464 -19 487 
Employment services 184 851 192 643 7 792 
Home health-care services 184 128 177 504 -6 624 
Groceries and related products 182 427 177 029 -5 398 
Automobile dealers 172 746 150 795 -21 951 
Individual and family services 169 224 208 882 39 658 
Animal slaughtering and processing 167 904 179 832 11 928 
Clothing and accessory stores (except shoes) 167 660 185 031 17 371 
Non-depository credit and related activities 156 800 84 588 -72 212 
Physicians’ offices 153 080 175 902 22 822 
sourCe: Compiled by the author with data from usdol (2008, 2011).
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table 4
oCCupations employing tHe HigHest numbers of latinos in tHe u.s. 
in 2007 and tHe CHanges from 2007 to 2010
Ordered by number of Latinos employed in 2007
     2007    2010
Net change 
2007-2010
Total employed 16 years and over 146 047 000 139 064 000 -6 983 000 
Total Latinos employed 16 years and over 20 446 580 19 886 152 -560 428 
Occupations      Number of Latinos
Construction laborers 789 866 546 077 -243 789 
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 605 500 529 900 -75 600 
Cooks 601 090 634 075 32 985 
Grounds maintenance workers 591 408 523 410 -67 998 
Janitors and building cleaners 582 400 675 474 93 074 
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 576 508 574 056 -2 452 
Cashiers 513 740 506 767 -6 973 
Carpenters 490 656 319 194 -171 462 
Retail salespersons 426 024 450 182 24 158 
Laborers and freight, stock, and material 
movers, [by] hand 377 277 362 100 -15 177 
First-line supervisors/managers of retail 
sales workers 330 720 322 596 -8 124 
Secretaries and administrative assistants 316 293 289 708 -26 585 
Miscellaneous agricultural workers 313 497 330 989 17 492 
Waiters and waitresses 302 634 343 122 40 488 
Painters, construction, and maintenance 292 740 236 980 -55 760 
Customer service representatives 270 297 288 192 17 895 
Stock clerks and order fillers 261 576 281 008 19 432 
Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 259 302 283 416 24 114 
Managers, all other 237 860 246 330 8 470 
Production workers, all other 234 398 209 988 -24 410 
Child care workers 225 288 238 177 12 889 
Receptionists and information clerks 206 063 215 208 9 145 
Elementary and middle school teachers 203 067 205 349 2 282 
Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators 199 206 165 025 -34 181 
Supervisors/managers office 
and administrative support 184 077 167 277 -16 800 
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Packers and packagers, [by] hand 167 272 166 439 -833 
Pipelayers, plumbers, pipefitters, 
and steamfitters 160 310 109 408 -50 902 
Food preparation workers 159 354 169 929 10 575 
Automotive service technicians 
and mechanics 155 583 162 806 7 223 
Teacher assistants 153 892 145 866 -8 026 
Office clerks, general 151 386 155 064 3 678 
Supervisors/managers construction trades 
and extraction 145 962 108 735 -37 227 
Personal and home care aides 144 008 171 248 27 240 
Food service managers 143 286 140 160 -3 126 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 141 550 114 136 -27 414 
Industrial truck and tractor operators 135 898 159 680 23 782 
Electricians 130 416 96 740 -33 676 
Drywall installers, ceiling tile installers, 
and tapers 124 352 100 206 -24 146 
sourCe: Compiled by the author with data from usdol (2008, 2011).
table 4 (Continuation)
oCCupations employing tHe HigHest numbers of latinos in tHe u.s. 
in 2007 and tHe CHanges from 2007 to 2010
Ordered by number of Latinos employed in 2007 
       2007     2010
Net change 
2007-2010
The employment behavior in specific industries and occupations and the 
impacts for specific groups in the labor force deserves a much more detailed anal-
ysis than can be provided here. In general, Rakesh Kochhar and his collaborators 
(2010) confirmed that during the first year of economic recovery, starting in July 
2009, the unemployment rate for immigrants began to fall slightly (a decline of 0.6 
percent), even though unemployment for native born workers continued to rise by 
0.5 percent. In spite of this employment growth, the total number of immigrants 
employed in mid-2010 remained below the pre-recession level. This was also the 
case among Latinos. The unemployment rate for Latino immigrants decreased 
slightly, from 11.0 percent in the second quarter of 2009 to 10.1 percent in the 
second quarter of 2010; meanwhile the rate for U.S.-born Latinos continued to 
rise, from 12.9 percent to 14.0 percent. Thus, as the economy began to turn around 
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and growth resumed, it seems that most of the initial gains in employment were 
for foreign-born rather than U.S.-born Latinos.
However, this small rise in immigrant employment, during what was officially 
the first year of economic recovery, was accompanied by a 4.5 percent decline in 
their earnings, whereas earnings for the native-born population fell by only 1 per-
cent. Furthermore, Latino immigrants suffered the greatest wage losses. Their 
median weekly earnings decreased 1.3 percent from 2008 to mid-2009 and an 
additional 5.8 percent by the second quarter of 2010. As Kochhar points out, 
“Hispanics are the only group of workers whose median earnings decreased during 
both the recession and the recovery”; and moreover, “The downward momentum 
in earnings for Latinos was led by immigrants” (2010, 20). As a result of these 
changes, by the second quarter of 2010, the median weekly earnings of native 
born workers stood at US$653, and for foreign-born workers it was US$525. At the 
same time, the median for all Latinos was US$480 and only US$422 for Latino immi-
grants (Kochhar 2010, 20). 
Undoubtedly, Latino workers and Latino immigrant workers have directly suf-
fered the effects of the most severe recession in the U.S. since the 1930s. They 
are among the millions who lost their jobs, or whose family members lost their 
jobs, and later lost their homes because they could not meet the mortgage pay-
ments. Most of the U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents who became 
unemployed during this recession have received at least some relief from unem-
ployment insurance payments, which are nevertheless certainly insufficient to 
compensate for their losses. Obviously, none of the unemployed, undocumented 
immigrant workers have received any benefits whatsoever.
Furthermore, the repercussions, both direct and indirect, of this “great reces-
sion” for Latino immigrants in particular, and to some extent for Latinos in general, 
go far beyond the immediate economic impacts. In some places, especially in 
some of the southeastern states, the hard times experienced throughout the coun-
try have generated hostility toward those who a few years earlier had been sought 
out and even actively recruited to fill thousands of jobs that local workers would 
not accept. I will briefly refer to the case of the state of Georgia, where I conducted 
field work during a sabbatical stay from August 2009 to July 2010, to show how the 
recession contributed to generating an extremely adverse social and political cli-
mate for Latino workers and their families.
Growing Hostility toward Latino Immigrants in Georgia
The number of immigrants in Georgia has grown tremendously over the last two 
decades —this is also the case in other states in the Southeast or other regions where 
previously there had been few immigrant workers—, rising from just 173 000 in 
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1990 to approximately one million in 2010. Two-thirds of these recent immigrants 
have settled in and around metropolitan Atlanta. They come from many different 
countries of origin, but more than half are Latin Americans and approximately 
one-third are from Mexico. Mainly as a result of these recent migratory flows, the 
Latino population in Georgia has grown from 109 000 in 1990 to 853 700 and 
increased from 1.7 to 9 percent of the state’s total population.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center’s “Demographic Profile of Hispanics in 
Georgia, 2010,” the state’s Latino population is now evenly divided between immi-
grants and U.S.-born Latinos. However the median age of Latino immigrants 
in the state is 32 and for U.S. born Latinos, it is only 11. This means that a signifi-
cant majority of the working-age Latinos are immigrants. The proportion of immi-
grants in Georgia’s Latino population is significantly higher than the national rate of 
37.1 percent in 2010 (Pew 2012; Motel 2012). Median income for Latinos in Geor-
gia was US$17 300 in 2010, in other words, US$2 049 less than in 2008 and US$2 700 
below the national median for all Latino workers in 2010. In contrast, median 
income for Latinos who worked full time year round was $29 000 in 2010, with a consid-
erable difference between the median for immigrants (US$25 000) and U.S.-born 
Latinos (US$34 800). 
Over half the immigrants in Georgia are presumed to be undocumented. 
However, this was not such a problematic issue during the economic boom years 
of the 1990s and early 2000s. It is well known that in the mid-1990s, undocu-
mented Mexicans were actively recruited to work in constructing the installations 
for the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, just as they had previously been sought to work 
in Dalton’s carpet mills and Gainesville’s poultry processing plants (Amescua 2006). 
However, only a decade later the political and economic climate had changed con-
siderably. In 2006, Georgia began to pass anti-immigrant laws that affected undoc-
umented workers. Four counties with high percentages of Latino immigrants have 
established 287(g) agreements with the federal Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment Agency (iCe),7 which allow local police to make inquiries about a person’s 
immigration status and as a result have led to the detention and deportation of 
thousands of undocumented immigrants.
Many of the 91 persons I interviewed at the Mexican Consulate in Atlanta 
reported that they had initially been attracted to Georgia because of the abundant 
job opportunities there and that often wages were higher and the cost of living 
lower than in other regions. The annualized individual median income of those 
interviewed was US$23 400, not much lower than the US$25 000 median for 
Latino immigrants nationwide. Median household income (for those interviewed) 
7  I am referring to what are known as “287(g) agreements” derived from section 287(g), “Delegation of 
Immigration Authority,” of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in accordance with the reforms estab-
lished as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of September 30, 1996. 
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was US$35 880, only US$1 020 below the national median for Latino immigrants. 
Almost half (48 percent) reported more than one person working per household. 
Most had been living in the U.S. for 10 years or less and only 36.4 percent had 
lived elsewhere in the U.S. before coming to Georgia. In all, 30 percent worked in 
construction-related occupations and 15.7 percent worked in restaurants.
Ten of the ninety-one persons interviewed reported having lost their jobs 
because of the recession, but only two said that they were planning to return to 
Mexico for that reason. Most of those interviewed had not returned to Mexico at 
any time since they arrived in the U.S. and had no plans to do so in the near future. 
Three women reported having entered the labor force because their husbands had 
lost their jobs or had their working hours cut back. Thirty-three persons (36.3 per-
cent of those interviewed) reported working fewer hours because of forced layoffs 
for several days or even weeks and in some cases months, and/or a considerable 
drop in the amount of overtime they had previously been accustomed to working. 
This was most prevalent for those employed in construction. However, when the 
interviews were conducted (between February and May 2010), almost all of them 
said that working hours had begun to rise again somewhat.
Some reported having to cut back on spending because of the recession and 
that their incomes were insufficient to cover their living expenses. They said the 
cost of living was going up at the same time that their income was going down. A 
few said that some family members and friends had left the state of Georgia 
because of the economic conditions related to the recession. Others mentioned the 
rise in detentions and “persecution” of Latinos as situations somehow related to 
the economic crisis. However, in Georgia in 2010, Mexican immigrants did not 
speak very freely about the problems they had because of being undocumented. In 
this respect, my experience was quite different from what it had been in Los Angeles 
ten years earlier, before 9/11, and long before Arizona’s sb1070, or Georgia’s Hb87 
and the 287g agreements in four Georgia counties.
It was mainly by means of other experiences, rather than from direct inter-
views, that I was able to perceive the effects that anti-immigrant actions have had 
on Latino communities in Georgia. By working as a volunteer in the office of an 
organization that defends Latinos’ human rights in Georgia, I could see the impact 
that detention and deportation policies were having on Latino residents in the 
state. My main task was simply to answer phone calls, take note of the situations 
callers reported, and write down the pertinent information. I also attended various 
meetings with community members seeking information about how to cope with 
the enforcement measures implemented in the counties where they lived and 
worked. Based on everything I saw and heard as a result of this experience, I am 
convinced that the intimidation, fear, emotional suffering, and human rights viola-
tions caused by anti-immigrant attitudes and persecutory actions prevalent in 
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Georgia over the past few years have had —and will continue to have— a more 
profound, devastating, and lasting impact on the individuals and communities 
affected than all the hardships and difficulties caused by the recession.
Information from a 2012 Department of Homeland Security report provides 
an example of the terrible injustices committed with the pretext of combatting 
what is referred to as “illegal” immigration. Thousands of minors under the age of 18, 
who are U.S. citizens by birth, have been separated from their parents; the parents, 
in turn, have lost parental rights and custody of their children because of their 
detention and deportation due to being undocumented immigrants. The report 
“Deportation of Parents of U.S.-Born Citizens” (usdHs 2012) provides data on the 
number of deportation, exclusion, and removal orders sought and obtained by iCe 
in order to expel from the U.S. foreigners who have U.S.-citizen minor children. 
During the first six months of 2011 (January 1 through June 30, 2011), iCe reports 
having expelled from the United States 46 846 foreigners who have at least one 
minor child that is a U.S. citizen.
It is interesting to note that 21 860 of the persons reported as expelled from 
the country had been detained for some period of time prior to their deportation 
and the numbers are registered by “District/area of responsibility (aor) in which 
the removal order was obtained.” The Atlanta district/aor showed the greatest 
number of removals, 2 249 or 10.3 percent of the total, reported for the six month 
period (usdHs 2012). In the vast majority of these cases, the circumstances would 
not have warranted detention, except for the fact that the individual involved was 
an undocumented immigrant. A recent study carried out by the Applied Research 
Center found that “a disturbing number of children with detained or deported par-
ents are now in foster care.” It was also the case that “in jurisdictions where local 
police aggressively participate in immigration enforcement (e.g., 287[g] and 
Secure Communities), children are more likely to be separated from their parents.” 
Furthermore, “once children of undocumented immigrants enter foster care, [this] 
research indicates that their families face significant barriers to family reunification” 
(Freed Wessler 2011, 5, 17, 27).
Conclusions
Attracting immigrant labor to the United States has played a fundamental role in 
the nation’s economic development throughout its history, and the migratory flows 
have generally adapted to the ups and downs in economic activity. Latin American 
immigrants have become an important component of labor force growth in the 
U.S. over the past few decades. Moreover, there is a clear tendency toward con-
solidating labor market niches for specific groups of immigrants. The demand for 
low-skilled labor to carry out undesirable tasks in low-skilled services, construction, 
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food processing, and light manufacturing for low wages rose considerably in the 
late twentieth century, just as new waves of immigrants from Mexico and other 
Latin American countries arrived who were more than willing to take such jobs. 
Over this period, the labor demand in the U.S. and the labor supply from 
Mexico evolved in such a way that Mexico became the primary source of low-
skilled, low-wage workers in several branches of activity in various parts of the 
U.S. Low-skilled Mexican workers, especially if they are undocumented, have be -
come an ideal source of “disposable labor” that is available “just in time.” They have 
proven to be readily available and easily expendable. They can be easily attracted 
or recruited in boom times and are totally expendable when the economy contracts. 
They can be laid off and even deported with no obligation on the part of, or disad-
vantage for, their employers.
The severe recession in 2008-2009 has momentarily stemmed the arrival of 
new labor migrants, especially the undocumented. Such changes in supply flows 
show the increasing complementarity and a certain degree of de facto integration 
of the Mexican and U.S. labor markets. The supply from Mexico is more or less 
adaptable —or can be forced to adjust— to demand conditions north of the border. 
From 2009 through 2011, given the severity of the recession and the increasingly 
hostile political climate in the U.S., iCe removed an average of 1 000 undocumented 
immigrants a day, and the majority of them were Mexicans. 
My central conclusion is that three conditioning factors have all combined to 
propitiate a hostile climate toward Latin American immigrants: 1) generalized 
anti-immigrant sentiments that flourished after September 11, 2001; 2) the grow-
ing numbers of immigrants, with greatly increased presence in new destinations; 
and 3) the severe recession, beginning at the end of 2007, with high and persistent 
unemployment rates since. This is despite the important role these immigrants 
have played in the country’s economic dynamism in recent decades up until the 
onset of the recession. In several states in the Southeast, these factors interacted 
with vestiges of racism and intolerance present in the region to exacerbate anti-
immigrant feelings and attitudes and facilitate the passing of hostile and punitive 
state laws that would criminalize undocumented immigrants if they are allowed to 
take effect. Therefore, it is likely —and also most unfortunate— that the social 
effects of this deep and prolonged recession will be felt for a considerable time 
after economic growth has been restored because of the anti-immigrant senti-
ments that took root and flourished in the midst of it. 
46 ELAINE LEVINE
Bibliography
amesCua, Cristina
2006 “La cultura mexicana en Estados Unidos: fuerza local y adaptabilidad glo bal,” 
in Lourdes Arizpe, comp., Retos culturales de México frente a la globa lización. 
Mexico City: H. Cámara de Diputados, lix Legislatura / Miguel Ángel Por-
rúa, 99-126.
CounCil of eConomiC advisers
2007 Immigration’s Economic Impact, Government Printing Office, http://www 
.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=ERP, accessed 
November 29, 2010.
ennis, sHaron r., merarys ríos-vargas, and nora g. albert
2011 “The Hispanic Population: 2010,” http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/
briefs/c2010br-04.pdf, accessed October 3, 2013.
freed wessler, setH 
2011 “Shattered Families, the Perilous Intersection of Immigration Enforcement 
and the Child Welfare System,” Applied Research Center, November, ARC 
_Report_Shattered_Families_FULL_REPORT_Nov2011Release.pdf.
gibson, Campbell J., and emily lennon
1999 “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United 
States: 1850-1990,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, http://
www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029 
.html, accessed September 29, 2000.
giorguli, silvia e., and selene gaspar
2008 Inserción ocupacional, ingreso y prestaciones de los migrantes mexicanos en 
Estados Unidos. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Población. 
illEGal iMMiGration rEforM and rEsPonsibility act of sEPtEMbEr 30, 1996 
1996 http://www.theodora.com/ina_96.html, accessed May 13, 2010.
iMMiGration and nationality act
2010 http://www.theodora.com/ina_96.html, accessed May 13, 2010.
inegi (instituto naCional de estadístiCa y geografía)
2012 “Resultados de la Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo,” Press bulletin 
 THE IMPACT OF THE 2008-2009 ECONOMIC CRISIS 47
no. 401/12, November 9, Aguascalientes, Mexico, http://www.inegi.org 
.mx/inegi/contenidos/espanol/prensa/comunicados/estrucbol.pdf.
koCHHar, rakesH
2012 “Labor Force Growth Slows, Hispanic Share Grows,” Pew Hispanic Center, 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/13/labor-force-growth-slows-his 
panic-share-grows-2/, accessed February 13, 2012.
koCHHar, rakesH, in collaboration with C. soledad espinosa and
rebeCCa Hinze-pifer
2010 “After the Great Recession: Foreign Born Gain Jobs; Native Born Lose 
Jobs,” Pew Hispanic Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/10/29/
after-the-great-recession-brforeign-born-gain-jobs-native-born-lose-jobs/, 
accessed March 16, 2011.
levine, elaine
2010 “Los hispanos/latinos en Estados Unidos,” in José Luis Sánchez Gavi and 
Adriana Sletza Ortega Ramírez, comps., Migración México-Estados Unidos: 
textos introductorios. Puebla, Mexico: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma 
de Puebla / Lunarena, 149-187.
2008 “Transnacionalismo e incorporación laboral de migrantes mexicanos en Es-
tados Unidos y las perspectivas de ascenso socioeconómico para sus hijos,” 
in Elaine Levine, ed., La migración y los latinos en Estados Unidos: visiones y 
conexiones. Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte, 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 253-276.
2001 Los nuevos pobres de Estados Unidos: los hispanos. Mexico City: Miguel 
Ángel Porrúa / Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas / Centro de Inves-
tigaciones sobre América del Norte, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México.
massey, douglas, ed.
2008 New Faces in New Places, the Changing Geography of American Immigration. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
migration poliCy institute
2009 “mpi Data Hub, Migration Facts, Stats, and Maps,” Migration Policy Insti-
tute, http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/, accessed June 6, 2011.
motel, setH
2012 “Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2010,” Pew Hispanic 
48 ELAINE LEVINE
Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/02/21/statistical-portrait-of 
-hispanics-in-the-united-states-2010/, accessed February 21, 2012.
odem, mary e., and elaine laCy, eds.
2009 Latino Immigrants and the Transformation of the U.S. South. Athens, Georgia: 
University of Georgia Press.
passel, Jeffrey
2006 “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the 
U.S. Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey,” 
Pew Hispanic Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf, 
accessed April 8, 2009.
passel, Jeffrey s., and d’vera CoHn
2011 “Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010,” 
Washington, D.C., Pew Hispanic Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
2011/02/01/unauthorized-immigrant-population-brnational-and-state 
-trends-2010/, accessed February 5, 2012.
2009a “A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States,” Pew His-
panic Center, April 14, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/ a-por 
trait-of-unauthorized-immigrants-in-the-united-states/.
2009b “Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave?” Pew His-
panic Center, July 22, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/112.pdf.
pew HispaniC Center
2012 “Demographic Profile of Hispanics in Georgia, 2010,” http://www.pewhis 
panic.org/states/?stateid=GA, accessed February 20, 2012. 
2011 “The Mexican-American Boom: Births Overtake Immigration,” Pew His-
panic Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/07/14/the-mexican 
-american-boom-brbirths-overtake-immigration/, accessed July 20, 2011.
2006 “From 200 Million to 300 Million: The Numbers behind Population Growth, 
Fact Sheet,” Pew Hispanic Center, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/10/10/
from-200-million-to-300-million-the-numbers-behind-population-growth/, 
accessed October 24, 2009.
roberts, sam
2008 “In a Generation, Minorities May Be the U.S. Majority,” The New York 
Times, August 13, http://nytimes.com/2008/08/14/washington/14census 
.html?ei.
 THE IMPACT OF THE 2008-2009 ECONOMIC CRISIS 49
sum, andrew, neeta fogg, and paul Harrington
2002 “Immigrant Workers and the Great American Job Machine: The Contribu-
tions of New Foreign Immigration to National and Regional Labor Force 
Growth in the 1990s.” Report prepared for the National Business Round-
table, Washington, D.C., August.
u.s. Census bureau
2012 “Census 2000 Foreign-Born Profiles,” last revised in October 2010, http://
www.census.gov/population/foreign/data/stp-159-2000.html.
2008 Tables 1 and 2 in “The Hispanic Population in the United States: 2008 
Detailed Tables, Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement 2008,” http://www.census.gov/population/hispanic/data/2008.
html, accessed February 7, 2010.
usdHs (united states department of Homeland seCurity, u.s. immigration 
and Customs enforCement)
2012 “Deportation of Parents of U.S.-born Citizens, Fiscal Year 2011 Report to 
Congress, Second Semi-Annual Report, March 26, 2012,” http://www.lirs 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ICE-DEPORT-OF-PARENTS-OF-US 
-CIT-FY-2011.pdf.
usdol (u.s. department of labor, bureau of labor statistiCs)
2012a “2012 Employment and Earnings Online. Household Survey Data, Annual 
Average Household Data,” http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/2012/cps/annual.
htm#empstat, accessed  March 14, 2012.
2012b “Spotlight on Statistics, The Recession of 2007–2009, February 2012,” 
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/, accessed March 16, 2012.
2012c “News Release, The Employment Situation-July 2012,” http://www.bls 
.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_08032012.pdf, accessed August 3, 2012.
2011 Employment and Earnings 58, no. 1, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn 
201101.pdf, accessed March 9, 2012. 
2010 Employment and Earnings 57, no. 1, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn 
201001.pdf, accessed March 20, 2011.
2009 Employment and Earnings 56, no. 1, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn 
200901.pdf, accessed March 10, 2010.
2008 Employment and Earnings 55, no. 1, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn 
200801.pdf, accessed July 9, 2009.
2007 Employment and Earnings 54, no. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
50 ELAINE LEVINE
1991 Employment and Earnings 38, no. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
world bank
2011 “Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011,” http://siteresources.world 
bank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf, accessed Novem-
ber 7, 2012.
IMMIGRATION AND POLICY: 
NEW CHALLENGES AFTER THE ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN PORTUGAL
Maria Lucinda Fonseca*
Jennifer McGarrigle**
Introduction
Until relatively recently, like other Southern European countries, Portugal was a 
country of emigration. Political and economic hardship and lack of opportunities 
acted as motivating factors compelling people to search for prospects in more 
advanced European economies or across the Atlantic. However, at the end of the 
1980s following the entry of Portugal into the eeC, the economic tide began to 
turn, leading to the civil construction boom in the 1990s. As a result, from that 
point through the turn of the century, Portugal became a destination for interna-
tional labor migrants. Labor migrants arriving through both formal and informal 
networks from Eastern Europe and Asia and a new wave from Brazil added to the 
migrants that had arrived earlier from the former colonies, namely Portuguese-
speaking African countries.
The sudden change in Portugal’s migration balance meant the country was ill-
prepared in policy and legislative terms for the incorporation of the new and 
diverse migrant groups. As such, immigration policy developed retrospectively. 
Despite this, the subsequent development in immigration and integration policy 
as well as nationality law has attracted attention as a frequently cited example of 
best-practice across Europe. At present, however, Portugal finds itself in a severe 
financial crisis. As a consequence, a growing body of evidence suggests not only that 
the inflow of migrants into Portugal has slowed, but that return migration is occur-
ring to some countries, particularly Brazil and Eastern Europe. 
The current economic climate poses major questions about how immigrants 
will react and be impacted by the economic downturn. This article explores these 
processes, illustrating the link between national economic growth and the rise in 
immigration in the 1990s through the turn of the century. It considers the same 
relationship, albeit with the inverse direction, in the post-crisis period in Portugal. 
In addition to changes in flows, stock, and policy, attitudes toward immigrants and 
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inter-group trust in Portugal compared with Greece and Spain are examined using 
recent survey data from the geitonies project.1 
The Dynamics of International Migration and Economic 
Growth in Portugal over the Last Two Decades
In the 1990s, Portugal underwent a migratory transition process that transformed 
a traditional country of emigration into one of immigration.2 In the time between the 
1981 and 1991 population censuses, net migration reached 404 747, becoming 
the main factor in demographic growth.
This is mainly due to the significant increase in the number of foreigners set-
tling in Portugal after 1998 and especially after 2000 (see Figure 1). This phenom-
enon, which cannot be dissociated from the favorable economic conditions in 
Portugal during this period, has also been linked to other more structural causes, 
namely the Portuguese population’s increasing skill levels, which contributed to ris-
ing labor market expectations, the maintenance of low-cost and labor-intensive sec-
tors, the relevance of highly seasonal economic sectors (e.g., tourism-related activi-
ties, construction, etc.), the consolidation of the heavily segmented labor market, 
the size of the informal economy, and also the perception of Portugal as an “easy 
country of entry and stay” in the EU context (Fonseca 2008; Baganha, Marques, and 
Góis 2004). This process started somewhat earlier in other Southern European 
countries like Spain and Greece and has been explained by various factors such as 
joining the eeC in the 1980s and the demographic and economic transition, namely 
the coexistence of labor- and capital-intensive activity sectors in the context of a 
modernizing service economy (King, Fielding, and Black 1997). 
The increase in foreigners registered in 2001 (Figure 1) is the statistical con-
sequence of the implementation of the stay permits scheme under the changes 
that were introduced in the 1998 Foreigners Law by Decree Law No. 4/2001. This 
enabled the regularization of the status of more than 180 000 foreigners between 
2001 and 2004, the majority from Eastern European countries (in particular, the 
Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, and Romania) and Brazil. From 2004 onward, at the end 
of an extended period of public works, in the context of economic recession and 
more efficient mechanisms for controlling irregular migration and the employment 
of undocumented workers, the trend observed in previous years reversed, with a 
1  The authors gathered data in the  framework of the geitonies project  (Generating Interethnic Toler-
ance and Neighbourhood Integration in European Urban Spaces), which lasted from May 1, 2008 to 
April 30, 2011, and was funded by the European Union’s Seventh framework Programme.
2  More than 3.5 million Portuguese nationals are currently living abroad (Observatório da Emigração 
2008).
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reduction in the number of legally documented foreign citizens. The decline mainly 
affected the Ukrainian community. However, between 2005 and 2009, the num-
ber of foreign citizens still grew due mostly to the inflows of Chinese, Brazilian, 
Moldovan, and Romanian immigrants and the regularization of the status of some 
undocumented immigrants (Malheiros and Fonseca 2011).
The worsening of the country’s economic and financial situation is reflected in 
decreased immigration to Portugal, the increased emigration of Portuguese citi-
zens, as well as in return flows to sending countries or re-emigration to other desti-
nations of a growing number of foreigners (Pires, Machado, Peixoto, and Vaz 
2010). Thus, in 2010, the number of immigrants decreased by 1.97 percent, going 
against the growth trend observed over the previous two decades. However, it is 
important to stress that part of this decline can also be explained by the acquisi-
tion of Portuguese nationality by a considerable number of foreigners residing in 
the country (sef 2011).
As far as emigration is concerned, Malheiros (2011, 135) contends that some 
migratory flows to traditional destinations such as Switzerland, Germany, and 
Luxemburg were reactivated and new destinations such as the UK, Spain, and Angola 
figure 1
evolution of tHe number of legal foreigners 
(all Categories) settled in portugal (1990-2010)*
*  Until 2000, only foreigners with residence permits. From 2001 to 2004, foreigners with residence 
permits and stay permits (title introduced in 2001). In 2005, 2006, and 2007, foreigners with resi-
dence permits, renewed stay permits, and long-term visas. In 2008, 2009, and 2010, foreigners with 
residence permits and long-term visas. 
sourCe: sef (n.d.a).
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have emerged. It is estimated that in the second half of the last decade, there were 
approximately 70 000 annual departures.
The growth of immigration to Portugal during the last two decades was 
accompanied by the diversification of sending areas. As is the case in other 
Southern European countries, like Spain and Italy, the dynamics of immigration to 
Portugal are characterized by a growing diversity in migrants’ countries of origin, 
including migratory flows of workers and family members from Brazil, Portuguese-
speaking African countries (palop), Eastern and Central Europe, and Romania, as 
well as highly skilled migrants, retirees, and lifestyle migrants from other European 
Union member states.
At the end of 2010, the largest groups of foreigners in Portugal were Brazilians 
(119 363), Ukrainians (49 505), and Cape Verdeans (43 979). Among the EU 
member states, the Romanians and the British were the largest groups (36 830 
and 17 196, respectively). In addition, as Figure 2 shows, Guinea-Bissau, China, 
Moldova, and Saint Tome and Prince are also included in the top 10 nationalities 
of documented foreign citizens settled in Portugal.
figure 2
doCumented foreign Citizens residing in portugal 
(main nationalities) (2010)
sourCe: Developed by the authors with information from sef (n.d.b).
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Concomitant to the growing diversity of sending countries, changes also 
occurred in the migratory processes and in migrants’ social and professional pro-
files. The development of the migratory chain from Eastern Europe represents a 
turning point in the traditional processes of immigration to Portugal. The organiza-
tional strategies based on social networks that characterized immigration from 
palop have been replaced by a system organized by international labor recruiting 
networks. Another new element brought about by the rising flow of immigrants 
from Eastern Europe is related to their relatively high educational and professional 
skill levels. A large proportion has intermediate-level technical training or higher 
education. Despite this, like immigrants of African origin, they work predominant-
ly in socially devalued and low-paid activities such as civil construction (men) and 
cleaning and domestic services (women). However, a considerable proportion of 
immigrants work in agriculture, specifically in the regions of Alentejo, Ribatejo, 
and Oeste, and in some industrial activities, particularly labor-intensive ones in 
the Littoral North and Center (Fonseca, Ormond et al. 2005; Fonseca 2008).
A recent study by Reis, Serra, Tolda, and Pereira (2010) clearly demonstrates 
the relationship between economic growth and the expansion of the labor force 
(extensive growth model), where in a context of a specific economic growth cycle 
(1996-2002), Portugal became a country of immigration (Figure 3). This labor-
intensive model results in low levels of innovation and a lack of articulation with the 
European economic context. As a consequence, there was a divergence in compari-
son with the EU average and stagnant economic growth, aggravated by the effects 
of the international economic and financial crisis. 
The Spanish and Greek economies have also profoundly contracted since 
2008. In the case of Greece, due to the external debt crisis, the recession has become 
more serious and gdp decreased by 2 percent in 2009, 4.5 percent in 2010, and, 
according to Eurostat estimates, the decline will reach 5.5 percent in 2011. Spain, 
contrary to Greece and Portugal, began to show signs of recovery in 2011, although the 
most recent Eurostat estimates (0.7 percent) point toward a much lower figure 
than that defined by the government at the beginning of the year. Moreover, Spain 
has one of the highest unemployment rates in the EU: 22.8 percent in October 2011.
The economic benefits of immigration to Portugal have been identified by sever-
al research studies (Ferreira, Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Corrêa d’Almeida 2003, 
Corrêa d’Almeida and Duarte Silva 2007; Reis, Serra, Tolda, and Pereira 2010; 
Carvalho 2004; Faustino, Peixoto, and Baptista 2009), in particular its positive 
impact on gdp and public finance. The Portuguese labor market has also benefited 
from immigration. Migrants have occupied low-paying jobs that were difficult to 
fill, thus avoiding any negative impact on the employment of Portuguese citizens 
(Ferreira, Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Peixoto 2007). So, the negative impacts of 
immigration on the labor market are mainly felt by immigrants themselves through 
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continued low wages and high precariousness. Therefore, there is little competi-
tion between immigrant and native workers or between immigrants from the more 
recent migratory waves and those from previous flows (Pereira 2010).
Over the last two decades, the activity/employment rates of both foreign-born 
men and women are above those of the native-born. According to data from the 
Employment Survey conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (ine, or 
Statistics Portugal) in 2009, the foreign population residing in Portugal accounted 
for 4.5 percent of the total active population, whereas their global activity rate was 
77.1 percent, 15 points higher than that of the Portuguese (61.9 percent). In an 
analysis by gender, one can observe higher differences among men with an activity 
rate of 84.4 percent among immigrants and 68.2 percent among Portuguese 
nationals. The equivalent proportions for women are lower than those for men, 
but foreign female workers also have a higher activity rate than their Portuguese 
counterparts: 70.5 percent and 56 percent, respectively. Despite the fact that this is 
partly explained by the younger age structure of foreigners, it is worth mentioning 
that the difference still persists when the activity rate is controlled for age (oeCd 
2008). In addition, it should be noted that the number of immigrant workers is 
most likely underestimated, due to the fact that a considerable number labor in the 
informal sector, namely in construction and domestic work.3 Therefore, according 
3  Several authors estimate that Portugal’s informal economy may contribute more than 20 percent to 
gnp (Schneider and Klinglmair 2004; mtss/dgeep 2006; Abreu and Peixoto 2008).
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to some estimates, the proportion of immigrants in the total active population may 
reach 6 percent (Ferreira, Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Peixoto 2008).
The Evolution of Policy and Legislation 
In Response to Immigration
Until the mid-1990s, immigration policy in Portugal was rudimentary, focusing to 
a large extent on the regulation of flows and responding primarily to the process of 
post-colonial transition. While it has been retrospectively and gradually integrated 
into the legislative framework, it can be said to have developed rapidly and quite 
uniformly. This is due to an assortment of factors including the very fast growth in 
the number of foreigners in the country, their relative and visible disadvantage, 
and the expansion of lobbies and the influence of the European Union. In addition, 
the lack of a strong extreme-right party has meant that immigration has not been 
politicized to the extent that it has in other EU states. 
Regardless of political awareness of the illegal character of migration to Portugal 
from Portuguese-speaking Africa after decolonization and entry into the EU, little was 
done to regulate this flow (Baganha 2005; Peixoto and Sabino 2009) until the two 
processes of extraordinary regularization in the 1990s. In 1992/1993, the papers of 
around 40 000 undocumented migrants were regularized and of approximately 
35 000 more in 1996.
The policy focus broadened in scope under the Socialists (1995-2002) to tackle 
issues of integration (Peixoto and Sabino 2009, 36). To this end, a less restrictive 
immigration law (244/98) was enforced in 1998, which strengthened the principle 
of equality of rights and made provision for family reunion and regularization 
(Fonseca, Caldeira, and Esteves 2002; Baganha and Malheiros 2000; Pires 2003). 
Despite these advances, some authors argue that immigration policy only really 
developed after the turn of the century in response to the increasing visibility of 
illegal migrants and claims of labor shortages (Fonseca, Malheiros et al. 2002; 
Peixoto and Sabino 2009). For the first time, economic issues became central in the 
immigration debate (Fonseca, Malheiros, and Silva 2005). Decree Law no. 4 was 
enforced in 2001, under which the circumstances of 185 000 migrant workers were 
regularized (Fonseca and Goracci 2007). “Stay permits” allowed legal residence 
for one year, renewable for up to five years (Fonseca, Malheiros, and Silva 2005), 
after which immigrants could apply for a residence permit (Peixoto and Sabino 2009) 
and provisions for family members were made. A quasi-quota system was also 
implemented to respond to the demand for labor. Fonseca, Caldeira, and Esteves 
(2002) assert that this was the first step toward bringing immigration policy in line 
with eC regulations. In practice, however, this system served to regularize the circum-
stances of existing migrants as opposed to recruiting new ones (Fonseca, Malheiros, 
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and Silva 2005). The Social Democrats passed the more restrictive Decree Law 
no. 34 in February 2003, restricting entries and family reunion, strengthening the 
mechanisms to control irregular migration, and reinforcing the quota system as 
the principal mechanism of control (Peixoto and Sabino 2009). This law has been 
criticized as having overlooked human rights in favor of the labor market, though it 
proved largely unsuccessful in curbing illegal migration and in meeting short-term 
labor demands. Following this, two consecutive regularization processes took place.
In 2007, a new immigration law (no. 23/2007, July 4), still in effect today, was 
approved under the Socialist government. In short, previous legal admission titles 
were simplified and reduced in number and include the short-term, transit, and 
stopover visas and the two main visas, the temporary permit and the residence per-
mit. Preconditions for acquiring the latter include residence for five years, means 
of subsistence, no criminal record, and Portuguese language skills. Family reunifi-
cation provisions were widened and a less cumbersome quota system implement-
ed (Peixoto and Sabino 2009). Harsher disincentives were introduced to counter 
illegal immigration and combat trafficking, while treatment of illegal migrants was 
made more favorable. The law also enables minors born in Portugal (and their par-
ents) who attend school to obtain residence permits without a prior visa. Recently, 
in response to the current economic crisis, a joint decree of the Ministries of 
Interior and Labor and Social Solidarity (Decree no. 760/2009, July 16) relaxed 
means of subsistence as a precondition to remain in the country for involuntarily 
unemployed immigrants.
Citizenship, like immigration policy, was given little political consideration until 
after decolonization. Fears of mass migration culminated in the 1975 Nationality 
Law (Decree-Law no. 308-A/75, June 24), which to a large extent restricted na -
tionality to those born in European Portugal or the descendants of emigrants. By de f-
inition, many African immigrants residing in Portugal became foreigners. Upheld 
by similar principles, the 1981 Nationality Law (Law no. 37/81, October 3) transferred 
the criteria of ius soli (right of territory/soil) to ius sanguinis (Fonseca, Malheiros et al. 
2002). The law became even more restrictive with its 1994 amendment (Law 
no. 25/94, August 19). 
With the increase in the immigrant population, it became clear over time that 
the legislative framework needed to adapt to the new reality. Yet, the legislature 
only embraced the question of citizenship in 2005. Finally, in 2006, a new national-
ity law was approved (Law no. 2/2006, April 17, regulated by Decree Law no. 237-
A/2006, December 14). The new law updated the legislative framework in line 
with the European Convention on Nationality (Healy 2011a). It strengthened 
once again the principle of ius soli (right of territory). The Portuguese-born descen-
dants of immigrants who had either been stateless or inherited their parent’s 
nationality now had a subjective right to Portuguese nationality, the right to apply 
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for it. The new law also extended the right of nationality to a much wider group of 
immigrants and their descendants (Healy 2011b). 
Thus presently, Portuguese nationality may be obtained by way of attribution 
(nationality of origin), by effect of law or will, which corresponds to cases of citi-
zens who are Portuguese by origin, or by the acquisition of nationality (derived 
nationality). This last case can result from three situations: by the effect of will, by 
adoption, or by naturalization.
The new law reduced the requirements and residence can now be proved by 
any type of valid residence title. Language proficiency remains a requirement and 
individuals cannot have been sentenced to three years or more in prison under Por-
tuguese law. However, moral and civil rectitude and means of subsistence have been 
eliminated, eradicating socio-economic discrimination from the procedure (Healy 
2011a, 20).
A six-year legal residence requirement is applicable to first-generation immi-
grants. For Portuguese-born children or grandchildren of immigrants the principle 
of ius soli was reinstated in specific cases. The new law also recognizes de facto unions 
between heterosexual or homosexual couples. The acquisition of Portuguese nation-
ality only implies the loss of nationality of origin if the law of the country of origin 
determines it (for example in Ukrainian law).
While the policy and legislative measures outlined above have had undeniable 
impacts on integrating immigrants, integration grew into a policy goal in its own 
right. The main institutional body currently responsible for implementing integra-
tion policy and coordinating intercultural dialogue is the High Commission for 
Integration and Intercultural Dialogue (aCidi). The aCidi has been instrumental in 
developing the currently existing infrastructure to promote immigrant integration 
including the National Information Network for Immigrants; the National Immigrant 
Support Centers (Cnia); a national network of local centers (Clai), which are “one-
stop shops” for relevant state departments and services; and the Immigration 
Observatory to promote research. aCidi has been responsible for the implementation 
of the Plans for the Integration of Immigrants (2007-2009; 2010-2012) (Fonseca and 
Goracci 2007) and an array of other initiatives such as the Promotion of Immigrant 
Entrepreneurship, now in its third term (2011-2012). 
Other initiatives responding to particular needs have been implemented over 
the course of the last decade or so, such as the Schools Program targeting social 
exclusion among descendants of immigrants and minority ethnic groups living in 
problematic neighborhoods. 
Access to social services is granted in legislation, albeit problems are sometimes 
encountered in practice. All legal immigrants have access to the Social Insertion 
Income, a minimum income guarantee, though take-up rates are very low (oeCd 
2007, in Peixoto and Sabino 2009). The children of immigrants have access to the 
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educational system and all immigrants, regardless of legal status, have access to 
the Portuguese National Health Service. 
It is difficult to measure the degree to which government funding will be 
restricted in the domain of immigrant integration in the context of the current eco-
nomic crisis. However, a critical reading of the budget justifications for 2012 pro-
vides some insight into the changing reality:
“Despite the cuts presented, the government wants to ensure the overall mea-
sures of the II Plan for the Integration of Immigrants (2010-2012). . . . In a context of 
fiscal restraint, we intend to continue the work so far…with the support of Com-
munity funding (Ministério das Finanças e da Administração Pública 2011, 155). 
The Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis 
On Immigrants Living in Portugal
labor market
The economic and financial crisis has been very hard on the Portuguese economy. 
In 2009, gdp decreased by 2.5 percent compared to 2008. In 2010, a slight recovery 
produced 1.4-percent growth, but the Eurostat projections for 2011 point toward 
a contraction of 1.9 percent, whereas for EU27, it is estimated that gdp will grow by 
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1.6 percent. In addition, both Eurostat and the Bank of Portugal indicate a greater 
contraction in economic activity in 2012 than that anticipated for 2011 (Banco de 
Portugal 2011). 
The unfavorable evolution of the economy is clearly visible in the fast growth 
of unemployment. According to the Labor Force Survey (ine 2009), the unemploy-
ment rate grew from 7.6 percent in 2008 to 9.5 percent in 2009, 10.8 percent in 
2010, and 12.4 percent in the third quarter of 2011. The severe job losses over this 
period affected the immigrant population more seriously than non-immigrant workers, 
increasing the gap between the percentage of the two groups that is unemployed 
(Figure 4). In 2009, the unemployment rate among Portuguese citizens was 9.1 per-
cent, while for foreigners it was 7.3 points higher, reaching 16.4 percent and 17.3 
percent in the case of non-EU27 nationals (Peixoto and Iorio 2011). In 2010, the 
difference between both groups was more or less the same.
Unemployment affects women more than men, both for nationals and immi-
grants (Figure 5). However, it must be stressed that for the foreign population, the 
differences between male and female unemployment tend to be smaller in the two 
periods of greater economic slowdown, 2003-2004 and 2008-2009. This is primarily 
due to the fact that the sector most seriously harmed by the recession, namely civil 
construction, employs mostly males.
Portuguese law guarantees equal conditions of access to unemployment ben-
efits and to other social support schemes for documented foreign workers. After 
2007, the number of foreign workers registered in Ministry of Labor Employment 
figure 5
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Centers increased at a much faster rate than that of the Portuguese (Figure 6). 
Peixoto and Iorio (2011) argue that while this increase is in part a result of the 
higher number of regularized immigrants, who are thus protected by social securi-
ty, this explanation alone cannot account for the evolution observed. Therefore, it 
is legitimate to infer that the likelihood that foreign workers will become unem-
ployed has increased, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis.
figure 6
unemployment registered in employment Centers: portuguese 
and foreign Citizens (2003-2010) (2003=100)
sourCe:  Authors’ research at the Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social, Instituto de Emprego 
e Formação Profissional.
By using a geographically disaggregated analysis by nationality, increasing 
unemployment can be observed across groups. However, it is more intense among 
those who arrived in the more recent migratory waves, namely Romanians, fol-
lowed by Brazilians, Moldovans, and Ukrainians. Migrants from Cape Verde, 
Angola, and Guinea Bissau present lower growth rates, with the first two national-
ities showing almost identical trajectories (see Figure 7).
The number of foreigners receiving unemployment benefits reached 16 592 
in October 2011. Paradoxically, it is important to stress, however, that compared to 
the same period in the previous year, this was a 13.5 percent decline, even though the 
number of unemployed foreign workers registered in the Unemployment Centers 
continued to increase.
The economic crisis and the subsequent growth in unemployment have, in 
general, significantly worsened the living conditions of many foreign residents. This 
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is exacerbated by the fact that many immigrants have surpassed the maximum 
period for receiving unemployment benefits. Consequently, besides reduced immi-
gration to Portugal, in the last three years the flow of return to countries of origin 
or re-emigration to other destinations has been growing. Moreover, the number of 
people asking for financial help through the Assisted Volunteer Return Program 
sponsored by the International Organization for Migration has increased. Between 
January and October 2011, 1 790 people applied, a monthly average of 179, compared 
to 149 in 2010, 84 in 2009, 53 in 2008 and 27 in 2007. This represents a six-fold 
increase in the average monthly number of candidates between 2007 and 2011.
remittanCes
The effects of the economic and financial crisis are also visible in the levels of for-
eign workers’ savings. According to Central Bank of Portugal data, in the last three 
years, remittances sent to countries of origin decreased. Between 2003 and 2006, 
a remarkable increase in the remittances sent by immigrants, mostly to Brazil, was 
figure 7
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observed. Since then, the figures have contracted, falling from €609 771 in 2006 
to €567 340 in 2010 (Figure 8).
Figure 8 also shows that despite the overall reduction over the past two years, 
in 2010 more than half of the remittances (54 percent) were sent to Brazil, 8.8 
percent to the Ukraine, 6.5 percent to the palop, 3.6 percent to Romania, and 27 
percent to other countries (of which 6.4 percent went to Asia).
In addition to the economic crisis, this drop in remittances may also be the 
result of the reduction in migratory flows to Portugal, given that more recently 
arrived migrants usually send proportionally more money. Taking into account the 
size of the respective groups, this explains why Brazilians and Eastern Europeans 
send proportionally more remittances than palop citizens.
attitudes toward immigration
As the opening lines of the recent World Migration Report concisely state, “Few 
areas of public policy are subject to greater misrepresentation in public and politi-
figure 8
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cal discourse, yet more influenced by public opinion, than international migra-
tion” (iom 2011, 15). Economic concerns and the prominence given to the issue in 
the media (German Marshall Fund 2011) are well-known evidence of negative 
public sentiment toward immigration. Public opinion polls on immigration con-
ducted in Portugal have tended to show quite mixed results: nevertheless, there 
seems to be a trend of improving attitudes over time. The question is, however, if 
this trend continues in the current context of increasing unemployment and 
decreasing state welfare in the wake of the global recession. On the one hand, 
according to 2006 Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2006), the propor-
tion of residents in Portugal who agreed that immigrants “contribute a lot to the 
country,” at 66 percent, was well above the European average, and second only to 
Sweden —Greece was also above the average with 43 percent, and Spain repre-
sented the EU-25 average with 40 percent (iom 2011, 11). Likewise, results from the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (Mipex) reveal a positive attitude toward immigra-
tion among the Portuguese: 69.3 percent support the idea that immigrants should 
have equal social rights; 72.2 percent defend the right to family reunification; and 
45.2 percent think that foreigners should be able to acquire Portuguese nationality 
easily (Niessen et al. 2007, cited in Fonseca and Goracci 2007). On the other hand, 
data collected three years earlier in the European Social Survey (eumC 2005, 33) 
revealed that 62.5 percent of respondents were “resistant to immigrants,” com-
pared to 50 percent in Spain and 87 percent in Greece. Yet, in the same report 
only a relatively small percentage of respondents (26 percent) opposed civil rights 
for legal migrants (eumC 2005, 31). 
ngos, and most notably aCidi, have been working to create a positive image of 
immigrants in society. In particular, aCidi has supported the production of docu-
mentaries and television programs portraying the realities of immigrants’ lives. 
They established the Immigration and Ethnic Minority Journalism for Tolerance 
Award, which recognizes journalism that has served to combat racism (Fonseca, 
Malheiros, and Silva 2005). Furthermore, several authors contend that positive 
change has occurred in the representation of immigrants in the media related with 
an increase in more objective reporting (Cádima 2003; Ferin Cunha, Almeida 
Santos, Silveirinha, and Peixoto 2004).
A recent survey implemented in three immigrant neighborhoods in Lisbon, 
Bilbao, and Thessaloniki, as part of the geitonies project, explored the attitudes of 
both native and immigrant residents toward immigration.4 Residents were asked if 
4  The survey was applied to 1 800 residents (900 natives and 900 people with an immigrant back-
ground) in nine multi-ethnic neighborhoods (three per city). The questionnaire was the same in all 
cities in order to ensure comparability to the largest degree possible. A random sampling method was 
used. The sample size was 200 in each neighborhood (100 natives and 100 immigrants), that is, 600 
interviews per city. The target population was comprised of inhabitants who had resided in the neigh-
borhood for at least one year and the sampling unit was the household.
66 MARIA LUCINDA FONSECA AND JENNIFER McGARRIGLE
they agreed or disagreed that “immigrants are good for the economy” (see Figure 
9). The survey was conducted between June 2009 and May 2010 precisely when 
gdp growth dropped to its lowest (see Figure 3). Interestingly, the relative position-
ing of the countries is the same regardless of migration background. Considering 
natives, the Spanish respondents show the most favorable attitudes, with the vast 
majority either agreeing or strongly agreeing that immigrants are good for the econ-
omy (63 percent), followed by Portugal (46 percent), with Greece in last place (35 
percent). Unsurprisingly, however, migrants consistently reveal more positive atti-
tudes than natives. Almost 83 percent of immigrants interviewed in Bilbao 
believed immigrants to be good for the economy, almost three-quarters of respon-
dents in Lisbon, and over half in Thessaloniki. The Greek case is interesting as 
almost 30 percent of migrants disagree. This is likely related with the large percent-
age of Soviet Greeks in the sample, a group that shares cultural affinities with the 
native population and thus may not consider themselves immigrants. Furthermore, 
it may be evidence of tension between “old” and “new” migrants.
The relative positioning of the three cities compared to each other can be ver-
ified at the national level with European Social Survey data (Figure 10). When asked 
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if immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy, on a scale of 0 to 10 with 
the latter being positive, the mean score on average across all the countries sur-
veyed has consistently fallen below five on the negative end of the scale. Still, 
Spain has constantly remained above the average of all countries surveyed over the 
five rounds of the survey, albeit the mean score has been falling closer to the aver-
age over time. In 2010, for the first time the mean score fell below five, that is, 
below the threshold of neutrality. Portugal has sided on the negative end of the 
scale close to the average across countries or slightly below it, only peaking above 
it in 2008 and falling again, in line with the worsening economy, in 2010. The low-
est mean score (4.39 on a scale of 0 to 10) was in 2004 after the lowest gdp growth 
in almost a decade (see Figure 3). Despite this, it is important to note that fluctua-
tions have been very slight and that relative consistency is the rule. This is evi-
dence, perhaps, that the economic crisis has not deeply affected attitudes toward 
immigrants. Greece demonstrates an extremely negative sentiment, and sits clear-
ly below the average.
More general opinions gathered in the geitonies survey on natives’ openness 
toward immigrants reveal different patterns compared to the perceived contribu-
tion of immigrants to the economy. The Portuguese respondents’ evaluations are 
the most positive, with over 63 percent of natives agreeing or strongly agreeing 
that natives are open to migrants. Greek native respondents contrast starkly, with 
only 35 percent affirming the statement and over half disagreeing. While Spain is 
intermediate, it is more closely aligned with Portugal. The result for Portugal 
figure 10
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reflects well the popular perception that Portuguese culture is tolerant in its 
acceptance of others both at home and abroad. Furthermore, the experience that 
Portugal has had with emigration must be noted here as a potential explanatory 
factor. The difference in the opinions of immigrants when compared to natives in 
all three cities is very interesting. Only immigrants in Lisbon have more negative 
opinions than natives; in the other two cities the contrary is true, with immigrants 
expressing more positive opinions than the indigenous population. Immigrants in 
Bilbao have the most positive opinions, with almost 67 percent agreeing that 
natives are open to immigrants, followed by 54 percent in Lisbon and 45 percent 
in Thessaloniki.
 
Conclusions
During the last two decades, the dynamics of international migration have been 
closely associated with economic cycles, whereby since the mid-1990s new migra-
tory waves have coincided with periods of high economic growth. On the other 
figure 11
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hand, during periods of economic recession, the inflows of foreign workers have 
declined; return migration to sending regions has increased, as has re-emigration 
to other countries; and emigration of Portuguese nationals has grown noticeably.
These changes clearly show that the recent evolution of immigration to 
Portugal was steered by labor-market demand and the Portuguese model of eco-
nomic growth. During the last two decades, this has been characterized by a strong 
segmentation of the labor market and deep social disparities, where more modern, 
highly productive sectors coexist with traditional ones, mostly maintained by the 
immigrant labor force.
Immigration policies were completely inefficient in regulating migratory flows 
and only intervened reactively through mechanisms to regularize undocumented 
migrants’ status. Thus, most immigrants are confined to the secondary labor mar-
ket, with insecure working conditions, low wages, and low levels of professional 
mobility. Besides the inefficiency of the mechanisms regulating the labor market, 
visible in the informal economy, undocumented work, and precariousness of labor, 
there is also a remarkably high level of brain waste among highly-skilled migrants. 
An original feature of international migration to Portugal, resulting from the 
free circulation of workers within the EU and low wages paid in the low-skilled 
segments of the Portuguese labor market, is the coexistence of immigration and 
emigration. The process of “ethnicization” of some activities such as civil construc-
tion, industrial and domestic cleaning services, and work in hotels and restaurants 
was accompanied by the persistence of emigration among Portuguese workers to 
other European countries where they performed the same kind of activities for-
eign workers do in Portugal. More recently, with rising youth unemployment, there 
has been a steady growth of emigration among young highly-skilled professionals, 
namely to the United Kingdom, Spain, and Angola. 
Despite the economic recession and unemployment growth in Portugal, and 
unlike other European countries, such as Greece, there have not been major social 
tensions or anti-immigration attitudes expressed in political discourse, public opin-
ion, or in conflicts between national and foreign workers. This can be explained, on 
the one hand, by the integration policies, internationally recognized by the Mipex and 
the United Nations, and, on the other hand, by the fact that much of the tension that 
could result from the competition between national and foreign workers in the 
less-skilled segments of the labor market is dissipated by persisting emigration. 
Another possible explanation is the belief that immigrants in Portugal have made a 
highly positive contribution to economic growth, and immigration also has a posi-
tive role in Portuguese population dynamics. Both ideas have been supported by a 
number of studies promoted by the National Observatory of Immigration (Ferreira, 
Rato, and Mortágua 2004; Corrêa d’Almeida and Duarte Silva 2007; Valente Rosa, 
Seabra, and Santos 2004; Abreu and Peixoto 2009).
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Despite this, there is a clear need to respond to current levels of unemploy-
ment through policies designed to make the economy more dynamic and promote 
job creation. Beyond economic policy, social policies have an obvious role to play 
in safeguarding equality of opportunity among all citizens.
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THE IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 
ON MIGRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Jon Simmons*
This article sets out to explore in brief what the available statistics say about the 
impact of the 2008-2009 economic recession on international migration to and 
from the UK. In short, statistics suggest that economic migrants responded to the 
recession in the way that one might expect, with a reduced inflow and increased 
outflow of long-term migrants coming to work in the UK, in particular within the 
EU free market, although these changes did not quite translate into a net reduc-
tion in this group despite the domestic economic conditions. For non-EU 
migrants, the dominance of non-work-related flows meant that the recession did 
not influence them in the same way and the resultant reduction in overall net 
migration was only slight.
A Short History of Recent Migration to the UK
Although the United Kingdom has seen a great deal of international migration 
over the course of the last century, for much of that period the numbers leaving 
were often as great or greater than the numbers arriving, resulting in low or nega-
tive net migration, as measured by the international definition relating to people 
changing their normal place of residence for a period of 12 months or more. 
Following two decades of reduced inward migration and low or negative levels of 
net migration, immigration to the UK began to grow in the 1980s; perhaps reflect-
ing the global growth in international travel, the numbers began to escalate from the 
mid-1990s (see Chart 1). Although some of this growth was in temporary migration, 
the number of emigrants did not keep up, resulting in a sharp rise in net migration.
The new migrants to the UK came from across the globe. In previous decades, 
large numbers of migrants had come from Ireland and the Caribbean. In the 
1990s, the largest numbers came from the former British colonies in south Asia 
and Africa. Other countries such as China and the Philippines also supplied large 
numbers. Beginning in 2004, a significant new influx began from the Eastern 
* Home Office Director for Migration and Border Analysis, UK, Jon.Simmons@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk. 
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ips Estimates of Long-term International Migration in the UK (1964-2010)
table 1
top ten foreign nationalities resident in tHe united kingdom (2012)
United Kingdom
thousands
 Nationality Estimate CI +/-
1 Poland 700 36
2 India 348 26
3 Republic of Ireland 314 24
4 Pakistan 180 18
5 United States of America 158 17
6 Lithuania 140 16
7 Germany 131 16
8 Italy 129 16
9 France 123 15
10 Portugal 111 15
sourCe: ons (2013).
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European countries that had recently joined the European Union (often referred 
to as “the new accession states” or “A8 nationals”), particularly Poland. Polish 
nationals comprise the largest foreign nationality currently resident in the UK, 
whereas prior to the Polish accession that position was held by people originating 
from India, a large proportion of whom subsequently gained British citizenship. 
Just under half (47 percent) of the UK’s foreign population is made up from the 
top 10 foreign nationalities (see Table 1).
table 2
net migration by Country of last and next residenCe (2000-2012)
thousands
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
European Union -14 -11 -38 -23 28 48 65 88 21 54 73 79 67
European Union 15 -14 -11 -38 -23 -14 -11 -8 2 -9 26 18 27 33
European Union A8  –  –  –  – 47 59 69 88 23 18 43 41 31
European 
Union Other
 –  –  –  – -7 0 4 -1 8 11 12 11 3
Rest of Europe 28 13 19 0 5 3 4 2 -2 2 -1 -5 7
Old 
Commonwealth
-1 11 -8 -12 2 -9 -34 -29 -18 -32 -7 -23 -19
Australia -18 -1 -15 -23 -16 -12 -28 -27 -26 -27 -10 -22 -20
Canada 2 -3 -5 5 -4 -5 -4 -2 -1 -3 0 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 -6 -8 -7 -8 -9 -7 -4 -6 2 -6 1
South Africa 15 14 17 14 28 15 7 6 14 4 1 5 1
New 
Commonwealth
79 74 73 86 122 101 106 103 94 109 124 103 58
Africam 
Commonwealth
23 25 36 34 39 26 16 19 23 23 15 12 10
Indian 
sub-continent
42 40 36 47 81 70 85 77 63 78 99 93 43
Other 
Commonwealth
14 10 2 5 2 4 4 7 8 8 11 -1 4
USA -10 -3 -9 3 2 1 -6 4 5 4 -3 -1 7
Rest of the Americas 6 2 4 2 2 -1 3 2 2 4 5 2 2
Middle East 15 21 21 19 18 8 6 12 9 11 10 9 10
Other 55 65 91 73 68 56 55 51 51 46 52 50 44
All countries 158 171 153 148 245 206 198 233 163 198 252 215 177
note: Figures may not sum due to independent rounding.
sourCe: House of Commons Library (2014).
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The United Kingdom is one of the most significant recipient nations for foreign 
migrants within Europe. In 2011, for example, the number of long-term migrants 
arriving was the highest in the European Union. The net migration figure was only 
higher in Germany and Italy (see Table 3). The situation in Germany has changed 
greatly over recent years, and its 2011 figure was the highest for a decade. Many Ger -
man migrants are also temporary seasonal workers. In the UK, however, like Italy 
and, to a lesser extent, Spain until the most recent period, the numbers of migrants 
leaving have been considerably fewer than those arriving, resulting in high levels of 
net migration (see Table 3).
Differences in migration patterns are one obvious explanatory factor for differ-
ences in the demand for migrants since some countries have a history of low-skilled 
migration, for example, or high numbers of asylum seekers. Another factor that may 
be significant is population growth, and specifically whether a country is able to 
refresh its labor force from its own citizens. A comparison of fertility rates across the 
EU suggests two very different groups of countries (see Chart 2). One, which includes 
France, Sweden, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, has a fertility rate well 
above the European average, and closer to a replacement rate (although currently 
only Ireland is at or around replacement levels).1 However, this “higher fertility” 
group comprises less than one-third of the EU member states, with other countries 
showing much lower fertility rates of between 1.3 and 1.6 (see Chart 2). Although 
there has been a general recovery in European fertility rates since their low point in 
the late 1990s, for the majority of countries, fertility rates are nowhere near the levels 
required to offer replacement of the current population. For many countries in 
Europe, this therefore implies a potential gap in their labor force, which migration 
might help to fill. For France and the United Kingdom, for example, this pressure 
would not apply to the same extent as in other large recipient nations.
How Do We Define a Recession and When
Was the Most Recent One?
An economic recession is generally identified as a period of temporary economic 
decline during which trade and industrial activity are reduced, technically defined 
by a fall in real gdp in two successive quarters. For the UK, the most recent sus-
tained recession occurred between spring 2008 and summer 2009. Although the 
UK has not strictly been in a sustained recession since then, the recovery has been 
somewhat hesitant as the Chart 3 shows. 
Compared to the rest of Europe, the UK experienced recession earlier and 
began to recover from it earlier. Although the recovery has shown some positive 
1  The replacement fertility rate is around 2.1 births per woman in developed countries, but it can be 
higher in developing countries where child mortality rates are higher.
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table 3 
immigration and net migration in tHe european union (2011)
2011 Immigration Net Migration
EU (27 Countries) 1 701 500 460 000 
United Kingdom 566 044 215 341 
Germany 489 422 240 377 
Italy 385 793 303 332 
Spain 371 331 (37 703)
France 319 816  54 000 
Poland 157 059 (108 739)
Belgium 144 698  77 223 
Netherlands 130 118  25 917 
Greece 110 823 (15 161)
Austria 104 354  36 473 
Sweden   96 467  45 288 
Ireland   53 224 (33 829)
Denmark   52 833  11 240 
Finland   29 481  16 821 
Hungary   28 018  12 918 
Czech Republic   27 114 (28 796)
Cyprus   23 037 18 142 
Luxembourg   20 268 11 004 
Portugal   19 667 (24 331)
Lithuania   15 685 (38 178)
Slovenia   14 083    2 059 
Croatia     8 534   (4 165)
Latvia     7 253 (23 127)
Malta     5 465    1 659 
Slovakia     4 829    2 966 
SourCe: Eurostat Statistics Database (n.d.a). 
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gdp growth in recent quarters, as in previous recessions, it has taken longer for this to 
translate into falls in unemployment; in fact, unemployment rates, both in the UK and 
the rest of Europe, rose considerably following the recession (from May 2008 to 
about mid-2009) and have remained relatively high since then (see Chart 4, previ-
ous page).
The relationship between gdp changes, unemployment levels, employment, 
and hence the demand for labor is not straightforward. Generally, it is thought that 
a recovery in gdp may not immediately translate into a growth in employment, 
since companies respond initially through making more use of existing workers, 
overtime, and other temporary adjustments. Only once there is greater confidence 
in the recovery do we tend to see a rise in jobs and labor market recovery.
What Happened to Migration during the Recession?
The main migration statistics for the UK are produced by the Office for National 
Statistics based on its International Passenger Survey. They identify migrants 
according to international definitions, that is, as persons who change their normal 
place of residence for more than a year. The estimates are produced for a rolling 
four quarters (one year), and the estimates best corresponding to the start of the 
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recession in spring 2008 would be the long-term migration statistics for the year 
ending September 2008, that is, the four-quarter estimate the midpoint for which 
is closest to the month or quarter when the recession began.
 We would expect economic conditions to have a strong impact on the number 
of migrants coming to the UK to take up employment or to look for a job. The UK 
has a relatively flexible labor market that might make international labor migrants 
particularly responsive to economic conditions, more so than in a more heavily reg-
ulated labor market. The demand for migrant workers will also vary between different 
sectors and occupations. Other factors that may influence migration will include 
the existing relationship with the country of origin, such as the existing stock of 
migrants or a large Diaspora (and therefore family and other reasons that might 
suppress mobility), relative global economic conditions, and the availability of jobs 
in other countries, the attractiveness of the education sector, affordability (for exam-
ple, due to movements in the currency exchange rate), and an ability to speak the 
same language. However, it is undoubtedly the case that the need for migrant labor, 
how it varies across sectors, and how it change depending on the state of the economy 
are “highly contested” (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). 
For total long-term migration to the UK, the period of the recession coincided 
with a sharp fall in immigration but an even sharper fall in emigration, so that, over-
all, net migration rose slightly. That is, in a period when the economy was contract-
ing and unemployment rising, more people were still coming to reside in the UK than 
were leaving to go elsewhere. It is worth noting that the onset of recession coincid-
ed with the introduction of a new Points-Based System, which may also have had 
some impact on migration flows. However —and not withstanding this point—, as 
the recession ended in the fourth quarter of 2009, immigration recovered and began 
to rise again, but emigration did not, resulting in a further steep rise in net migration.
Around half of this hike in net migration could be accounted for by a fall in 
British emigration. In the year ending September 2008, an estimated 173 000 Bri t-
ish citizens left the UK to go abroad for more than a year, but two years later (in the 
year ending September 2010), the number of British emigrants had fallen to 122 000. 
This change alone would add around 50 000 to the net migration figure, which 
rose from +160 000 to +254 000 over the same period.
There appears to be some relationship between unemployment levels and the 
emigration of British citizens in recent years, in that rising unemployment has been 
associated with lower levels of emigration. This may appear at first to be coun-
terintuitive in that, if economic conditions weaken we might expect to see more 
peo ple move abroad to look for work. However, it could be that when people lack 
economic security their first priority is to obtain some stability at home rather than 
seek work abroad. Or, it could also be a response to the global nature of the recession 
and the lack of new job opportunities in countries where British citizens might have 
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otherwise moved to work. Whichever driver is dominant, the lack of a swift recovery 
in the UK labor market and labor market conditions in key destination countries has 
meant that the emigration numbers for British citizens have remained low.
However, the next biggest contribution to the uptick in net migration both 
during the recession and after it was from the inflow of foreign citizens. The net 
migration of non-British citizens rose from +253 000 to +296 000 between the 
year ending September 2008 and the year ending September 2010. If the domi-
nant driver were economic, this finding might appear surprising.
We can see the expected impact of the economic conditions most clearly in the 
numbers for the new European nationals arriving in the UK (that is, the eight most 
recent accession states, sometimes referred to as the “A8”). These countries were 
admitted to the European Union in 2004 and gained freedom-of-movement rights, 
although in many countries these rights were initially restricted for up to seven years 
(although in the UK, unlike most other EU states, they were not).2 Most of the 
2  Nationals of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia could face temporary restrictions on working in another EU country, but for no 
more than seven years after their countries joined the EU (Bulgaria and Romania joined on January 1, 
2007; all the others on May 1, 2004). In practice, only the Bulgarian and Romanian accession had work 
restrictions imposed in the UK.
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migrants from these countries were relatively young and in the years immediately fol-
lowing the accession came to the UK in relatively large numbers in search of work. 
The numbers of these new European arrivals may have peaked just before the 
recession, but they fell rapidly during the recession and then began to grow again, in 
response to the slight improvement in economic conditions, but perhaps also as a 
result of families being formed by the first waves of arrivals. The inverse effect can be 
seen in emigration by A8 nationals, with the result that by the end of the recession 
period, for the first time since their accession to the EU and for only one set of esti-
mates (those for the year ending September 2009), the number leaving was greater 
than the number arriving and the net migration of A8 nationals was therefore negative. 
For migrants from outside the European Union coming to the UK the picture 
was different. They did not have the freedom-of-movement rights enjoyed by EU 
nationals and their ability to take jobs was restricted. The low-skilled immigration 
route for work by foreign nationals from outside the EU (Tier 3 of the Points-Based 
System) had been closed since its introduction in 2008. Aside from certain short-
age occupations and those family members or students with rights to work, the 
main routes to come to the UK to work were heavily regulated. For these reasons, 
as the table below shows, according to the International Passenger Survey, the pro-
portion of non-EU, long-term migrants arriving for work was considerably smaller 
than for European migrants, amounting to just 18 percent of the total inflow in the 
year ending March 2011. The largest group of non-EU migrants coming to the UK 
to stay for a year or longer was now made up of students rather than workers, a 
change in the pattern of migration that occurred at the same time as the recession 
took hold.
table 4
proportions of old eu, new-aCCession eu and non-eu immigrants 
to tHe uk Coming to work, aCCompany or Join someone, or to study 
(Year Ending March 2011)
Place of Origin EU15 A8 Non-EU
All reasons 72 000 69 000 307 000
Work-related 50% 68% 18%
Accompany/Join 4% 6% 18%
Study 40% 14% 58%
Other 6% 12% 5%
sourCe: ons (2011b).
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Nonetheless, there were still considerable numbers of low-skilled workers 
coming to the UK, as family members alongside the skilled workers applying 
through the UK’s Points-Based System, or as students with rights to take on a limited 
amount of work, and whose number we might therefore expect to be affected by 
economic conditions.
For non-EU migrants, there was a reduction in immigration during the reces-
sion and a slight rise in emigration, but the changes were not as large as had been 
seen in more normal periods, and the net result was only a slightly lower net migra-
tion figure for non-EU citizens, falling to roughly the same level it had been four or 
five years earlier, and from which the recovery post-recession appeared to be swift.
However, as mentioned above, the motives and make-up of non-EU migrants 
was significantly different from the European migrants. EU citizens migrating to 
the UK were primarily coming to work, and it is therefore unsurprising that their 
numbers were significantly affected by the recession. Non-EU foreign nationals, 
however, came to the UK for a wider variety of reasons. More than two-thirds (68 
percent) of the new European state nationals arriving in the UK in the latest year 
came to work, compared to only 18 percent of the non-Europeans. A further 18 
percent of non-EU migrants came for family or relationship reasons. However, by 
far the largest group was made up of those who came to study. 
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The growth in the number of student migrants to the degree that they now 
outnumber work migrants to the UK is a recent phenomenon. However, it has 
been rapid. The number of undergraduates arriving from non-EU countries at UK 
universities more than doubled from just under 32 000 at the start of the last 
decade to 69 000 in 2010-2011; for post-graduates, numbers tripled over the 
same period from 33 300 to 105 000 (Hesa, 2000, 2010). Similar data is not avail-
able for the non-higher-education sector, but visa data would seem to suggest a 
growth in the further education and private education sectors, also.
Although there has been long-term growth in the number of foreign students 
coming to the UK for most of the last decade, it was only during the recent reces-
sion that their number overtook the numbers of foreign migrants coming to the UK 
to work. At the start of the last decade, almost twice as many long-term migrants 
came to the UK to work compared to those who came to study (163 000 compared 
to 84 000 in the year ending December 2000). By the end of the decade, the num-
bers of those who came to work had risen (to 193 000 by the year ending December 
2010), but the numbers of those who came to study were greater, at 236 000. 
As a result of this change in the composition of foreign migrants, it is not surpris-
ing that the impact of the recession was much greater for the Europeans exercising 
CHart 8
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their freedom-of-movement rights to work than it was for non-European migrants, 
the majority of whom were now coming to the UK to study.
Migrants coming for family or marriage were by-and-large not affected by the 
economic conditions. Those coming to study (predominantly the non-Europeans) 
continued to grow in number, most sharply at the formal end of the recession. One 
might hypothesize that when job opportunities are scarce, it makes sense to try to 
improve one’s skills and education to make oneself more attractive to future employ-
ers once they start to recruit again or simply to make productive use of one’s time. 
There is also evidence that some of the rise in student numbers came from low-
skilled migrants, whose route into the UK had been closed by the latter half of the 
decade, and who were using the student route to obtain entry into the UK and, once 
there, work rather than study.3 Whatever the motivation, foreign student numbers 
grew rapidly over this period, the growth only ending when the government began 
to take more stringent action against some of the educational establishments that 
3  According to the Labour Force Survey in 2009 more than half (53 percent) of undergraduates reported 
working for more than the permitted 21 hours per week (Home Office 2010, 17).
CHart 9 
long-term international migration in tHe united kingdom 
by reason for migration
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
M
ig
ra
tio
n 
(t
ho
us
an
ds
)
 YE    YE    YE     YE     YE   YE     YE     YE    YE    YE    YE     YE    YE    YE    YE    YE     YE    YE     YE    YE     YE    YE    YE     YE     YE    YE    YE    YE    YE    YE     YE    YE     YE    YE    YE     YE    YE     YE    YE    YE
Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar  Jun  Sep  Dec  Mar
 01    01    01    02     02    02    02    03    03    03    03     04    04    04    04    05    05    05    05    06     06    06    06    07     07    07    07    08    08    08    08    09     09   09    09    10     10   10    10     11p
Work related             Accompany/join           Formal study            Other          No reason stated
Rolling year
YE= Year Ending
  p= Year includes provisional estimates for 2011
Standard Errors YE Mar 11:
Work related:                5%
Accompany/join:           3%
Formal study:                4%
Other:                         12%
No reason stated:        14%
sourCe: ons (2011b).
 THE IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 91
appeared to be providing inadequate provision for their students or were using the 
cloak of study to facilitate their employment.
What Happened to Foreign Workers 
During the Recession? 
The impact of the recession on migrants who came to work can be clearly seen in 
the ips measure of migration. Prior to the start of the recession (year ending June 
2008), immigration for reasons related to work —either to look for a job or to take 
up the offer of a definite job— peaked at 239 000. By the end of the recession (year 
ending September 2009), that number had fallen by more than a quarter (26 per-
cent) to 177 000. Thereafter, it has remained broadly level, with only a small 
increase to 191 000 in the year ending September 2010.4
An alternative measure is provided by the Labour Force Survey (lfs), also pro-
duced by ons, which is used to estimate the employment levels of all workers aged 
16-74. The lfs does not actually measure migration directly, only stocks of workers 
(and non-workers) among the adult population at different points in time, but it 
might be reasonable to assume that the changes in the estimated levels of migrants 
in the lfs might equate to a net change in the flow of migrants between the relevant 
time periods, as indicated by the ips. In practice, for a variety of methodological 
reasons the comparison is not exact.
The lfs publishes data on a quarterly basis (rather than the rolling four quar-
ters used in the ips), so the peak prior to the recession was in the April-June 2008 
quarter, when the total number of foreign nationals with employment was esti-
mated to be 2.3 million. When using non-seasonally adjusted lfs data, it is impor-
tant to compare one quarter with the same quarter in earlier years, rather than the 
preceding quarter, to avoid mistaking seasonal changes for an underlying trend. At 
the turn of the century, in January-March 2000, the lfs estimated there were just 
over one million foreign national workers in the UK; by the end of the decade, 
there were just under 2.3 million, a 107-percent increase, compared to just 1.2 
percent for native workers. Almost half the increase came after the accession of 
the new European states, whose numbers rose from 29 000 in January-March 
2000 to just under half a million 10 years later.
The lfs tends to be a popular data source among economists because of its 
importance for measuring labor market activity and, as a measure of certain 
4  ons changed their method for aligning ips and ltim tables during 2012 which means that the most 
recent published statistics have been prepared on a slightly different basis. Numbers quoted here are 
based on comparisons of the statistical tables produced prior to this adjustment. Although consistent 
comparisons are not available in the latest data, the trends are very similar.
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aspects of employment, it is the only source available. However, it is a less than 
perfect measure of international migration.
According to the lfs, over the course of the recession, the numbers of foreign 
national workers appear to grow (albeit by a lower rate than previously). The 
decline in foreign nationals with jobs did eventually arrive, six months after it hit 
UK nationals, according to the lfs. 
The lfs data are reported in two different ways for migrants: one measures 
numbers of people who were born outside the UK and the other, people who are 
foreign nationals. Those born abroad will include a large proportion who have 
since changed their nationality and become British citizens. These long-term 
migrants are no longer “foreign” nor come under immigration control, and so the 
more appropriate statistic to use from the lfs to look at trends in migration will 
normally be that for foreign nationals. This is also the basis for the ips estimates.
The fluctuations in employment levels shown in the lfs seemed to be more 
extreme for foreign workers. Some of this could in part be due to the variability in 
the quarterly survey results for groups (such as foreign nationals) with only a rela-
CHart 10 
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tively small representation in a survey aimed at measuring changes in the population 
as a whole. This could be true for the ips, given that this survey aims to measure all 
of the flows across the UK border, the largest volume of which belong to British trav-
elers and short-term visitors, but the effects might be accentuated in the lfs because 
it is designed to estimate stocks of workers rather than their migratory flow.
However, the main difference between the lfs and the ips is due to the coverage 
of the two surveys. Specifically, the lfs includes all migrants including short-term 
migrants, whereas the ips records migrant movements according to the interna-
tional definition, that is, “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or 
her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country 
of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence” (UN 
Statistics Division 2013). Although a more restrictive definition of a migrant, this 
is a more robust measure of migrant movements because the inclusion of short-term 
migration in the lfs estimates for foreign nationals will tend to blur the underlying 
longer-term changes in migrant behavior and make it harder to identify trends 
clearly. This criticism will also apply to the other measure sometimes used to estimate 
numbers of foreign nationals: new registrations for national insurance numbers 
produced by the Department for Work and Pensions (and this source has the addi-
tional constraint of only recording those migrants who are working). For this reason, 
the ips tends to be the most reliable measure of changes in long-term migration. 
Further information on the differences between the lfs and ips is provided in 
Appendix A and in the paper written by Ker, Zumpe, and Blake for the Office for 
National Statistics (2009). 
Nevertheless, the lfs data can provide additional insights into the foreign 
workforce in the UK, and the contrast between foreign and native workers can 
appear stark. 
According to the lfs data the recession came to the foreign workforce in the 
UK later than for the native population, but when it did come, it hit harder (falls of 
2-4 percent per quarter, compared to 0-2 percent for native workers). However, its 
effects lasted only three quarters, whereas for native workers, the drop in employ-
ment lasted for six or seven (see Table 5).
Although the timing and extent of changes might be distorted by the coverage 
issues already mentioned, the pattern revealed by the lfs would seem to reflect 
the greater flexibility in the foreign workforce, which is one of their potential 
attractions for employers, particularly vis-à-vis Europeans who could return to 
their home country more easily when times were hard —and it may be worth not-
ing in this respect that Poland was the only economy in Europe to have positive 
gdp growth in 2009. However, for employment-related migration, the pattern also 
appears to be true for non-Europeans. 
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Is This Response to the Recession as Expected?
Before the end of the recession, Dobson and colleagues published a short paper 
(Dobson, Latham, and Salt 2009) that looked at the experience of past recessions 
to see what that might suggest for migration during the current one. Their paper 
asks the question whether “buffer theory,” which provides a theoretical description 
of how migrants might be used by an economy to provide greater flexibility, portrays 
what actually happens in the real world. Drawing on Böhning and Maillat (1974), 
the paper describes buffer theory as the idea that society might “bring in tempo-
rary workers when labor shortages existed, who would then go home during eco-
nomic downturns.” Dobson and her colleagues found that, in practice, this did not 
really occur in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, nor did it occur specifically in the 
UK. In the three earlier recessions they looked at, although there was indeed evi-
dence of “a fall in numbers of foreign migrants entering the UK, albeit for a limited 
period, . . . there is no evidence of a significant upturn in outflows, contrary to 
what buffer theory would suggest. In fact, the reverse is true” (13).
Drawing on Hatton (2005), Dobson, Latham, and Salt, posit several reasons 
why this might be anticipated. Firstly, unemployment can be shown to tend to 
reduce immigration (Hatton estimated a 1 percent rise in unemployment might 
cause a reduction in net migration of around 5 000 per annum). This is, of course, 
table 5
CHange in employment Compared to same quarter previous year 
(percent) 
Total UK Non UK Non-EU EU14 A8
Apr-Jun 2008 1.2 0.7 7.4 6.7 2.5 15.4
Jul-Sep 2008 0.4 -0.1 7.7 8.9 -2.5 17.0
Oct-Dec 2008 -0.3 -0.9 7.7 12.0 4.6 -0.1
Jan-Mar 2009 -1.2 -1.5 2.6 4.2 1.6 -0.2
Apr-Jun 2009 -2.2 -2.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
Jul-Sep 2009 -1.8 -1.7 -2.2 -3.8 3.8 -4.3
Oct-Dec 2009 -1.4 -1.2 -3.6 -5.3 -2.4 0.0
Jan-Mar 2010 -1.2 -0.9 -3.9 -4.7 -4.0 -1.9
Apr-Jun 2010 0.4 0.0 4.4 3.1 3.5 8.9
sourCe: ons (n.d.b).
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broadly what happened in the current recession, although the net impact is com-
plicated by the different flows of migration. However, immigration for work rea-
sons certainly fell substantially, and emigration rose, as the chart below shows, 
looking at the migration patterns for non-British nationals for work-related reasons 
alone. The net migration of foreign workers fell from just under +100 000 in the 
year ending December 2007 to +3 000 in the year ending December 2009.
It is also the case that people classed as “labor migrants” will not only be driv-
en by economic factors. Some of those who come to the UK to work will form 
relationships or a family and seek to settle, for example. Previous research (for 
example, Hatton 2005) had found that worsening economic conditions in the UK also 
tend to lead to falls in emigration by UK citizens. The impact of this was relatively 
modest in the past, but that was not the case during the current recession, as has 
already been noted.
However, the most significant reason for the recession in the UK having only 
a relatively modest impact on migration trends overall was due to the changed 
composition of the migratory flows to the UK, and specifically the significant rise 
in student migration over this period. The expected impact on work-related migra-
CHart 11 
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tion did occur within the European free market —that is, for EU nationals. 
However, work migration represented less than one-fifth of non-European migra-
tion to the UK, whereas by the year ending in December 2009, students repre-
sented 55 percent of the non-Europeans coming to the UK, rising to 60 percent 
just one year later.
The reasons for such a strong rise in foreign students are not clear. British 
universities were active in recruiting foreign students, but evidence also exists of 
growth in non-compliant student migration, in particular to colleges of further 
education whose delivery of a high-quality educational service was not confirmed 
by official inspection. In addition, it is possible that some of the hike in foreign 
student numbers was linked to the depreciation of the currency and a resultant 
reduction in the cost of education in the UK —the U.S.-dollar-value of the pound 
sterling fell by almost one-third between spring 2008 and spring 2009, and against 
the euro by around one-sixth over the same period.
However, as the above chart shows, unsurprisingly, work has for a long time 
been more important as a reason for migration inside the European Union than for 
migrants from outside the EU. As a result, for European migrants the recession 
had the anticipated effect, the labor market worked as anticipated, and, to a sig-
nificant extent, buffer theory could be said to have applied. 
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For non-European migrants the position is very different. Legal routes to work 
in the UK had become scarcer over the latter half of the last decade, primarily as a 
result of the introduction of the Points-Based System, which to a large degree 
closed the legitimate route for low-skilled workers, and then due to further tight-
ening of entry requirements for other routes under the Coalition Government 
elected in May 2010. As a result, the last decade saw the proportion of non-EU 
immigrants to the UK coming to work fall from just under 40 percent at the start 
of the decade, to around 32 percent in 2005-2006 and then fall sharply to 16-17 
percent in 2010-2011. The reduction was in absolute terms also, with an estimat-
ed 100 000 non-EU workers arriving in the year ending December 2006, dropping 
to around half that number three or four years later. The difference was more than 
made up by numbers of student arrivals from outside the EU.
Appendix A
differenCes between tHe lfs/aps and ips/ltim data 
Stocks: lfs and aPs data Flows: iPs and ltiM data
Sampling 
frame 
Includes all private households. 
Excludes most communal 
residencies. 
The ips samples passengers as they 
arrive in or leave the UK through ports 
(by air, sea, and the Channel Tunnel). 
Adjustments made for those known to 
be missed (e.g., asylum seekers). 
Timing of 
the survey 
Data collected throughout 
each quarter in the case of 
the lfs, and throughout four 
consecutive quarters in the 
case of the aps. 
Single, point-in-time interview. 
Collected throughout the year. 
Definition 
of a migrant 
A migrant is defined as some-
one whose country of birth is 
non-UK or whose nationality 
is non-British. 
Length of time in the UK is 
currently not used to define a 
migrant in the lfs. 
The UN definition is used to define 
a migrant: “Person who moves to a 
country other than that of his or her 
usual residence for a period of at least 
a year (12 months), so that the country 
of destination effectively becomes his 
or her new country of usual residence” 
(UN Statistics Division 2013).
Therefore anyone staying/going for less 
than 12 months is excluded. 
Nationality As stated by respondent. If re-
spondent has dual nationality, 
the first one given is recorded 
in the survey. 
Citizenship is taken from the passport 
shown at the time of the interview, or, 
if this is not available, taken as stated 
by respondent. 
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Actual versus 
intended 
migration 
The lfs asks for the date of 
arrival in the UK. This can be 
used to calculate the actual 
length of time the respondent 
has lived in the UK. However, 
no information is provided 
regarding how long they may 
remain in the UK. 
The ips collects information on
intended length of time in/outside 
the UK. However, ltim includes ad-
justments for migrants 
who do not fulfill their intentions. 
Students Included, but only if they live 
in private households or have 
at least one parent resident in a 
private household in the UK. 
Included. 
Asylum 
seekers 
Included if living in a private 
residence, but may be 
reluctant to participate. 
Those living in communal 
establishments are excluded. 
Included. A few asylum seekers are 
captured on the ips, and an adjustment 
based on Home Office data on asylum 
seekers is a component of ltim. 
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IMMIGRATION TO AND EMIGRATION 
FROM GERMANY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS
Bernd Geiss*
Germany, Destination for Migrants
Germany is in the middle of Europe and has common borders with nine countries. 
Therefore, geographically, it is cut out to be a country of immigration and emigration. 
Of its total population of 82 million, 8.7 percent (7.1 million) are foreigners (hold-
ers of only foreign passports), 2.5 million of whom are citizens from other member 
countries of the European Union (EU). Citizens of EU-member countries have, in 
addition to national citizenship, what is called a Union citizenship. Except the rights 
to vote and to run in national elections, EU citizens have the same rights as national 
citizens. As Germany has been a receiving country for migrants for nearly 60 years, 
it now has a migrant population (holders of only foreign passports plus naturalized 
persons) of 15.7 million. One-fifth of the total population has a migrant back-
ground.
Europe, a Continent of Internal Migration
France has 64 million inhabitants; the United Kingdom (UK), 62 million; Italy, 60 
million; Spain, 45 million; and Poland, 38 million. The whole EU has a population 
of half a billion, 6.5 percent of whom (32 million) are foreigners. Compared with 
other regions of the world, these figures are relatively small. In 2010, 3.2 million 
immigrants entered Europe and 2.2 million emigrants left. The positive migration 
balance was about one million. In terms of figures, contrary to many Europeans’ 
impression, Europe is not a big player in the field of international migration. 
Migration in Europe is mainly internal. The EU still does not have a comprehen-
sive migration policy. However, in May 2009, it agreed on a directive concerning 
the immigration of high qualified experts. This directive is known as the EU Blue 
Card and was slated to be turned into national law by July 2012.
*  Former head of the staff of the German Federal Government’s Commissioner on Migration, Refugees, 
and Integration, nc-geiszbe@netcologne.de.
102 BERND GEISS
table 1
immigration and emigration of germans and foreigners (1991-2010)
Immigration Emigration Net Migration 
Year Total
Foreigners 
(number)
Foreigners 
(%) Total
Foreigners 
(number)
Foreigners 
(%) Total Foreigners
1991 1 198 978 925 345 77.2 596 455 497 540 83.4 602 523 427 805
1992 1 502 198 1 211 348 80.6 720 127 614 956 85.4 782 071 596 392
1993 1 277 408 989 847 77.5 815 312 710 659 87.2 462 096 279 188
1994 1 082 553 777 516 71.8 767 555 629 275 82 314 998 148 241
1995 1 096,048 792 701 72.3 698 113 567 441 81.3 397 935 225 260
1996 959 691 707 954 73.8 677 494 559 064 82.5 282 197 148 890
1997 840 633 615 298 73.2 746 969 637 066 85.3 93 664 -21 768
1998 802 456 605 500 75.5 755 358 638 955 84.6 47 098 -33 455
1999 874 023 673 873 77.1 672 048 555 638 82.7 201 975 118 235
2000 841 158 649 249 77.2 674 038 562 794 83.5 167 120 86 455
2001 879 217 685 259 77.9 606 494 496 987 81.9 272 723 188 272
2002 842 543 658 341 78.1 623 255 505 572 81.1 219 288 152 769
2003 768 975 601 759 78.3 626 330 499 063 79.7 142 645 102 696
2004 780 175 602 182 77.2 697 632 546 965 78.4 82 543 55 217
2005 707 352 579 301 81.9 628 399 483 584 77.0 78 953 95 717
2006 661 855 558 467 84.4 639 064 483 774 75.7 22 791 74 693
2007 680 766 574 752 84.4 636 854 475 749 74.7 43 912 99 003
2008 682 146 573 815 84.1 737 889 563 130 76.3 -55743 10 685
2009 721 014 606 314 84.1 733 796 578 808 78.9 -12 782 27 506
2010 798 282 683 530 85.6 670 605 529 605 79.0 127 677 153 925
sourCe: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 
(2012), 18.
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The situation is different for refugees. The EU has a common policy on asy-
lum seekers and other refugees and even a common border security program 
(Frontex) along the Mediterranean Sea to prevent African refugees from entering 
Spain, Italy, Malta, and Greece. In February 2012, the European High Court of 
Human Rights decided that EU member states —it was referring specifically to 
Italy in this case— are not allowed to refuse refugees entry without having exam-
ined their applications for asylum.
Immigration to Germany/Emigration from Germany
In 2010, nearly 798 000 persons immigrated to Germany, while 671 000 emigrated 
from Germany. Net migration (127 000) was positive. The figure for foreigners 
was positive (154 000); the figure for Germans was negative (-26 000).
Only in 2008 (-56 000) and 2009 (-13 000), just when the worldwide financial 
and economic crisis started, was net migration negative. The highest positive balanc-
es were recorded in the early 1990s, in 1991 (603 000) and 1992 (782 000). The 
main reasons for this were the fall of the Berlin Wall, which led to the immigration 
of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the 
civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, which sparked streams of refugees. It is my 
assessment that the impacts of the recent financial and economic crisis on migration 
to Germany have been relatively small. There was, of course, a crisis in Germany; 
but, if you compare it with other economies in Europe, you can say that it lasted 
for only a short time. Although economic growth decreased, the employment rate 
remained nearly stable because of a special package of measures. 
In this context, I have to mention especially what has been called “short-time-
work” money. Instead of dismissing workers, they were paid lower wages for 
less work. The difference with the former full wage was paid by the government’s 
Federal Office of Labor. So, workers still had enough money to cover living costs. 
In macroeconomic terms, this means that the internal demand for goods and services 
did not drop. At the end of the economic crisis, companies did not have to look for 
new skilled workers and employees; they could immediately go back to full pro-
duction and thus achieved a competitive advantage.
In some of the other European economies, circumstances were quite differ-
ent. The impact of the recent economic crisis on migration was more serious. The 
UK has lost parts of its industrial structure over the last 25 years. London became 
one of the most important financial markets worldwide, but is very sensitive to crises. 
Spain has a real estate crisis and 50-percent unemployment among young people. 
Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and especially Greece took on large debts.
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Poland
Romania
Bulgaria
Turkey
Hungary
United States
Italy
Spain
France
Russia
China
Serbia
Austria
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Greece
India
Netherlands
Croatia
Iraq
Slovakia
125 861
103 237
74 585
48 868
39 387
23 785
30 171
36 033
30 015
21 330
29 704
32 243
27 188
24 268
21 543
16 071
20 266
18 691
18 671
13 466
17 922
16 234
17 893
14 345
17 859
19 889
16 565
17 259
14 945
27 386
13 717
12 641
12 942
10 109
12 450
10 602
10 269
11 333
9 152
3 772
8 613
7 328
Immigration            Emigration
CHart 1 
immigration and emigration (most frequent Countries 
of origin and destination, 2010)
sourCe: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 
(2012), 24.
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Where Did the Immigrants 
To Germany Come From in 2010?
Half of the migrants to Germany (400 000) came from other European countries, 
mainly from Poland (126 000); Romania (75 000); Bulgaria (39 000); Turkey 
(30 000), previously the main sending country; Hungary (30 000); the United States 
(30 000); Italy (27 000), the first country after World War II to sign a migration 
agreement with Germany (1955) to ensure a flow of workers and always an impor-
tant sending country; Spain (22 000); and France (20 000). 
The pie charts for immigrants and emigrants show that the numbers for immi-
gration and emigration are similar for certain countries, for example Poland and 
Italy. Among the total figures of immigrants, 15.8 percent were Poles; among the 
emigrants 15.4 percent. But relatively more Romanians and Bulgarians immigrat-
ed than emigrated. For Turks, the opposite was the case.
CHart 2
immigration and emigration (most frequent Countries of origin, 2010)
Total: 798 282
Poland 15.8%
Other sending countries 
47.7%
Russia 
2.3% France 
2.5%
Romania 9.3%
Bulgaria 4.9%
Turkey 3.8%
Hungary 3.8%
United States 3.7%
Italy 3.4%
Spain 2.7%
sourCe: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) (2012), 21.
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CHart 3
immigration and emigration (most frequent destination Countries, 2010)
mexiCan immigrants and emigrants in germany
Since this academic forum is taking place in Mexico City, I will present some 
numbers concerning Mexican immigrants and emigrants in Germany; these num-
bers were relatively low.
In 2010, 3 670 Mexicans immigrated to Germany and 3 019 emigrated from 
Germany. The positive net migration was 651. Within the last 20 years, the annual 
numbers of immigrants increased —though the volume is very low— from 1 143 
in 1991 to 2 442 in 2001, and, as I already mentioned, to 3 670 in 2010.
Germany’s Federal Office of Migration and Refugees provided me with some 
(only partly published) detailed figures on Mexican migrants in Germany.
At the end of 2011, 10 543 Mexicans lived in Germany, among them 1 749 
students. Among the 3 670 Mexicans who immigrated to Germany in 2010 were 
970 first-year university students, 419 participants in language courses, 95 partici-
pants in occupational training, 328 workers (two-thirds of them skilled), 136 per-
sons who were part of the international personnel exchange, and 10 highly quali-
fied experts. In 2010, 280 bi-national marriages, 313 naturalizations, and 269 
births of Mexicans were registered, and 604 Mexicans were granted visas for fam-
ily reunification.
Total: 670 605
Poland 15.4%
Other receiving countries 
47%
France 
2.5%
Romania 7.3%
Bulgaria 3.5%
Turkey 5.4%
Switzerland 4.1%
Hungary 3.2%
United States 4.8%
Italy 3.6%
Austria 3%
Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) (2012).
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CHart 4
worldwide immigration to and emigration from germany (2010)
In 2010, 585 000 persons from other EU-member countries immigrated to 
Germany, 110 000 from Asian countries, 65 000 from the Americas and Australia, 
and only 31 000 from Africa, although it is geographically very close to Europe. 
The total number of immigrants in 2010 was nearly 800 000. About 493 000 emi-
grants returned to other European countries, 82 000 to Asian countries (30 000 
less than those who immigrated from Asia to Germany); 66 000 emigrated to the 
Americas and Australia, bringing their net balance close to zero; and 22 000 emi-
grated to Africa, making its positive balance only 9 000.
immigration to different european Countries
The bar chart of migration in different European countries in 2009 shows that 
Germany, the UK, Spain, and Italy received the highest number of immigrants in 
Europe. Positive net migration was very high in the UK, Spain, and especially in Italy 
Emigration 66 176
The Americas, Australia, 
and Oceania
Immigration 64 875
Emigration 145 013
European Union
(14 older EU-member 
countries) 
Immigration 156 055
Emigration 81 549
Asia 
Immigration 110 265
Emigration 21 748
Africa
Immigration 30 664
Immigration and Emigration 
2010
Emigration 126 776
Europe
(without EU) 
Immigration 125 864
Emigration 221 530
European Union
(12 new EU-member 
countries) 
Immigration 303 193
Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 
(2012), 20.
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(443 000 immigrants and only 80 000 emigrants). Spain and Italy changed from being 
sending to receiving countries.
CHart 5
immigration and emigration to and from seleCted eu Countries, 
plus switzerland and norway (2009)
The next chart demonstrates the accumulated immigration and emigration 
between 2000 and 2009 for some European countries. Here again, you can see 
that Spain and Italy in particular became receiving countries for migrants. In this 
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sourCe: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 
(2012), 142.
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period, 6.4 million people immigrated to Spain and only 1.2 million emigrated; 4.8 
million immigrated to Italy and only 600 000 emigrated from there.
CHart 6
aCCumulated immigration and emigration to and 
from seleCted eu Countries, plus switzerland and norway (2000-2009)
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sourCe: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 
(2012), 145.
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Why Immigrate to Germany?
The biggest group is made up of seasonal workers, mainly from Poland, Romania, 
and Bulgaria, who work in agriculture a few months a year (3 to 6 months) and then 
return to their home countries (294 000 seasonal workers came and went in 2010). 
The second biggest group is workers and employees and their families from other 
European countries (107 000). Sixty-six thousand immigrants were first-year 
undergraduates, and forty-one thousand, refugees and asylum seekers. (This last figure 
is quite low in contrast with the early 1990s, when it was quite high: in 1992, 438 
000. The main reason for this high figure was the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia.). 
Forty thousand people immigrated for family reunification, a number that is 
decreasing. Foreign workers and employees numbered 28 000; contract workers (for-
eign workers in foreign companies, who are performing commissioned work in 
Germany), 18 000. Ethnic Germans (2 350) from the former Soviet Union and some 
other Eastern Euro pean countries whose ancestors had once emigrated to Eastern 
Europe and Russia, continue to immigrate to Germany. These figures are quite low 
today. In the beginning of the 1990s, every year more than 200 000 ethnic Germans 
immigrated to Germany.
Another small group of 1 000 Jewish migrants emigrated from Russia, where they 
were facing anti-Semitism. Finally, only 2 347 IT experts immigrated to Germany. 
In terms of labor market demand, this figure is far too small, demonstrating that 
Germany is not attractive enough for them. IT experts, for example from India, prefer 
English-speaking countries. There are other internal reasons that restrict the immi-
gration of highly qualified migrants: lack of a welcoming culture and structure, 
restricted permission to remain, restricted work permits for husbands/wives, and 
finally various obstacles for young migrants and their families.
Migration, a Must
The subject of my presentation was immigration to and emigration from Germany in 
the last few years. The underlying question was the impact of the recent economic 
crisis on international migration. As I mentioned above, it had no serious impacts 
on migration to Germany. This has to be explained by the short duration of the crisis 
in the country and the good use of special measures. Although Germany was suc-
cessful in managing the last economic crisis, future challenges involving migration 
are rather large: by 2030 there will be a shortage of six million skilled workers and 
employees. The population will decrease from 82 million to 77 million by 2030, 
and to 65 million by 2060. More serious than the shrinking population will be an 
even more serious change of the age distribution. Neither Germany nor the EU 
has developed a modern, comprehensive migration policy until now. The mentality 
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CHart 7
different groups of immigrants (1991-2010)
Year
Internal 
EU 
Migration 
(EU-14)
Family 
Reuni-
fication
Ethnic 
Germans 
from 
Eastern 
Europe
Jewish 
Migrants 
(from 
Russia)
 Asylum 
Seekers
 Contract 
Workers
Seasonal 
Workers and 
Fairground 
Showmen 
Assistants
IT 
Experts
Foreign
Students 
(under-
graduates)
1991 128 142 - 221 995 - 256 112 51 771 128.688 - -
1992 120 445 - 230 565 - 438 191 94 902 212.442 - -
1993 117 115 - 218 888 16 597 322 599 70 137 181.037 - 26 149
1994 139 382 - 222 591 8 811 127 210 41 216 137.819 - 27 922
1995 175 977 - 217 898 15 184 127 937 49 412 176 590 - 28 223
1996 139 382 - 222 591 8 811 127 210 41 216 137 819 - 27 922
1997 150 583 - 134 419 19 437 104 353 38 548 205 866 - 31 123
1998 135 908 62 992 103 080 17 788 98 644 32 989 207 927 - 34 760
1999 135 268 70 750 104 916 18 205 95 113 40 035 230 347 - 39 905
2000 130 683 75 888 95 615 16 538 78 564 43 682 263 805 4 341 45 652
2001 120 590 82 838 98 484 16 711 88 278 46 902 286 940 6 409 53 183
2002 110 610 85 305 91 416 19 262 71 124 45 446 307 182 2 623 58 480
2003 98 709 76 077 72 885 15 442 50 563 43 874 318 549 2 285 60 113
2004 92 931 65 935 59 093 11 208 35 607 34 211 333 690 2 273 58 247
2005 89 235 53 213 35 522 5 968 28 914 21 916 329 789 - 55 773
2006 89 788 50 300 7 747 1 079 21 029 20 001 303 429 2 845 53 554
2007 91 934 42 219 5 792 2 502 19 164 17 964 299 657 3 411 53 759
2008 95 962 39 717 4 362 1 436 22 085 16 576 285 217 3 906 58 350
2009 98 845 42 756 3 360 1 088 27 649 16 208 294 828 2 465 60 910
2010 107 008 40 210 2 350 1 015 41 332 17 983 293 71 1 2 347 66 413
sourCe: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) 
(2012), 42.
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of a closed, homogeneous society and the idea that the country is a fortress, espe-
cially against Africa, is not only widespread in Germany. There is a demand for 
skilled workers: Germany needs, for example, engineers, medical doctors, and 
health care personnel. I mention this to illustrate that political decisions in the 
field of migration depend not only on purely economic considerations, but on tra-
ditions, mentalities, irrational imaginary scenarios, and, last but not least, the fear 
of strangers.
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IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT AND MANAGING 
LABOR MIGRATION IN FINLAND
Paula Kuusipalo*
In this article, I will briefly describe the history of Finland as a country of migration 
and its current position vis-à-vis international mobility. With its fairly small, aging 
population of 5.4 million inhabitants, Finland is already facing the need for a mobile 
work force. Several government actions support recruiting as well as development 
programs for efficiently integrating newcomers, but many challenges continue to 
exist for meeting the needs of a multicultural population and coherently managing 
immigration.
Finland, a Few Facts about the Development 
Of the Nation-state
Finland is situated in Northern Europe between Scandinavia and Russia. From 
the thirteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth, Finland was an auton-
omous territory of the Kingdom of Sweden (from about 1200 until 1809) and the 
Russian Empire (1809-1917). During these periods, Finland experienced the 
influence of foreign languages, rule, and religion. Despite the extensive period 
under the rule of other countries, it has preserved its own cultural history and identi-
ty, distinctly represented through the Finnish language, which is related neither to 
Scandinavian nor Slavic languages; its origin is in the Uralic language family, of 
which the three most spoken languages are Hungarian, Finnish, and Estonian. 
Development of the nation-state accelerated when Finland gained its indepen-
dence during the 1917 Russian Revolution. Following independence, a cruel and 
intense civil war took place in 1918. 
During World War II, Finland fought against the Soviet Union and strived 
successfully to maintain independence and sovereignty. In the end, even though 
Finnish losses were severe both in territory and manpower, the mere act of defend-
ing the nation-state has been considered one of the factors that united the opposing 
fronts of the civil war into one Finnish nation. The years after wwii brought rapid 
*  Adviser at Immigrat, Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment, paula.
kuusipalo@ely-keskus.fi.
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industrialization and urbanization. Development of the metal industry and high 
technology were boosted by the heavy reparations that Finland paid to the Soviets. 
Today Finland is one of the Nordic advanced welfare states and member of the 
European Union since 1995 as well as a member of the eurozone. With the cur-
rent population of 5.4 million, and a gdp of €35 559 per capita, Finland is among 
the wealthiest in Europe (Finnish Statistics n.d.).
Changes in Migration Flows
Finland has only recently changed from a country of emigration to an immigrant-
receiving one with today’s yearly net immigration of 15 000 people. This develop-
ment is simplified into three periods in this article following a study by Korkiasaari 
and Söderling (2003). The first period of emigration was the journey of the landless 
population mainly to the United States and Canada and to lesser extent to other parts 
of the world after the famine of 1860 and until the war years (1944). The second 
period is the emigration from 1945 to 1999, after wwii, especially to Sweden and Cen-
tral Europe. The third period began in the early 1980s, when Finland first started 
attracting Finnish returnees and gradually, as a result of economic growth and the 
need for workers, more and more work-related immigration. Finland’s humanitarian 
immigration goes back to the signing of the unHCr Refugee Convention in 1968 and 
receiving its first group of refugees in 1985. Since 2001, the quota of refugees 
accepted by Finland has been 750 per year (Finnish Immigration Service n.d.).
table 1
emigration from finland (1860-1999)
Destination 1860-1999 1945-1999
Sweden (45 000) 535 000
Other Countries 
in Europe
(55 000) 125 000
United States 300 000 18 000
Canada 70 000 23 000
Latin America 1 000 5 000
Asia 500 6 000
Africa 1 000 4 000
Oceania 3 500 20 000
Total 476 000 736 000
sourCe: Korkiasaari and Söderling 2003, 3.
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Immigration in Finland 
After the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 and the following crisis in the Balkans, the 
Ingrian Finns from the former Soviet Union, refugees from the former Yugoslavia, 
and the first asylum seekers of Somali origin were among the first groups to immi-
grate to Finland. The Finnish authorities were taken by surprise by this new situation 
and had to improvise activities, trying their best to adapt the service system to the needs 
of the refugees and to help the newcomers settle in the country. For the Somalis, 
integration into the Finnish labor market has taken a relatively long time. They 
were the first group of asylum seekers to come to Finland, a visible minority that 
entered the country after a period of very little immigration except for Finnish return-
ees. At that time, there was no established resettlement program or any Somali com-
munity to help the newcomers (Linnanmaki-Koskela 2010, 77).
Since the 1990s, immigration to Finland has steadily grown as the economy 
has continued to develop positively. Today Finland has a resettlement program for 
a yearly quota of 750 unHCr refugees, plus a growing number of work-related migrants, 
international students, and family-related immigrants, with a net immigration of 
approximately 15 000 persons a year. The number of asylum seekers is linked to inter-
national crises, but has stayed at a relatively low level compared, for example, to 
Sweden. In all, 1 271 of the persons seeking asylum were granted permission to stay 
in Finland in 2011. The total 3 086 asylum-seekers in Finland in 2011 compared 
to Sweden’s 29 648 says something about the different policies in the neighboring 
countries, suggesting that Finnish policy has concentrated more on control and 
security issues (Salmio 2000). 
The current public discussion on immigration issues in Finland is guided, on 
the one hand, by the concern with a declining population and future labor force 
needs, and, on the other hand, by the fairly recently voiced populist opinions 
against foreign influence and some even with racist overtones. The number of 
immigrants is still expected to grow and to continue at the yearly level of 15 000 
net immigration. A report by the Finnish National Board of Education anticipating 
the long-term demand for labor and educational needs states that the declining sup-
ply of labor in Finland will pose significant socio-political challenges. Improving 
immigrants’ standing in the labor market is necessary in order for the economy and 
employment to develop positively (Hanhijoki et al. 2012, 62). 
 
Immigrant Employment
The years from 1989 to 1993 were a period when Finland opened up economically, 
politically, and culturally. The strong links with the Soviet economy and its collapse 
drove the Finnish economy into a deep recession and spawned massive unemploy-
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ment. At the same time immigration to Finland started to increase and these unfa-
vorable conditions delayed immigrants’ integration and employment. However, 
recent research in the Helsinki area shows that over time, even the immigrants with a 
refugee background have achieved a strong foothold in the labor market (Linnanmaki-
Koskela 2010, 79). The study shows that getting settled and learning the language 
and new skills to find your place in the community is a process that takes time. One 
factor separating immigrant groups is how long the integration process takes. As a 
conclusion, immigrants’ integration and employment should not be observed only 
in cohorts, but over several years, a longer period of time 
The government in Finland has acknowledged and taken seriously the future 
need for workers given the aging native population. A government program sets 
overall employment policy goals as well as a framework policy for integration. The 
revised Integration Act and the National Integration program are based on the assump-
tion that integration is a mutual, two-way development of the society and newcomers. 
The act applies to all legal immigrants regardless of the grounds for their residence 
permit. During the initial integration period of a maximum of three years, a variety 
of support actions are available starting with an information package about Finnish 
society (www.lifeinfinland.fi). Measures include recommendations for community 
activities, social services, and the labor market, as well as managing the integration 
of international students and refugee resettlement. According to the Integration 
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Act, integration training for adult migrants must be provided in compliance with 
the National Core Curriculum for Integration Training for Adult Migrants adopted 
by the Finnish National Board of Education. A National Policy Framework for 
recruiting workers internationally and the employment of immigrants sets the 
ground rules for actors in the recruiting business.
Managing Labor Migration 
Managing labor market needs is no simple task. Varying needs and the local environ-
ment in different parts of the country call for local solutions. The Finnish language 
can be an obstacle when individuals of the mobile international work force are 
making decisions about choosing their destination country. Even if recruited by an 
international employer, learning the local language is still considered key to overall 
integration into Finnish society. The Helsinki metropolitan area is clearly benefitting 
from mobility, with over 50 percent of the total number of immigrants settling there; 
it has already been successful in adapting public services to meet the needs of the inter-
national work force. The need for labor in the countryside is also be coming obvious, 
but attracting workers and managing the practicalities can be challenging.
Even after 30 years of immigration, regions still exist in Finland where immi-
gration is not usual and only a few foreign-born inhabitants live. In some rural areas, 
community service-providers or employers are not familiar with mobility issues. 
For example, the procedure for applying for residence permits and managing an 
integration program are not equally well executed as in growth centers. Even some 
suspicion and mistrust of foreign credentials may exist among employers, causing 
reluctance to hire foreigners. Education acquired in Finland can be seen as proof of 
trust in the system and taking on Finnish values. Linnanmaki-Koskela’s study shows 
that after 14 to 17 years from the year of immigration, 19 percent of all the persons 
in the group studied had acquired a Finnish diploma, which can be understood as 
a sign of internalizing the Finnish value of seeing education as an important asset 
(Linnanmaki-Koskela 2010, 75). There are also good examples of developing smooth 
initial integration measures even for smaller numbers of immigrants outside 
growth centers (for example, see the City of Iisalmi Guide for Immigrants, n.d.). 
Together with high unemployment rates, certain industries suffer from a con-
stant labor shortage. For example, farmers with livestock report difficulties in 
recruiting, and this speaks to a serious labor shortage in rural areas. In farming, 
interest seems to be growing in recruiting a more motivated, well-educated foreign 
work force. In many cases in remote rural settings, it has already become routine to 
recruit from abroad, especially from the neighboring Estonia and Russia, as well as 
from the Ukraine. 
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figure 2
unemployment rate (2001-2010) (perCent) 
Public opinion has been somewhat negatively impacted, in part due to the 
high unemployment rate of newly arrived immigrants. Nevertheless, generally 
speaking, over the past 30 years of immigration, interaction has increased confi-
dence among members of the community, regardless of the populist political 
movement.
To attract more labor, Finland can still benefit from the good reputation and high 
quality of its educational system. It is still a welfare state where equality and safety 
are important values.
As the research of Linnanmaki-Koskela states, for policymakers and the pub-
lic alike, it is important to deliver a clear message of the benefits of immigration’s 
increasing economic solidity over the long term, but that it brings no quick profits. 
The current government is committed to an active and anticipatory immigra-
tion policy. It recently signed a resolution on the Strategy of the Future of Immigration 
in Finland 2020, which takes a position on questions of equality, people’s welfare, 
and economic competitiveness. To enhance immigrants’ chances of improving 
their standing in the labor market and to achieve all other strategic objectives 
included in the resolution, the government will prepare a separate action plan to set 
up goals and measures, as well as to determine the parties responsible and scheduling.
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The strategy aims at a more workable and pro-active immigration policy in a 
situation of emerging global mobility, an aging population, and increasing diversity. 
To be able to resolve the issue of competitiveness and the balance of resources, 
immigration issues should become more visible in national policy-making, and 
Finland should formulate coherent, active policies at the EU level and in other 
international forums. The strategy’s success depends on the commitment of a wide 
range of actors across society and among Finnish nationals (Siäasiainministeriö 
2013, 25).1 
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THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND OVERSEAS 
FILIPINOS’ REMITTANCES: 
LEARNING TO BUILD A FUTURE BACK HOME
Imelda Nicolas*
Introduction
The Philippines has emerged as one of the world’s major migrant-sending countries, 
together with Mexico, China, and India. Our latest data from the Commission on 
Filipinos Overseas stock estimates show that as of December 2010, 9.45 million 
Filipinos are living overseas worldwide, 47 percent of whom (4.42 million) are per-
manent residents, 45 percent (4.32 million) are temporary migrants, commonly 
known as overseas Filipino workers (ofws), and 7 percent (705 000) are irregular. 
They are spread out in more than 210 countries and territories (Cfo 2010).
table 1
stoCk estimate of overseas filipinos
(as of December 2010)
The data likewise demonstrate that the Philippines has gone beyond labor 
migration. Many Filipinos leave the country for a wide variety of reasons ranging 
from the intent to marry to family reunification, from educational to professional 
advancement, from business to investment opportunities.
*  Cabinet-rank secretary of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (Cfo), Office of the President of the 
Philippines, www.cfo.gov.ph/imelda.nicolas@cfo.gov.ph.  
Total: 9 452 984
Overseas Filipino Workers 4.32M (45%)
Permanent Migrants 4.42M (47%)
Irregular Migrants 0.71M (8%)
Source: Cfo (2010).
122 IMELDA NICOLAS
Remittances and the Philippine Economy 
According to the World Bank’s Migration and Development Factbook (2011), the 
Philippines now ranks fourth globally in terms of remittances, with the top three 
remittance-receiving countries identified as India, China, and Mexico.
From the same World Bank report, we note that remittances constitute 10.7 per-
cent of the Philippines’ 2010 gross domestic product (gdp), the highest of any country 
in Southeast Asia and the twenty-first highest in the world.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (bsp, or Philippine Central Bank) reported 
that remittances in 2011 grew 7.2 percent year-on-year to US$20.11 billion, slightly 
more than the official central bank forecast of 7 percent for the whole year (n.d.a).
Remittances clearly outrank investment flows (fdi) and official development 
assistance (oda). In 2009, the country was able to attract less than US$1.9 billion 
in foreign direct investments, while in 2007, the Philippines received around 
US$634 million in oda (bsp n.d.b).
table 2
top 10 Countries remittanCes are sent from
(as of December 2010, in billions of U.S. dollars)
Countries 2008 2009 2010
United States 7.825 7.323 7.862
Canada 1.308 1.900 2.022
Saudi Arabia 1.387 1.470 1.544
United Kingdom 0.776 0.859 0.888
Japan 0.575 0.773 0.882
UAE 0.621 0.644 0.775
Singapore 0.523 0.649 0.734
Italy 0.678 0.521 0.550
Germany 0.304 0.433 0.448
Norway 0.185 0.352 0.372
sourCe: bsp (n.d.a).
In 2010, the biggest source of remittance transfers to the Philippines is the 
Americas, with 53 percent (U.S. and Canada); Europe provides 17 percent (United 
Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Norway); the Middle East, 16 percent (Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates); and Asia, 13 percent (Japan and Singapore). Based on 
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the growth rate of overseas Filipinos’ remittances for the past seven years, the 
Central Bank has described them as “resilient, providing [a] cushion against external 
shocks” (Guerrero 2012, slide 11).
CHart 1
volume of remittanCes
This sustained remittance growth rate is attributed to the following factors: 
diversity of overseas Filipinos’ skills and expertise in more than 200 countries all 
over the world, new and broader markets for labor migration, expansion of bank 
and non-bank services tailor-fit for overseas Filipinos, and the various efforts by 
the government and civil society organizations to mitigate the effects of the global 
economic crisis. It has also been reported that the increase in the number of 
skilled Filipinos deployed usually corresponds to higher remuneration and employ-
ment benefits. Some of them even acquire two or three jobs to, at the very least, 
sustain the usual amount they remit to their families. It is no wonder that many of 
us feel that our overseas Filipinos are our country’s unsung heroes and heroines.
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A Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste
A crisis, in spite of its bad aspects, is an opportunity to learn important lessons, but 
that opportunity is wasted if the lessons are missed.
For almost four decades as a sending country, the Philippines has weathered 
various financial crises, both domestic and international. In surviving them, the 
country has learned quite a few lessons, especially in relation to remittances:
• Improving the remittance environment encourages their continued flow;
•  Promoting financial education among overseas Filipinos and their families mobi-
lizes remittances toward productive activities and allows our overseas Filipinos 
to look forward to a financially secure future back home or in their host country;
•  Return and reintegration initiatives for overseas Filipinos should be multi-sec-
toral in approach and given more attention by the Philippine government;
•  Collective remittance models and harnessing the economic development 
potentials of migration require a business and investment perspective; and,
•  Diversification of skills, professions, and destination countries translate to 
resilience in remittance levels.
Improving the Remittance Environment
The combined effect of medium- to long-term loans, a solid investment portfolio, 
and the remittances of overseas Filipinos minimized the impact of the 1997 Asian 
crisis on the Philippines (Tenorio, cited in Opiniano 2002).
Learning from this experience, the Philippine Central Bank (bsp) actively sought 
to improve the remittance environment in three ways: 1) by enhancing transparen-
cy and competition to lower remittance charges, 2) by expanding and diversifying 
channels of remittances, and 3) by exploring low-cost options for fund transfers.
The Central Bank launched an overseas Filipinos portal on its Web site, linking 
with all the banks’ Web pages on remittance services, fees, and rates. It also required 
that banks post on their premises and Web sites their remittance charges and 
other relevant information. This provides overseas Filipinos and their beneficiaries 
with competitive data, leading to more informed decisions on their choices of 
channels for transfers.
Furthermore, it improved remittance provider services by facilitating the 
interconnection of major atm networks. It authorized qualified rural banks and 
cooperative banks to operate a foreign currency deposit unit (fCdu), which gives 
overseas Filipinos the option of maintaining foreign currency deposits instead of 
immediately changing them to pesos. It also standardized the banks’ identification 
requirements and allowed the use of foreign-issued ids.
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Committed to use new technology for low cost options, the bsp likewise set up 
a local clearinghouse, PhilPaSS, to eliminate the use of couriers in delivering remit-
tances. This initiative reduced charges by as much as 90 to 96 percent and lowered 
the back-end processing fees to 50 pesos per transaction. From 2004 on, the remit-
tance cost in the Philippines has gone down to 12 percent on average. There is still 
a way to go to reach the universally desired target of 5 percent. In addition, according 
to the bsp, 95 percent of all remittances now go through formal channels and only 
5 percent through the informal ones (Tetangco 2011).
Very recently, our agency, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (Cfo), part-
nered with the bsp to establish a multi-stakeholder Remittance for Development 
Council (redC), an advisory and policy-recommending body, and a venue for regu-
lar dialogues and feedback on issues regarding remittances, especially on measures to 
lower costs; easier, greater, and faster access to remittance channels; and innovative 
remittance conduits.
Promoting Financial Education
Perhaps the greatest lesson that any overseas Filipino has to learn is that it is not 
how long they have worked or lived abroad or how high their salaries are that result 
in a seamless and successful retirement, but how they are able to do fiscal goal-set-
ting and financial planning as a family, before and during their migration phase.
This is why the government and various non-governmental organizations contin-
ue to undertake financial literacy campaigns that aim to promote a culture of savings 
among overseas Filipinos and their families. Atikha, a civil society organization 
working with and for migrants, has notably developed modules that cover not only 
money issues, but link them with social and family concerns that drain their resources. 
Through the Philippine Overseas Labor Offices (polo), the Philippine embas-
sies and consulates actively conduct financial literacy classes for overseas Filipino 
workers. International road-shows in countries where there are large numbers of 
overseas Filipinos have been carried out by various government agencies and civil 
society organizations. 
Because most financial literacy programs are geared toward overseas Filipino 
workers and their families, the Cfo has taken the initiative to develop one for its major 
clientele, the permanent residents of other countries and those migrating perma-
nently. We are now integrating financial literacy modules in our pre-departure orien-
tation sessions and in our community education programs. 
Furthermore, various migration-related organizations in the Philippines have 
actively worked for the incorporation of lessons in money, savings, and invest-
ments in the public school curricula, targeting in particular the children of over-
seas Filipinos. 
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Return and Reintegration
In 2008, the large-scale labor displacements in countries such as Taiwan, Korea, 
and the United Arab Emirates put the government to task. Because of this, the 
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (owwa) established a One-Stop-Help-
Desk at our international airport to provide information on services that displaced 
overseas Filipino workers can avail themselves of. The Department of Labor and 
Employment also organized quick response teams in its regional offices to look 
after displaced workers’ needs (Asis 2006).
Soon thereafter, the Filipino Expatriate Livelihood Support Fund (felsf) was 
created. The fund was designed for overseas Filipino workers displaced by the crisis 
to be able to take out loans of up to 50 000 pesos with easy terms if they wish to go into 
business. Applicants had to attend a three-day training program for this purpose.
This became the precursor for Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino’s 
2-billion-peso reintegration fund for overseas Filipino workers and their families, 
triggered last year by the various man-made and natural upheavals in the Middle 
East and Japan. 
These government initiatives required a multi-stakeholder approach as the 
government assumed varied roles: that of a disaster management expert, a welfare 
provider, a placement and information officer, and a business consultant and trainer, 
among others. This underscored the need for government to involve as many 
stakeholders as possible when it comes to presenting a comprehensive and realistic 
set of options for reintegration.
Collective Remittance Models 
For Local Development
The Cfo, in partnership with the United Nations Development Program (undp) and 
the Western Union Foundation, has been working with civil society organizations 
and the local government leaders of the province of Ilocos Norte and the city of Taguig 
on a project called “Of-red,” or Overseas Filipinos Remittances for Development. It 
seeks to increase the effectiveness of collective remittance programs for local devel-
opment. The four collective remittance models identified by the project are migrant 
savings and investment schemes, cooperatives, rural banks, and microfinance 
institutions.
Using the cooperative model, the Philippine-based ngo Atikha developed an 
investment scheme with one of the largest agriculture-based cooperatives in the 
country. It introduced the investment format as part of its financial literacy training 
among overseas Filipinos in Italy, which they organized together with Philippine 
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labor agencies (the owwa and the National Reintegration Centre for Overseas 
Filipino Workers [nCro] ) and the Italy-based Filipino Women’s Council. 
On the other hand, the Migrant Savings and Alternative Investments model was 
pioneered by Unlad Kabayan, another Philippine-based ngo that espouses migrant 
entrepreneurship. It organizes migrant workers into savings and investment groups, 
usually according to the region in the Philippines they come from or by factory. The ngo 
pools the migrants’ savings while the migrants themselves choose any of the follow-
ing: invest the funds in microfinance/microcredit institutions, in successful social 
enterprises that the ngo has helped set up in the Philippines, or start their own busi-
nesses (Franco 2009, García, Jr. 2011, and ukmsf n.d.). 
Meanwhile, Colayco Foundation has managed to raise millions from contri-
butions from its members in the cooperative, mostly Hong Kong-based household 
service workers. Their pooled resources are invested in trust funds and mutual funds, 
leveraging them for higher returns.
On a parallel track, tigra, or the Transnational Institute for Grassroots Research 
and Action, a U.S.- and Mexico-based ngo, forges strategic alliances among remitters, 
their families and communities, and remittance service providers. By using the 
consumer power of senders and their beneficiaries, tigra has been able to get com-
mitment from companies to reinvest anywhere from US$1 to US$2.25 per trans-
action for community-based enterprises.
The lesson that the overseas Filipino community has learned is simple: there is 
power in numbers, and, more importantly, development and reintegration are integral 
parts of the migration continuum. And at all times, there is a need to professional-
ize the management of collective remittance funds to ensure that institutional 
arrangements are in place, returns on investments are consistent and monitored 
regularly, and funds are strategically directed toward local development and more 
productive activities.
Diversification of Migrant Stock and Destination Lends 
Resilience to Remittance Levels
Remittances to the Philippines grew steadily by over 7 percent in 2011 largely 
because demand for overseas Filipino workers has remained remarkably stable. In 
fact, data show that overseas Filipino worker deployments increased by nearly 20 
percent between 2008 and 2010 despite the still-raging global financial crisis. The 
deployment of seafarers, who account for one quarter of overall overseas workers 
outflow, increased by 33 percent from 2008 to 2010 (poea 2010). 
In addition, a growing number of countries allow for permanent residency on 
the basis of the skilled-work category, including Canada, Australia, and the U.S., 
while in Europe, countries such as Italy, Spain, Austria, and the UK espouse family 
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reunification among migrants. This shows the importance of destination-country 
policy changes for the future sustainability of remittance flows to the Philippines. 
In many of these countries, Filipinos who have acquired residency and contributed 
social security payments, have now become eligible for workers benefits and family 
tax credits. 
Conclusion 
Migration is a complicated and complex issue and concern. It is a development 
challenge, but one that poses a wide spectrum of opportunities for learning and 
growth. In his 16-point social contract with the Filipino people and his commitment 
to transformational national leadership, President Aquino specifically expressed it 
thus: 
From a government that treats its people as an export commodity and a means to earn 
foreign exchange, disregarding the social cost to Filipino families . . . to a government 
that creates jobs at home, so that working abroad will be a choice rather than a necessity, 
and when its citizens do choose to become Overseas Filipino Workers, their welfare 
and protection will be the government’s priority. (Aquino 2010)
In ending this topic on remittances, let me paraphrase Robert Fulghum (2004), 
because everything that we needed to know, we learned from understanding 
migration and the economic crises that come our way.
And this is what we learned:
•  Share everything. Play fair. Because improving the remittance environment 
encourages continued flow of remittances and so it is a win-win for everyone.
•  Be aware of wonder. . . . Learn some and think some. . . . Financial literacy is 
a must for all migrants and their families if they are to look forward to a secure 
future whether in their host or home country.
•  Remember that first book about Dick and Jane and the first word you learned, 
the biggest word of all: “Look.” For when we look hard enough, there are many 
opportunities to return and reintegrate.
•  When you go out into the world, watch the traffic, hold hands, and stick together. 
That is the key for collective remittances for development, which translate to 
savings, business, and investment, beneficial for the migrants themselves, 
their families, their communities, and the country. 
•  And finally: Live a balanced life, because, in the end, diversification in migrant 
skills, professions, profiles, and destination countries leads to resilience in 
remittance levels.
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That is the wisdom learned from the Philippines’ decades-long migration and 
global crisis experience. This is rooted in Filipinos’ sense of family, love of country, 
and resilience that weather economic downturns and unexpected crises. 
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EUROPE’S BACKLASH 
AGAINST MULTICULTURALISM1
Jan Rath*
In summer 2010, the world championship for men’s national soccer teams was 
held in South Africa, the country that after many years of painful struggle pre-
vailed over Apartheid. Spain won the tournament, but the revelation was Germany. 
Although Germany’s is historically one of the most successful national teams, the 
calculating,  unimaginative way the team used to play was not always much appre-
ciated. Throughout the 2010 tournament, however, Germany impressed fans by 
playing an attractive, aggressive soccer game. After the rousing 4-1 victory over 
England, the Welt am Sonntag (Frommann 2010) exclaimed, “With courage and 
strength the German footballers were knocking on the gates of heaven. The happy 
ending for the midsummer fairy tale is getting closer.” The team, interestingly enough, 
represented the new, multicultural Germany. Five players were born outside the 
country (in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Brazil), one had dual German-Ghanaian nation-
ality, and several others were second-generation immigrants of Nigerian, Spanish, 
Tunisian, and Turkish origin. Christian Seifert, Ceo of the German Football League, 
was jubilant: “[Germany] is a multi-cultural society where people come, where peo-
ple live, where people love to be, and the national team as you see it is very different 
from those of former days. In 1998, all those who played for Germany had German 
parents. Right now we have a lot of players with migrant backgrounds. . . . So, 
today’s German national team is proof of the success of the German national model” 
(Goal 2010).
Later that summer, German Bundeskanzler Angela Merkel made a public 
statement saying that the attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany 
had “utterly failed.” Her comments came amid an intense debate about immigra-
tion and multiculturalism or, to be more precise, the death of Multikulti. The 
polemic first heated up in August when a former Social Democratic senator and 
senior official at Germany’s central bank, Thilo Sarrazin, published a book with 
 1  An earlier version of this article was published by the Harvard International Review, January 6, 2011, 
http://hir.harvard.edu/debating-multiculturalism?page=0,0.
*  Head of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and researcher at the Institute for Migration 
and Ethnic Studies (imes) and the Center for Urban Studies at the University of Amsterdam, and Euro-
pean chair of International Metropolis, www.janrath.com.
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the provocative title Deutschland schabt sich ab (Germany Is Digging Its Own 
Grave) (2010). He stated that “no immigrant group other than Muslims is so 
strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime.” These immigrant 
groups would be unwilling and incapable of integrating into the mainstream, 
something that according to Sarrazin would be due to their gene pool. Many peo-
ple were appalled to hear such statements 65 years after World War II and accused 
him of racism and anti-Semitism. But the senator has already sold more than one 
million copies of the book. Furthermore, various surveys showed that approximate-
ly one-third of the German population believed the country had been “overrun by 
foreigners.” Meanwhile, anti-immigrant political parties (initially Die Republikaner 
and later Die Freiheit) had been carving out a niche in the German electoral market, 
while mainstream parties, the Christian Democrats in particular, had become 
anxious about their electoral position. One really wonders how it is possible that 
the country that enthusiastically embraced multiculturalism during the World 
Cup condemned it so loudly less than three months later. So much for the mid-
summer fairy tale.
Germany is apparently confused about immigration and its resulting ethnic and 
religious diversity. Two years later, at the European championships, the German 
soccer team failed to qualify for the finals again. This time the popular German news-
paper Bild (2012) struck a different tone, arguing that the players with immigrant 
backgrounds were to blame for this failure, as they refrained from singing the na -
tional anthem. But Germany is not the only country experiencing this: we are wit-
nessing similar situations in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Governments in these 
countries, which until recently in various ways and with differing levels of intensity 
welcomed immigrants and even invited them to settle and allowed or encouraged 
them to establish their own institutions, shifted gears to embark on restrictive immi-
gration and tougher integration policies, placing increasing emphasis on native 
norms, values, and behavior and on disciplining the “Other.” The “new realism” that 
has informed this shift has been accompanied by fierce criticism of the “ethnic 
minorities industry,” i.e., the self-proclaimed leadership of immigrant ethnic and 
religious minorities, the native white advocates of multiculturalism, as well as their 
institutions. In so doing, the political leadership felt it ought to respond to the smol-
dering discontent among parts of the native white population and to the plethora 
of populist, anti-immigrant parties that had so successfully won the hearts of the 
discontented. In several cases, including Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 
these parties even managed to become part of or closely associated with the ruling 
government. Although bigots, racists, fascists, and neo-Nazis gravitate to these radi-
cal parties, it would be too simple to say that each and every supporter is a neo-
Nazi in disguise.
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What, then, is happening in Europe nowadays? Has Europe been taken hostage 
by a bunch of twisted political entrepreneurs who have lost their minds, forgotten 
the lessons of 1933-1945 and the holocaust, and who are trying to gain political 
influence by trampling on immigrant ethnic and religious minorities? Or is it that 
Europeans have been too naive with regard to accepting individuals and groups from 
countries that are —or are seen as— culturally distant from the imagined national 
centers? Or should the current political mood be explained as a reaction to the poli-
tics of obstinate, left-wing lunatics and prophets of boundless multiculturalism?
There are no easy answers. In practice, things are much more complicated than 
popular wisdom suggests, and a wider perspective is needed to fully comprehend the 
current developments. Let us briefly examine a number of aspects.
First of all, it remains to be seen that we are dealing with a uniquely European 
situation. The rise of populist political movements that capitalize on anti-immi-
grant, anti-multicultural, and anti-government sentiments, religious fundamental-
ism, and narrow-minded nationalism can also be observed elsewhere. Take the 
United States. The recent immigration enforcement legislation in Arizona, the rise 
of the Tea Party with their swipes at minorities, and some of the recent electoral 
campaigns only serve to demonstrate that Europe is not alone. Australia, a country 
once notorious for its White Australian policy in days of yore, shifted to multicul-
turalism in the 1970s, but had already abolished its unconditional embrace of 
multiculturalism by the 1990s. This coincided with the rise of Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation party. Mrs. Hanson was by no means a friend of immigration and 
diversity. She was quoted as saying, “I believe we are in danger of being swamped 
by Asians,” and, “Of course, I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want 
into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my 
country,” and she complained constantly about “reverse racism” and “political cor-
rectness” (The Australian 2010). One Nation never constituted a government, but 
her influence was unarguably huge. Since the 1990s, Australia has been advocat-
ing the idea of a “shared national identity’ (with a remarkably high appreciation of 
the Anglo-Celtic heritage). Canada has treasured the public acceptance of ethnic 
and religious difference and support of cultural pluralism as a core element of its 
identity since the early 1970s. But Canada, too, hit upon the limits of multicultur-
alism, and the call for what has euphemistically come to be known as “reasonable 
accommodation” resounds loudly in the public realm today. It is unarguably true 
that these “classical countries of immigration” are more inclined to accept immigra-
tion as a fact of life and are not shocked when newcomers constitute ethnic 
enclaves. In that sense, everything is relative. For cultural backlash is everywhere 
and certainly not confined to Europe.
Secondly, it also remains to be seen that we are witnessing a rise of concerns 
about immigration and cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. As early as 1968, 
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the British Conservative leader Enoch Powell made a rather controversial speech 
in which he warned against “rivers of blood” due to what he saw as the continued 
unchecked immigration from the Commonwealth to Britain and the “race-relations 
problems” subsequent to that. His speech with its open appeal to racial hatred was 
declared “evil” at the time, but it inspired Margaret Thatcher (who had become 
prime minister shortly afterwards) to use the gist of his argument for her immigra-
tion and race-relations policies. A noteworthy side-effect was that by adopting a 
strong position, Thatcher stole the National Front’s thunder, resulting in the demise 
of this racist party and a further rise of the Tory Party. In France, maverick politician 
Jean Marie Le Pen rose to prominence in the 1980s. He gained widespread popu-
larity with his nationalist, anti-immigration platform. The very fact that he repeat-
edly denied the holocaust and put anti-Semitic slurs on Jewish politicians did not 
prevent numerous French voters from supporting him as candidate for the posi-
tion of président de la république. Other politicians tried to take the wind out of Le 
Pen’s sails by reaching out to xenophobic voters. In 1989, President Mitterrand said, 
“Il y a un seuil de tolérance” (there is a threshold of tolerance), implying that immi-
grants were a nuisance indeed and that the proportion of immigrants present in a 
population had to be minimized. Jacques Chirac joined this lamentation by com-
plaining about “du bruit et des odeurs” (the noises and the smells) generated by 
African immigrants. Many voters grasped the message only too well. In Austria, Jörg 
Haider was a successful regional politician before he joined the national govern-
ment in 2000. He was notorious for his offensive statements about immigration 
and immigrants, Muslim immigrants in particular, whose attitude and behavior 
were in his eyes incompatible with “Western” ones. In other countries, including 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, similar political situations arose. Peculiarly 
enough, many observers have a rather short memory when it comes to these mat-
ters. In the Netherlands, the country that likes to cherish the self-image of toler-
ance and the live-and-let-live mentality, it is often claimed that problematizing 
immigration and multiculturalism was not PC until very recently. The government 
pursued a multicultural policy —so it is believed— but not one single individual 
dared make any critical comment. Apart from the fact that the Netherlands never 
pursued such a policy —at best it paid lip service to the maintenance of ethnic and 
religious difference—, the critics apparently failed to notice the intense media 
debates in the early 1980s, or the election of dozens of racist politicians to Par lia-
ment and local councils since the early 1980s. Perhaps they were beamed up to the 
Starship Enterprise during these spectacular events. What is relevant here is that 
concerns about immigration and diversity have been voiced for quite a long time. 
So, what else is new?
Thirdly, discussions about immigrant ethnic and religious minorities and their 
relations with the mainstream are often dogged by explicit or implicit references to 
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Europe’s Judeo-Christian tradition and its incompatibility with that of immigrants. 
Immigrants from Muslim traditions in particular are supposedly incapable of 
embracing modern norms, values, and behavior, and have little or no understanding 
of democracy, gender equality, acceptance of homosexuality, and so forth. (This 
argument is never used in reference to highly-skilled and wealthy immigrants from 
Japan or visitors from the Vatican.) These references, however, are not unprob-
lematic. To the extent that such a tradition exists, there is a lot to be said against 
it. It was in the name of Christianity that soldiers and tradesmen sailed the ocean 
in sunshine, wind, and rain to conquer the rest of the world. Trade wars, looting, 
slavery, and colonial exploitation were only a few of the blessings of the Judeo-
Christian tradition. The Judeo-Christian tradition, moreover, could not prevent 
two world wars, nor the holocaust, nor the troubles in Northern Ireland, nor the 
mass expulsion of Roma from France. References to the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, furthermore, fail to appreciate the fact that Europe is rapidly secularizing, or 
that people of other religions or cultures have historically been subjects of Europe’s 
nation-states. Islam is often regarded as an immigrant religion, as something entire-
ly new, but this obscures the historical presence of indigenous Muslims in Eastern 
Europe or the presence of Muslims in (former) colonial areas. The United Kingdom, 
the French republic and the kingdom of the Netherlands ruled many millions of 
Muslims in the Middle East, Northern Africa, India and Pakistan, and Indonesia. 
But even if we imagined a Europe without Muslims —a purely theoretical exercise 
of course, just for the sake of argument—, we would find immense internal diver-
sity. Those who refer to the Judeo-Christian tradition may pretend that Europe is a 
cultural unit existing within clear-cut boundaries, but the opposite is true. In fact, 
all references to this tradition mainly serve the construction of Europe as a coherent 
and cohesive unit.
Fourthly, discussions about the ethnic or religious Other always pertain to 
fixed imaginary categories. The category of Muslims, then, invariably encompasses 
men with long beards in white dresses, silenced women with head scarves or bur-
kas, and agitated young men who make anti-Semitic statements about Jews and 
Israel and abuse homosexuals. All Muslim immigrants are supposedly ignorant 
people with insufficient proficiency in the host country’s language, people with 
unskilled jobs —if they are employed at all—, and people who live in inner-city 
working class areas or the banlieues, people who, in the words of the Somali anti-
Muslim and anti-multiculturalism activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, never read the famous 
works of Voltaire, in short, folks who do not conform to mainstream norms, values, 
attitudes, who failed to notice the Enlightenment, who missed the boat to moder-
nity, and who live parallel lives. Sure enough, those people do exist. But there are 
numerous other Muslim immigrants who do not conform to these inane stereotypes. 
In fact, the overwhelming majority of “Muslims” in Europe never visit a mosque 
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and do not feel represented by the unworldly imams that journalists are so crazy about. 
Likewise, something like a cohesive “Muslim community,” to be sure, does not 
actually exist. Muslims in Europe, like all ordinary people, come in all shapes and 
sizes. They come from different countries, have different migration histories, differ-
ent levels of education, different class positions, live in different neighborhoods, 
and have different political loyalties, life styles, and religious and ethnic identities and 
feelings of belonging. What’s more, these differences are utterly dynamic; they 
change continuously, partly under the influence of the specific context in which 
they live, and this leads to ever more variety. Talking about “the” Muslims or about “the” 
ethnic minorities, therefore, is increasingly out of sync with everyday reality. 
Fifthly, something always seems to be overlooked in these kinds of discus-
sions. There is a more fundamental but rather general discontentment in Europe 
about the role of the state, the welfare state in particular, and about the elites who 
have been ruling the country and created the situation that we are now in. For sev-
eral decades, Europe has been pursuing a neo-liberal course. Competitiveness and 
economic growth were to be boosted by giving more space to the business sector 
and by organizing society as if it were a private enterprise. Welfare-state provisions 
were considered acceptable as long as they served these goals. Since the 1980s and 
1990s, all European countries have deregulated the economy and dismantled the 
welfare state, leading to ever more precarious labor market conditions. Also, a 
plethora of services once offered by the state or by institutions operating under the 
aegis of the state have been privatized. So, health care, postal and telephone ser-
vices, public utilities such as gas, water, and electricity, public transportation, etc., are 
now available on the private market. So far, so good. The pundits of neo-liberalism 
slap one another on the back, but numerous consumers —oh, excuse me— citizens 
fail to acknowledge the blessings of this system: the costs of health care have been 
soaring, while fewer services have been made available; the telephone market has 
become hopelessly non-transparent; public transportation has gone downhill; and so 
forth. More fundamentally, the overall quality of the public sector has seriously dete-
riorated both in terms of services offered to the public and in terms of qual ity of work-
ing conditions for civil servants. As for the latter, the introduction of output-driven 
quality-control systems has increased red tape with a rising number of “managers” in 
a position of control, and de-professionalization looms large. The mindless liberal-
ization of the economy, the impudent pursuit of self-interest, and the perplexing lack 
of public responsibility and accountability eventually resulted in the current eco-
nomic crisis . . . and Joe the Plummer is expected to pay the bill. People expect the 
state to take care of them, but many feel abandoned.
Those who find themselves —rightly or wrongly— on the wrong side of the 
tracks, are keen to point out the culprit. And there they are: immigrants and the elite. 
As for the latter, the economic elite have been too busy going for profit; the cultural 
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elite have been on their own in lofty artistic spheres, splashing taxpayers’ money 
on their own hobbies; the scientific elite —the social sciences in particular— have 
lost touch with Joe’s reality; the political elite are bickering all the time, indulging 
in inanities instead of addressing “real” problems. This slanted representation of 
reality has been propelled by a media industry that is continuously on the lookout 
for a scoop and a scandal. At this moment, it is easy and rewarding to make a lot of 
fuss about minorities with little political clout. Moderate local politicians, part 
of the cursed political elite, are keen to show their credentials to Joe the Plummer. 
Some, like the deputy mayor of The Hague, Marnix Norder, talk about a “tsunami 
of immigrants,” referring to labor migrants from EU-member-state Poland, as a 
means of putting political pressure on the central government for more funding. But 
in so doing, they are reproducing unfounded suggestions of uncontrollability and 
irreparable damage. In this political climate, one can easily get the impression that 
a Turkish girl’s head scarf is a serious problem, while the fact that she dropped out 
of high school, is excluded from the labor market, and cannot develop her talents 
to the interest of herself or of society at large is seen as less relevant. For to the extent 
that there is a cultural backlash in Europe, it is about fear and the lack of social 
security of mainstream people; it is against the cultural, economic, and political elites 
who are regarded as responsible for this; and it is manifested by using politically 
weak minority groups as a convenient scapegoat.
Last, but not least, while there is a lot of fuss about a “cultural backlash,” a 
miracle is slowly and surely taking shape: ethnic and cultural diversity is becoming 
commonplace in Europe. In the Netherlands, for instance, while the government 
was considering banning headscarves in public spaces, the biggest supermarket 
chain, Albert Heijn, introduced headscarves for the thousands of Turkish, Mo ro c-
can, and Pakistani girls and women working as cashiers. They wear the head-
scarves —in the company color, of course: blue— when they sit behind the cash 
registers, and nobody has ever bothered about it. Also in the Netherlands, in cities 
like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the most popular local radio station, FunX, broad-
casts what is called “an urban program,” i.e., a program that reaches out to all ethnic 
and religious minorities by playing different styles of music and talking about the 
things that matter for all youngsters, regardless of their ethnic or religious back-
ground: school, finding a job, politics, shopping, dating, and so forth. And again in 
the Netherlands, restaurants, fashion, home decorating, sports, and so forth are all 
thriving thanks to ethnic influences: ethnic food, clothing, and gadgets sell (Aytar 
and Rath 2012; Rath 2007). Despite complaints about immigration and diversity, 
and despite integrationist or assimilationist discourses, “multiculturalism by 
stealth” is de rigueur. This almost seems like a midsummer fairy tale.
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THE RISE OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS IN THE U.S.: 
ARIZONA AND ALABAMA, EMBLEMATIC CASES
Mónica Verea*
Introduction
The new millennium has brought some unexpected circumstances that have led 
to the rise of anti-foreign/anti-immigrant sentiments all over the world, especially in 
the main immigrant-receiving countries like the United States. The 9/11 terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by foreign organized extremist Muslims were a determining 
factor for attitudes about immigration. At the end of the century’s first decade, 
global recession brought with it a substantive hike in unemployment rates, fostering 
the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments and, in some places, a sharp immigration 
policy backlash.
The severe economic recession, exacerbated by domestic pressure, has encour-
aged federal and state governments to implement a series of much more restrictive 
measures in their migratory policy than in the preceding period. The rise of anti-
immigrant actions, xenophobic pressures, and discriminatory attitudes are often 
aggravated in times of economic crisis. In order to understand these attitudes, I pre-
sent the main legal frameworks that the U.S. government and Congress have 
approved to manage their undocumented migrant flow from the 1980s until the 
Obama administration and the recent “Gang of Eight” congressional proposal to 
reform their broken immigration system.
One of the main factors in this situation has been the growing number of for-
eign residents and undocumented migrants in the U.S. during the last decade. This 
has made society more aware of who the immigrants are and how they are consti-
tuted as a group, because society perceives irregular immigrants negatively and pres-
sures policy-makers to adopt highly restrictive measures to control the flow. 
Language, physical appearance, and certain customs that are inherent characteris-
tics and values of certain ethnic groups, embedded in a specific place, have 
become more visible and evident because of their continued growth and have con-
tributed to fostering anti-immigrant attitudes, especially in some states. I explain 
how restrictionists have reacted and tried to influence Congress and government 
*  Professor and researcher at Cisan-unam and Cisan founding director (1989-1997), mverea@unam.mx. 
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to establish a more restrictive immigration policy. Finally, I describe the increasing 
role the states have played in controlling irregular migration, filling the void the 
federal government has left due to its resistance to approving immigration reform. 
I explain how Arizona and Alabama have become emblematic cases because of 
their anti-immigrant movement and the harsh measures proposed, approved, and 
in some cases implemented there during recent years.
U.S. Government and Congressional Concerns 
About How to Manage the Undocumented 
Migrant Flow since the 1980s
For the last 30 years, the United States has experienced high levels of unauthorized 
immigration,1 which has become the main concern in immigration policy-making. 
The passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (irCa), signed into law 
by President Reagan, reflected that concern and marked a turning point in strength-
ening enforcement in their migration policy, making the hiring of unauthorized 
immigrants unlawful for the first time in U.S. history. In addition, it called for bol-
stering border enforcement and provided for legalizing the migratory status of 
approximately 2.7 million of the unauthorized immigrant population at that time 
(2.3 million of whom were Mexicans) via two programs, one for long-term residents 
and another for seasonal agricultural workers.2 irCa’s legal-status provision com-
bined with employer sanctions —which have been poorly enforced since then—, 
new funding for border enforcement, as well as encouraging the H2-A and H2-B 
programs for temporary agricultural and non-agricultural foreign workers, respec-
tively, all policies intended to solve the problem of “illegal immigration,” not only 
did not solve it, but also did not stop it from continuing to grow.3 
The 1990s economic boom attracted legal and unauthorized foreign workers 
to the U.S. labor market, mainly from Mexico and Central America, people who 
were looking for what their parents and ancestors have looked for and done in the 
past: the “American Dream,” meaning better job opportunities, due to the great gap 
1  Undocumented, unauthorized, or illegal aliens are those foreigners who are unlawfully present in U.S. 
territory. Most of them entered without inspection or have overstayed their non-immigrant visas. All 
aliens who have not been inspected or admitted to the United States are inadmissible; therefore, they 
are removable aliens.
2  It established a legalization program for around 1.6 million individuals who had been living in the 
United States for more than five years, granting them temporary and then permanent legal status. An 
additional 1.1 million aliens who had worked in agriculture were given legal status as special agricul-
tural workers (Verea 2003).
3  Illegal inflows fell in the years immediately after irCa before beginning to rise again in 1990. Appre-
hensions along the U.S.-Mexico border fell from 1.6 million in 1986 to about 853 000 in 1989. One 
plausible explanation is that more family members crossed illegally to join legalization beneficiaries in 
the United States, and this increased flow replaced the cyclical migration.
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in salaries between U.S. and other migrant sending countries. The Clinton admin-
istration (1993-2001) implemented a migration policy based on stepped-up border 
enforcement targeting the reduction of the flow of unauthorized immigration, due 
to its important growth. It is true that President Clinton pushed for amnesty for 
thousands of immigrants left in legal limbo by a technical screw-up involving irCa 
and offered a path to citizenship for hundreds of thousands of Central Americans, 
but Republicans blocked that effort. Since that time, some attempts have also 
been made to establish harsher measures, such as barring undocumented immi-
grants from public schools and limiting legal immigrants’ access to health and wel-
fare services, as with Proposition 187 in California in 1994, which Republicans 
embraced after their Latino support dropped markedly in the 1996 election 
(Weiner 2013).
The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (iirira) 
was very tough on unauthorized immigrants. It required people living without 
authorization in the United States to return home and wait for from three to ten 
years before they were eligible to adjust their status and reenter the United States. 
iirira also increased funding for border and interior enforcement; launched an 
employment verification program that was the precursor to E-Verify;4 and made 
unauthorized immigrants ineligible for federal grants and loans for post-secondary 
education, among other measures (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). But one of the 
toughest implications has been that the law requires the government to lock up 
immigrants, including legal permanent residents and asylum seekers, without the 
right to due process. Therefore, since iirira passed, there has been a dramatic 
increase in number of people subject to mandatory detention, rising from 70 000 
detained annually during the 1990s to about 400 000 today. The U.S. now maintains 
a sprawling network of detention facilities, comprised of more than 250 federal, 
state, and private prisons and county jails, at an annual cost of US$1.7 billion to 
taxpayers. The expansion of the detention system has been accompanied by 
increasing levels of abuse, ranging from substandard living conditions to over 120 
immigrant deaths since 2003 (Le 2011).
The 2001 terrorist attacks presented an opportunity to the Bush administra-
tion (2001-2009) to redefine national security priorities, which became inter-
twined with the establishment of a more restrictive immigration policy and much 
harsher measures than had been in place before. We saw the birth of a new gener-
ation of innovative systems like sophisticated databases to detect immigrants’ origin 
and location, which has helped to reshape immigration enforcement at the federal, 
state, and local levels. In order to be more effective in enforcing this immigration 
policy, the Bush administration established programs to share much more infor-
4  The E-verify system is an electronic government database that checks whether new hires are eligible to 
work in the U.S.
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mation collection; expanded their immigrant detention policies, much more than 
what was already in place; and fostered growing state and local involvement in 
immigration enforcement and policymaking (Verea 2008). So, during the last decade, 
immigration policy proposals outside the ambit of national security became down-
graded amid the intense focus on border security. 
Since the terrorist attacks, border management has aimed both to gain operation-
al control over the southern border and to control the flow of people by using highly 
sophisticated screening mechanisms before their arrival to U.S. territory. This signif-
icant securitization process has indeed led to fewer border crossers going through 
traditional ports of entry, and more of them using much more dangerous crossing 
points. This has increased the number of border deaths, fostered an important pro-
liferation of migrant traffickers, who charge much more than before, and, unfortu-
nately, brought to an end the traditional circular Mexico-U.S. migration process.
During the second half of the last decade, in the debate about what to do and 
how to manage illegal immigration, different sectors of society expressed their 
opinions and explored different policy options. One example was the Com pre-
hensive Immigration Reform (Cir) bill, introduced by Senators Edward Kennedy 
(D-Mass.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) in 2005. It included a regularization pro-
gram creating paths to citizenship, establishing guest worker programs, increasing 
the number of visas to meet labor market demands, and, of course, reinforcing the 
border and establishing highly technical mechanisms to apprehend and deport 
migrants, the more the better. While the 2006 bill proposed to legalize the status of 
those who had lived in the United States for at least several years and could demon-
strate a strong employment history, a 2007 bill called for legalization of the status 
of those living in the United States at the time of the bill’s passage only after certain 
enforcement “triggers” were satisfied. Unlike irCa, the 2006 and 2007 bills included 
major changes to the legal immigration system to manage future permanent and 
temporary employment-based immigration to the United States (Chishti, Bergeron, 
and Hipsman 2013). It is true that President Bush pushed for immigration reform, 
trying to convince Republicans of its importance, but his efforts were not enough. 
Congress debated about the prospect of a reform, but conservatives constantly 
warned of the dangers posed by illegal immigration, pushing for an enforcement-
only approach (Mittelstadt 2011). Restrictionists started to swing even more to 
the right and against any possible immigration reform. Along with several pro-labor 
Democrats, Republicans opposed the legislation, which failed in Congress twice, 
in 2006 and 2007.5
The main reasons for its failure were immersed in the heightened national 
perception of the government’s inability to detect unauthorized immigrants under 
the new dimension of national security. The two internal factors that influenced 
5 The 2006 bill died in the House after being passed in the Senate. The 2007 bill died in the Senate.
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the failure were the lack of an adequate communications infrastructure and an 
insufficient networking strategy. Also, the inability of business and labor to agree 
on a plan for temporary guest workers was another important factor. But perhaps 
the most important element was the ever-expanding and more powerful immigra-
tion backlash movement that drowns out the voice of the pro-immigration groups. 
The anti-immigrant forces mobilized their advocates and the pro-reformers did not 
(Center for International Policy 2009). 
The Obama Administration and 
Congress’s “Gang of Eight” Approach 
To Undocumented Immigration Management
After several years of a frozen immigration reform debate, in his 2008 campaign, 
President Obama promised a comprehensive immigration reform (Cir), perhaps to 
win the Latino vote. During his first year as president, he called immigration 
reform a priority, but acknowledged that there was too much on his plate to get it 
done soon (Weiner 2013). By early 2010, Obama faced pressure from immigration 
advocates to move forward. He pushed for a comprehensive reform, and Senators 
Chuck Schumer (D/N.Y.) and Lindsey Graham (R/S.C.) collaborated in this sense. 
But after a harsh fight over health care and in the face of a tough midterm elec-
tion, unsurprisingly, the push went nowhere. President Obama acknowledged that 
“there may not be an appetite for immigration reform in 2010” (Weiner 2013).
Since the White-House-supported Dream Act has not been approved by Con-
gress,6 at the end of his first term, President Obama implemented the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (daCa) program,7 designed to grant a two-year reprieve from 
deportation to some qualified unauthorized immigrants, which was highly criti-
cized by Republicans. The debate on immigration emerged again during the last 
months of his re-election campaign. President Obama’s executive action definitely 
played an important role in persuading Latinos to vote for him, while Republican 
6  Dreamers are unauthorized youth who seek legal status and a path to U.S. citizenship, which the 
dream Act would provide (Migration News 2013). 
7  The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program ordered by President Obama allows unauthorized 
foreigners (15 to 31 years of age), who arrived in the U.S. before age 16, and have been in the U.S. at 
least five years, to pay US$465 for a two-year work permit. Those eligible for daCa must be in school, 
have graduated from high school, or been honorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces. Over 368 
000 applications were filed between mid-August and mid-December 2012. During the same period, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services reported that over 103 000 unauthorized youth had been 
granted protection from removal. Mexicans filed almost 70 percent of the daCa applications. About 27 
percent of daCa applications were filed in California, followed by 15 percent in Texas and 6 percent in New 
York. Analysts estimate that fewer than 10 percent of daCa applicants have college degrees. Fewer than 
half of the unauthorized youth who might otherwise qualify for daCa did not graduate from high school. 
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candidate Mitt Romney persisted in his re-enforcement policy (Bergeron and 
Hipsman 2012). It is important to mention that Mitt Romney was pushed by 
Republican Party activists to be tough on illegal immigration to win the nomina-
tion. His promise to encourage unauthorized foreigners to “self-deport” won him 
Republican supporters against primary opponents that included Texas Governor 
Rick Perry and Senator Rick Santorum (R-Pa.). After he won the Republican nom-
ination, Romney was unable to move toward the center of the political spectrum on 
immigration for the general election, thus alienating Latino voters. Simultaneously, 
the Republican Party platform criticized the Obama administration not because 
daCa was implemented via executive action rather than through legislative channels, 
but for creating a backdoor amnesty program unrecognized in law. The criticisms 
were about the president not having the authority to ignore a constitutional com-
prehensive federal law, and that he put the federal government in the position of 
helping individuals violate federal law and avoid the sanctions that Congress had 
established (Spakovsky 2011).
Other important measures implemented by the Obama administration were 
the use of 287(g),8 the expansion of Secure Communities,9and, in terms of work-
site enforcement, supposedly efforts targeting employers who hire unauthorized 
immigrants. But what the White House has really done is to deport unauthorized 
immigrants from their work places, prioritizing the deportation of “criminal ille-
gals.” In fact, during his first term, Obama deported more undocumented aliens 
than President George W. Bush did in both his terms,10 setting a record of 429 247 
in 2011 —it has been estimated that approximately 410 000 foreigners were 
deported in 2012—, giving Obama the record for the highest number of removals 
of any president (Preston 2013). During Bush’s first term (2001-2004), 572 000 
migrants were deported, and 1 048 000 during his second term (2005-2008).11 
Probably, some of those deported may attempt to return when the U.S. economy 
improves, because they left family members behind in different states.
Traditionally, electoral concerns push lawmakers to support or reject an immi-
8  The use of 287(g) enables states and localities to enter into agreements with the federal government 
through which state and local law enforcement officers are authorized to enforce certain aspects of im-
migration law. The Obama administration has scaled back in recent years.
9  Under the Secure Communities program, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (iCe) agents detain 
and deport unauthorized immigrants who have committed only minor offenses and who previously 
would never have come to the attention of immigration authorities. It is a separate immigration enforce-
ment program that allows the federal government to electronically and remotely screen the immigra-
tion status of individuals in state and local prisons who have been arrested for criminal offenses (Or-
renius and Zavodny 2012). 
10  Obama has deported 1.4 million illegal immigrants since the beginning of his administration: that is 
1.5 times more immigrants than Bush deported in both his terms, according to official figures from the 
Department of Homeland Security (South Atlantic News Agency 2011; The Washington Post 2012).
11  Therefore, during his first term, (2009-2012), Obama deported as many as Bush did in eight years, 
approximately 1 540 000 immigrants (iCe 2012; The Washington Post 2012). 
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gration reform. The influence of business and labor interests are crucial for the 
immigration debate. The 2012 elections showed Republicans that they can no 
longer rely almost entirely on non-Latino voters to win. They also showed that 
President Obama experienced no backlash over daCa, even though it was highly 
criticized. After he won the elections, Obama called immigration reform his major 
“long-term” priority for his second term. During the first months of 2013, the 
immigration reform issue moved into the national debate and in his first State of 
the Union, he urged Congress to enact immigration reform. 
Meanwhile, in Congress a bipartisan group of eight senators, “The Gang of 
Eight,” four Democrats and four Republicans,12 unveiled separate proposals for an 
overhaul of the nation’s immigration laws, including a legalization program for 
unauthorized immigrants; the continuation of immigration enforcement; and a 
broad reform of the legal immigration system. It seems that the “The Gang of Eight” 
are working on a legalization process for the nearly 11 million undocumented 
aliens living in the U.S. in 2013, proposing a 10-year wait to get a Green Card and 
3 more years to apply for citizenship (Associated Press 2013). They are also pro-
posing that unauthorized immigrants would have to register with the federal gov-
ernment, pay a fine and taxes owed, and pass a background check to receive pro-
bationary legal status enabling them to live and work legally in the United States. 
Individuals with probationary status who pay additional fines, learn English and 
civics, and demonstrate a history of past work and current employment would ulti-
mately be eligible to apply for lawful permanent residence (lpr). 
Some other proposals include having the registration process take place while 
border security continues to be ramped up. Border security would include an 
increased number of border patrol agents, the deployment of surveillance equip-
ment, and an end to an entry-exit system that tracks visitors. Reducing visa backlogs 
is another proposal, especially for family- and employer-sponsored immigrants, 
and awarding additional visas for those with post-graduate studies in science, engi-
neering, and math at a U.S. university, while reducing those for family reunification. 
It is interesting that they are considering the possibility of adapting the allocation 
of visas to labor needs, specifically in agriculture, and a kind of a “guest worker pro-
gram” for low-skilled workers in case of labor shortages. It will be important to define 
when and how the country enters into a labor shortage, to import foreign labor.
Simultaneously, President Obama announced a similar proposal: increased 
border security, a pathway to citizenship for many of the nation’s unauthorized 
immigrants, mandatory employment verification, and reforms to the current immi-
12  The four Republican senators are Marco Rubio from Florida, John McCain and Jeff Flake from Ari-
zona, and Lindsey Graham from South Carolina. The four Democratic senators are Dick Durbin from 
Illinois, Robert Menendez from New Jersey, Chuck Summer from New York, and Michael Bennet 
from Colorado.
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gration system. The White House proposal would require eligible provisional-legal-
status immigrants to wait until current legal immigration backlogs have been 
cleared before they could apply for lpr status. Also the Obama program would 
create new criminal penalties aimed at transnational criminal organizations and 
employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers, and would create a new visa 
category for employees of federal science and technology laboratories. Finally, the 
president’s plan would offer an “expedited opportunity to earn their citizenship” for 
unauthorized migrants who were brought to the United States as children and who 
attended college or served honorably in the armed forces for two years (Chishti, 
Bergeron, and Hipsman 2013).
I believe that it is very important that the immigration debate is back again 
after six years of silence, whether what is being considered is a comprehensive or a 
piece-meal reform. This may be a more practical way of resolving the issue on a fast 
track. In order to achieve all these goals, it is important to mention that several obsta-
cles are in the way; the most critical is legalization of status with a path to citizenship. 
It is believed that the major obstacle to an immigration reform in the Republican-
controlled House is a legalization program for the estimated 11 million unauthorized 
foreigners that would include a path to U.S. citizenship. Even though the Republican 
Party is aware of its need for Latino support in the next elections, their platform 
opposes any form of amnesty for people who intentionally violate immigration law, 
and they believe amnesty to be a reward that encourages more law-breaking.
The Growth of Anti-immigrant Sentiments 
And Actions in the U.S. during the Last Decade
a)  Increased Unauthorized Immigrant Flows and Reinforcement of the Border during 
the Last Decade
The United States absorbs 20 percent of the world’s migrant population: about 
one million immigrants and permanent residents were admitted in 2010, 140 000 of 
them Mexican; and 620 000 immigrants were granted citizenship, 67 000 of them 
Mexicans. Even though they are insufficient to cover labor market demand, the sys-
tem allows hiring more foreign temporary workers than any other country in the world.
Immigration and fertility are the factors that have increased the number of 
Latinos in the United States. The 2010 census counted 50.5 million Hispanics,13 
who represented 16 percent of the total U.S. population (308 million), and account-
ed for most of the nation’s growth (43 percent, or 35.3 million in 2000) over the last 
13 The 2010 census registered 40.2 million foreign-born, of whom 14.9 million (37 percent) were natu-
ralized citizens; 31.7 million were legal permanent residents (lpr); 1.5 million, temporary legal residents 
(tlr); and 11.2 million, undocumented aliens.
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decade. The number of people of Mexican origin living in the U.S. rose to 31.8 mil-
lion, representing two-thirds of the Hispanic population and 12.5 percent of the 
U.S. population.14 Mexicans are the largest group of legal permanent residents, 
accounting for 3.9 million out of 12 million (González Barrera et al. 2013). Of all 
those of Mexican descent, 11.7 million are foreign-born (37 percent) (Pew Hispanic 
Center 2011), which represented 55 percent of Latin Americans and 4 percent of 
the U.S. population of 311.6 million in 2011.
The United States accounts for the highest number of unauthorized immi-
grants in the world: nearly 11 million undocumented people lived there in 2013.15 
Of the around 12 million Mexicans who reside in the U.S., by far the largest group 
of immigrants in the country, 6.1 million (55 percent) are unauthorized. In 2011, 
143 000 Mexicans were granted lpr out of 694 193 (14 percent), and 94 000 of 
approximately one million became U.S. citizens. Clearly, these data suggest that 
increasing ethno-racial diversity could be perceived by restrictionists as a threat to 
society, and thus the imperative need to significantly diminish these flows.
Taking into account this important number of unauthorized immigrants living 
in different states and faced with high unemployment since 2008 due to the most 
severe economic downturn since the Great Depression, the government has been 
establishing a much more restrictive immigration policy. While the immigration-
related security measures implemented are intended to minimize risk and faci-
litate lawful travel, these measures have been key in criminalizing undocumented 
aliens and thus significantly enhancing exclusion, clear discrimination, exploita-
tion, and repression, angrily denied or ignored by anti-immigrant activists. 
Unfortunately, undocumented migrants have tolerated this increased discrimina-
tion because they fear returning to their homes, where they believe would face a 
worse situation. An economic crisis affects undocumented migrants far more than 
legal residents because they are more likely to be fired from their jobs. They 
respond more quickly to fluctuations in the economy, because they tend to meet 
employers’ demand not satisfied by legal workers (Papademetriou and Terrazas 
2009, 18-20).
Restriccionists believe the southern border is still very porous and that it is 
essential to keep building an impenetrable fence there, no matter how expensive 
or effective it would be, since most of them consider government has not been 
tough enough to stop undocumented flows despite the high federal expenditures 
on its enforcement-only policy. To give an idea of how the budget increases year by 
year, between fiscal years 2005 and 2011, the budget of Customs and Border 
14  Of all those of Mexican descent, 20 percent are U.S. citizens, and 63 percent arrived to the U.S. in 
1990 or later (Pew Hispanic Center 2011).
15  The undocumented population has been traditionally calculated by subtracting the number of legal 
residents from the total number of foreign-born people living in the U.S.
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Protection (Cbp), which is responsible for border management, more than dou-
bled, rising from about US$1.5 billion to roughly US$3.6 billion (Department of 
Homeland Security 2011). During this same six-year period, the number of border 
patrol agents nearly doubled from 11 156 to 21 500 with the support of an important 
number of National Guard troops.16 The border patrol made nearly 364 768 appre-
hensions nationwide in fiscal year 2012, down 50 percent since FY 2008 and 78 
percent from the FY 2000, a boom year.17
It could be said that the main reasons for this sharp decline have been the 
remarkable heightened border reinforcement that has not only raised the cost of 
migration but also sharpened the growing dangers associated with illegal border 
crossings, a rise in deportations, the anti-immigrant environment in some states, 
and, as said long ago, the decline in birth rates and better economic conditions in 
Mexico. The net migration flow from Mexico to the U.S. has stopped and may 
have reversed. In 2000, there were 4.6 million undocumented migrants, a number 
that peaked at 7 million in 2007, and has dropped since then to 6.5 million in 2010 
(Passel 2011).18 During the five-year period from 2005 to 2010, a total of 1.4 million 
Mexicans immigrated to the United States. Meantime, the number of Mexicans and 
their children who moved from the U.S. to Mexico during the same period rose to 
1.4 million. The trend within this latest period suggests that return flow to Mexico 
probably exceeded the inflow from Mexico during the past year or two. According 
to the Pew Hispanic Center, the standstill appears to be the result of many factors, 
including the weakened U.S. job and housing construction markets, heightened 
border enforcement, a rise in deportations, the growing dangers associated with 
illegal border crossings, the long-term decline in Mexico’s birth rates, and better 
economic conditions in Mexico (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). I will 
add that at the peak of the economic crisis, the establishment of more restrictive 
measures like E-Verify for employers, making it harder to hire unauthorized immi-
grants, combined with immigrants’ fear of losing their jobs and the fact that they 
have children born in the U.S. and families with deeper and deeper roots, proba-
bly had the effect of prompting emigration to other states with less anti-immigrant 
attitudes and fewer local laws limiting illegal immigrants’ rights, or staying where 
they were because it is costly and risky to re-enter the U.S. later. The increase/
decrease in flows has traditionally been tied to push-pull factors that also respond 
16 In 1992, only 5 000 border patrol officers were watching the border at different points.
17  In fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Cbp) prevented nearly 145 000 inadmis-
sible individuals from entering U.S. territory, down from 215 600 in FY 2011 (Department of Home-
land Security 2012). 
18  Even if it does not, it has already secured a place in the record books. The U.S. today has more im-
migrants from Mexico alone (12.0 million) than any other country has from all countries of the world. The 
next largest sending country, China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), accounts for just 5 percent of 
the nation’s current stock of about 40 million immigrants (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). 
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to economic cycles. So, it is possible that the Mexican immigration wave will 
resume as the U.S. economy recovers.
b)  Reactions about the Growth of Unauthorized Immigrant Flows and Presence
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, migratory flows increased 
significantly in several states. This generated an upsurge in the diversity of ethnic 
groups in certain places. Because of the rapid growth of the number of migrants, 
extremely aggressive movements opposing their entry for different reasons, mainly 
because they are foreigners, emerged. The growth of ethnic diversity has become more 
evident and visible and in some cases has been perceived as a threat to society, 
mainly for economic reasons, but also because most of them are non-white foreign-
ers. Some sectors repeatedly emphasize an important anti-immigrant rhetoric and 
evoke precisely the importance of maintaining a collective social identity.
The growing presence of “non-white” Latinos, especially Mexicans, is more visi-
ble in some southern states, where rejection is even higher. These states have experi-
enced rapid population growth of immigrants, mainly Mexicans, “the brown wave,” 
who have influenced cultural changes, causing friction among residents. People have 
asked themselves how to deal with the entry of old and new unauthorized flows of 
migrants such as those who cross the southern border. These attitudes have sparked 
the proliferation of extremist restrictionist, principally ultra-conservative members of 
caucuses in the Republican Party, whose weight has been magnified by the media.
In general, the restrictionists believe that their societies already have enough 
migrants and that they need to limit immigration anywhere from modestly to sig-
nificantly.19 This trend is opposite to the position of the expansionists, who agree 
with a flexible, open-door policy and that migratory flows must be limited through 
moderate, periodic increases.20 Both stances have influenced public opinion, con-
gresses, and governments.
In terms of immigration reinforcement, restrictionists believe their southern 
border is still porous and that it is essential to keep building an impenetrable fence 
along the border with Mexico, no matter how expensive or effective it would be, 
since most of them consider federal government has not been “tough enough” to 
stop undocumented flows, despite the highly technical securitization process and 
the high expenditures they have made on their “enforcement-only policy.”
19  For more information about principled and pragmatic restrictionists and expansionists, see Verea 
(2012).
20  Principled expansionists believe this policy is favorable for both sending and receiving countries, and 
that government should not limit migration. In contrast, pragmatic expansionists think that this 
policy benefits them and is not bad for their societies. The main proponents of this kind of policy are 
generally businessmen in the destination country who need labor that is cheaper than local labor; 
ethnic groups or legal foreign residents who want to reunite with their relatives; and unions that want 
to strengthen their organizations, as well as civic organizations, among others (Schuck 1998a, 4).
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Definitely, restrictionists have influenced public opinion. Their principal argu-
ments are that immigrants, mainly undocumented, displace local workers; that 
they are willing to work for much lower, sub-standard wages; and that they absorb 
scarce resources from social welfare programs (education and health services) to the 
detriment of nationals and in a greater proportion than the taxes they pay. They are 
also concerned about linguistic unity, religious tolerance, and/or cultural coherence, 
and are troubled about the introduction of foreign customs and values (Verea 1999, 
98). Lately, they have been perceived as a threat to job security and domestic secu-
rity, invaders, violent people, and potential criminals (Bordeau 2010, 21), among other 
arguments. The fact is that unscrupulous employers still hire them for much lower 
wages than locals, without sanctions being applied to most of them, to the benefit of 
their businesses. The civil offense of “illegal” entry is far more often sanctioned by the 
administrative process of deportation than an employer’s criminal offense of hiring 
undocumented people (Gilbert and Kolnick 2012).
It is important to note that these attitudes mainly toward unauthorized immi-
gration vary immensely from state to state, and even in different counties or cities 
within a state. They reflect the diversity of opinion on this controversial issue, perceived 
as a problem and not as a very old bilateral phenomenon that includes push-pull 
factors, among others
Amplified by the media, which often raises awareness of cultural and ethnic 
diversity, neo-nativist and xenophobic groups with restrictionist principles have 
shown their anti-immigrant feelings as diversity increases.21 They are aimed especially 
toward “non-white migrants,” such as Latinos, “the brown wave,” according to the 
neo-nativist ideologist Samuel Huntington, with a racial profiling bias.
In general, conservative wasps tend to sometimes stereotype, categorize, and 
discriminate against “non-white” foreigners, and, unfortunately, no matter what their 
“migration status” is. The growing presence of “non-white” Latinos, “the brown 
wave” especially Mexicans, is more visible in some southern states, where rejection 
is even higher. The obsession with “illegal status” has fed anti-immigrant senti-
21  Nativism is a U.S. American school of thought that seeks to keep the believer’s nation predominantly 
white, of European origin and preferably Protestant (wasps), a clearly racist attitude. Nationalists are usu-
ally people who feel a special loyalty to their country and perceive their traditions and culture as more 
important than those of any other nation. Cultural differences are exacerbated by nationalists and often 
lead to a belief in the superiority of one culture over another (Solomos and Schuster 2000). Nativists think 
that national citizens should be granted more rights than foreigners, and thus they contribute to the forma-
tion of xenophobic thinking. They usually perceive immigrants as potentially problematic, socially and 
culturally different, and a threat to the nation (Delaet 2000, 24). Xenophobia, as its name implies, ex-
presses a phobia or fear of foreigners, the “otherness,” the “stranger,” in a given community. Often irratio-
nal, it can give rise to acute feelings of hatred. In general, xenophobia emerges when a group of people of 
foreign origin living in a city or community is increasingly visible, sparking rejection because the nationals 
wish to differentiate themselves from them. Over the years, there have been movements or anti-immigrant 
xenophobia as a rejection of the growing flow of migrants in a particular place (Verea 2012).
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ment to unimaginable levels, without really trying to relate labor market demand to 
the availability of visas through the current impractical immigration system, which 
precisely leads to hiring unauthorized foreigners.
These anti-immigrant, and in some border states and localities “anti-Mexican,” 
feelings have been expressed through brutal, violent attacks, especially on unau-
thorized immigrants, who are more visible and generally occupy low-skilled jobs that 
locals refuse to do. A significant change in the last decade has been the role of the 
mass media that have played an important role in creating an increasingly hostile 
rhetoric and even “hate speech” against immigrants all over the country. Several radio 
and television programs and Internet sources have broadcast a number of anti-immi-
grant messages, characterizing migrants as “criminals and invaders” and a threat to 
society. On the other hand, a very new phenomenon has developed: highly orga-
nized extremist, civilian, nativist “hate groups” have emerged to assist in the detection 
and deportation of undocumented migrants, mainly Mexicans, spreading the idea 
of the southern border as a war zone.22 They have had an important influence over 
public opinion and certainly helped to create an atmosphere that seems to justify 
stricter immigration policies. They are convinced that undocumented immigrants 
are an economic burden for their communities, a danger to the social order, would-be 
terrorists, and violent criminals, who have no problem stealing and attacking U.S. 
citizens, and are undeserving of social, political, and economic rights (Bordeau 
2010, 21).
Another trend-shaping force is the politically influential Tea Party movement.23 
Its intolerant ultra-conservative activists and council members, who have supported 
punitive initiatives, focus on the need for local immigration regulation in light of 
the federal government’s willful abdication of its responsibilities. Many of its expo-
nents are known for their virulent attacks, mostly on undocumented immigrants. 
They champion restrictive/punitive immigration policies including criminalization 
and deportation and have targeted influential politicians urging officials to protect 
their communities from undocumented immigration and its effects.
It is important to mention that rising anti-immigrant sentiments do not reflect 
the views of most U.S. Americans. Thousands of immigrant rights supporters and 
civic organization activists have fought against racist, nativist, and xenophobic atti-
tudes and try to ensure that the benefits that immigration has brought to their 
economy and culture be recognized.
22  The politically influential border “vigilante groups” like the Minutemen Project have been devoted to 
monitoring the U.S.-Mexico border and have helped socially construct undocumented immigrants as 
a threat to U.S. American identity, a view shared by several groups operating in states along the Mexi-
can border, mainly Arizona. These groups include the Poverty Law Center, Ranch Rescue, Border 
Guardians, and Mothers against Illegal Aliens, among others (Solop and Wonders 2012). 
23  A radical populist nationwide conservative movement, mainly among Republicans, who propose to en-
hance local political power.
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The Increasing Role of the States vs. Federal Government: 
The Cases of Arizona and Alabama
Different actors have emerged very actively in dealing with the immigration issue, 
due to the fact that in recent years, the government and Congress have failed to 
approve a comprehensive immigration reform so longed-for by immigrants and 
their families. This vacuum has been filled by restictionists at the local level. It has 
stimulated greater intervention by the states on the immigration issue, like in the 
case of Arizona and Alabama, which have become emblematic of the U.S. anti-
immigrant movement.
Conservative —but also liberal— legislators and assemblies have stepped up 
to meet constituents’ demands for strong action on immigration. The result has been 
a harsh debate or even the approval of many cruel state initiatives that have built mis-
trust and hatred among communities. Table 1 shows that the National Conference 
of State Legislatures (nCsl) acknowledged that from 2005 through 2012, state leg-
islatures across the U.S. introduced 8 292 bills, 1 905 of which were adopted as 
laws or resolutions (National Conference of State Legislatures 2012).
table 1
state immigrant-related legislation (2005-2012)
Year
Bills
Introduced
Bills Passed 
Legislatures Vetoed Enacted Resolutions
Total Laws and 
Resolutions
2005 300 45 6 39 0 39
2006 570 90 6 84 12 96
2007 1 562 252 12 240 50 290
2008 1 305 209 3 206 64 270
2009 1 500* 373 20 222 131 353
2010 1 400* 356 10 208 138 346
2011 1 607 318 15 197 109 306
2012** 948 206 3 111 92 203
2005-2012 8 292 1 852 75 1 307 598 1 905
  * Estimates.
 **As of June 30, 2012.
sourCe: National Conference of State Legislatures (2012). 
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Virtually every state legislature have been discussing for a decade —and in 
some cases, have passed— very aggressive control measures against the presence 
of undocumented migrants, leading to a significant increase in anti-immigration 
feelings and attitudes. Nationwide, there are more state laws seeking to restrict 
immigrant rights than to expand them. Even though positive initiatives exist for the 
education or integration of immigrants, the majority of recent state-level bills can 
be classified as punitive/restrictive. Although the punitive initiatives differ from 
one state to another, Arizona is one of the most “prolific” and Alabama one of the 
most aggressive states, perhaps because they have experienced rapid population 
growth of immigrants, mainly Mexicans, which has influenced cultural changes, 
causing friction and tensions among residents, reflected in growing anti-immigrant 
feelings.
Arizona is the country’s sixth-largest state, sharing the longest border with 
Mexico (322 miles), with a population of 6.5 million, 14.7 percent foreign-born, an 
increase of 24.5 percent during the last decade, according to the 2010 census. The 
Latino population has grown from 16.2 percent of the state’s total inhabitants in 
1980 to 30 percent in 2010 (1.92 million, 90 percent of Mexican origin). The size of 
Arizona’s undocumented immigrant population has dropped significantly in recent 
years and is now near its lowest level in a decade. A report released by the Department 
of Homeland Security, based on 2010 census data, estimated there were 360 000 
undocumented immigrants in Arizona as of January 2011. That is down 110 000 
from a year earlier (González 2012).24 It also is down 200 000 from the peak in 
2008, when an estimated 560 000 illegal immigrants lived in Arizona. The factors 
behind this exodus have been the lack of jobs during the recession, tighter border 
enforcement, tough immigration laws, and anti-immigrant attitudes and actions. 
This data suggest that the main corridor for undocumented aliens along the U.S.-
Mexican border may not be through Arizona. In fact, Border Patrol apprehensions, 
an indicator of the number of illegal immigrants crossing the border, are also down 
in Arizona, falling 41 percent last year compared to 2011. This border state used to 
be the most active crossing point for unauthorized aliens along U.S.-Mexico bor-
der, but now Texas is taking its place (see Table 2).
In response, Arizona’s restrictionists took action during the last decade, and 
approved restrictions on access to social services by residents without legal status; 
imposed stricter identification requirements to prevent non-citizen voting in 2004; 
changed the state Constitution after a successful 2006 citizen’s initiative to make 
English the state’s official language; and also adopted an anti-smuggling law crimi-
nalizing undocumented migrants with the same sentences as the smugglers, 
24  Arizona now ranks ninth out of the 10 states with the largest undocumented populations. California, 
with an estimated 2.8 million undocumented immigrants, has the largest number, followed by Texas, 
with 1.8 million, and Florida, with 740 000. Illinois ranks fifth with 550 000 (Gonzalez 2012).
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among many other punitive initiatives. But, in 2010, Arizona passed the more 
sweeping and politically polarizing, highly anti-immigrant law, the well-known 
sb1070, establishing a key precedent. The law requires enforcement personnel to 
check the immigration status of people whom they suspect to be in the country 
illegally. It has been declared unconstitutional and suspended by federal courts 
because of its potential for encouraging racial profiling and the fact that it pre-
empts federal law.25 Since the law was passed, it has been weakened bit by bit. 
Federal courts suspended four of the law’s most contentious provisions. In late 
June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a landmark decision, rejecting much 
of Arizona’s immigration law, but allowing one key provision to stand: the Court 
ruled that federal law did not preempt the state’s instruction to its police to check 
the immigration status of people they detain. This sets an important precedent.
table 2
appreHensions in tHe soutHern border states (2012)
Enforcement Actions Arizona Texas New Mexico California
Apprehensions 124 631 172 335 5 661 54 246
Drug Seizures 1.1M pounds 1.7M pounds 43.4K pounds 285.6K pounds
Currency Seizures US$5.6M US$12.5M US$715K US$15.9M
Inadmissible 6 011 27 392 489 28 167
sourCe: Department of Homeland Security (2012).
The Court found that several other important provisions of the law conflicted 
with federal laws. Among them are the provisions that made it a state crime for immi-
grants not to register with the federal government or to seek or hold jobs without 
proper documents, and that made possible warrantless arrests of some people sus-
pected of being deportable. The decision was a partial victory for the Obama 
administration, which had sued to block several provisions in the law. The ruling was, 
correspondingly, a partial rebuke for state officials who had argued that they were 
entitled to supplement federal efforts to address illegal immigration.
Recently, a coalition of Democratic state senators and representatives has intro-
duced a bill in each house of the Arizona legislature to repeal Senate Bill 1070. 
25  This initiative also penalizes those who provide transportation and shelter to illegal immigrants and 
requires businesses with more than five employees to use the immigration check program “E-verify,” 
the use of which has quadrupled in the last two years (McKenzie 2011).
 THE RISE OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS IN THE U.S. 155
Sen. Steve Gallardo (D-Phoenix) and Rep. Sally Ann Gonzales (D-Tucson) have stat-
ed that sb1070 essentially legitimized racial profiling against people of color. Both 
are aware that the law has also hurt tourism in the state.
Unfortunately, after sb1070 passed in 2010, several copycat bills were intro-
duced in state legislatures across the country; five passed, in Alabama, Georgia, 
Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah. The aClu and a coalition of civil rights organi-
zations have filed lawsuits against those statutes in all six states.
The case of Alabama is also very illustrative. Driven by a robust economy dur-
ing the first seven years of the last decade and the possibility of finding jobs and 
economic prospects that were becoming scarcer in the more crowded, expensive 
western states, some southern states experienced very sharp increases in Latino 
settlement. This was the case of Alabama, with a population of 4.8 million, which 
had the second highest Latino growth rate in the nation (145 percent from 2000 
to 2010) during the last decade. The changing demographic face of the South, 
affected by this rapid growth in some states and especially in Alabama, has trig-
gered a sudden culture clash and a sharp increase in racial frictions. Even though 
the undocumented population is estimated at only 4 percent of the state (approxi-
mately 160 000), tensions have risen significantly.
Like Arizona, Alabama’s law calls for police to detain suspects on a reasonable 
suspicion that they are in the country illegally. But Alabama went further, making 
it a crime for undocumented migrants to conduct any business, whether private or 
with government agencies. It also required schools to collect information on the 
immigration status of enrolling students and their parents. Alabama’s controversial 
immigration law, known as Hb56, passed in 2011 and was amended slightly by a 
second bill, known as Hb658, last year. As originally passed, the law criminalized 
many aspects of an undocumented immigrant’s life and gave broad powers to state 
law enforcement to detain anyone in the country unlawfully.26
The Alabama Hb658 Act, which went into effect in September 2011, is the 
toughest in the country. It requires law enforcement to detain any “suspected 
immigrant” to be questioned by a police officer for being in the country illegally 
unless the person can provide identification showing that they are in the country 
legally. It also prohibits illegal immigrants from using public resources, hence bar-
ring them from obtaining any assistance for education. This has affected not only 
authorized children and youngsters, but also those who have U.S. citizenship from 
smoothly accessing public education. In many cases, their parents are unauthorized, 
26  Section 5 of Hb658 requires the state to compile and post on a public Web site the names and other 
information clearly identifying certain immigrants when they are detained on any state charge, no 
matter how minor, and appear in state court. The plaintiffs in this case and even those charged with 
minor traffic violations would fall within this requirement and be unconstitutionally added to the 
“black list” (American Civil Liberties Union 2013).
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and it is safer for them to prevent their children from accessing public education for 
fear of being deported. sb56 also bars businesses from taking tax deductions on wages 
paid to unauthorized immigrants; makes it a crime to knowingly rent housing to an 
illegal immigrant; prohibits unauthorized immigrants from enrolling in a public 
college after high school; and obliges schools to publish the immigration status of all 
students. It also mandates that employers use the federal E-verify system and pro-
hibits business owners from “knowingly” employing illegal immigrants, setting tough 
penalties for those who do. All this makes for a highly hostile environment.
Even though some provisions of the law are being upheld in court, it has had 
severe consequences for the economy. A recent cost-benefit analysis has stated that 
the law has cost the state economy up to a huge US$10.8 billion annually.27 A federal 
court in Atlanta said it would wait until the United States Supreme Court decided 
the constitutionality of Arizona’s strict immigration law before ruling on similar laws 
in Georgia and Alabama. Meanwhile several growers, business leaders, and even 
some politicians who originally supported the law have called for its redefinition 
and retooling, pointing to labor shortages particularly in agriculture, which depends 
on migrant workers, who have emigrated to other states to avoid this rigid situation 
that affects their minimum human rights. 
States where this type of legislation is popular include those located in politi-
cally conservative regions of the country, such as the South, and where immigrant 
settlement is still considered a recent phenomenon. These state initiatives and local 
ordinances proposed by restrictionist and neo-nativist groups have had an impor-
tant influence on public opinion and certainly helped to create an atmosphere that 
seems to justify stricter immigration policies.
It is important to mention that the system permits states and localities to have 
a meaningful political voice, even in a sphere traditionally reserved for the federal 
government. But the states and local authorities have gone beyond that, and this 
new enhanced role that they are now playing also suggests that constituents may 
be expecting their state authorities to introduce more bills modeled on Arizona’s 
and Alabama’s emblematic sb1070 and sb56. The urgent need for federal immigra-
tion reform is evident.
27  The study determined that the estimated 40 000 to 80 000 unauthorized immigrant workers fleeing 
the state has resulted in 70 000 to 140 000 jobs lost and a US$2.3-to-US$10.8-billion reduction in 
Alabama’s gdp annually. Also, the law is estimated to cost Alabama US$56.7 million to US$264.5 
million in reduced state income and sale tax collections, as well as US$20 million to US$93.1 million 
in local sales tax collections (Addy 2012; Dwoskin 2012).
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Final Remarks
The topic is inevitably divisive and sometimes causes a heated debate, which has 
increasingly included “hate-speak” in different states, especially Arizona and Alabama. 
The bills and ordinances approved have been instrumental in spreading the dis-
ruptive immigration debate to local communities and reaching out to conservative and 
nativist sentiments. Even though the power to set immigration policy is a federal 
responsibility and comes under federal jurisdiction, local lawmakers have been 
able to create their own legislation, developing policy measures to solve “the prob-
lem,” not recognizing that it is a very old, bilateral “labor market phenomenon.”
Meanwhile, conservatives are pushing for reinforcing the border and not cre-
ating paths for legalization of the status of millions of irregular immigrants and do 
not seem aware of the fact that many of them have been working for ages in many 
states, contributing to their economic development. It has rarely been recognized 
that it is precisely this illegality that creates unauthorized, cheap labor, which in 
turn brings enormous benefits to society and the economy through migrants’ hard 
work, investments, taxes, and spending.
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